Thank you very much.
It's a real privilege to be here. I welcome this opportunity to share some of my opinions that go back to the days of being a parliamentary intern in '72, which I should hasten to add was 1972, not 1872. So it's good to be here.
I've given the committee a short submission consisting of two parts: a diagnosis and a prescription. I've given your crack committee staff a longer, more academic paper on the Australian supply and estimates process, because I know that you've been listening to witnesses from other jurisdictions.
I intend to be very brief in these opening remarks and leave the maximum amount of time for questions and discussion with the committee members. I look forward to that very much.
I begin my submission with the observation that there has never been a golden era when Parliament was effective in examining the spending proposals of government in any systematic, comprehensive, and in-depth manner. The fact is that Canada's Parliament is not exceptional in that regard. Legislatures around the world find it difficult to cope with the complexities of modern public finance and using the estimates process to hold the political executive and the permanent bureaucracy accountable for spending to ensure they spend in ways that add value to Canadian society.
The exception to that general problem of legislatures coping with public finance matters is the U.S. Congress. In my submission I say to be careful what you wish for, because Congress has its own problems in ensuring that public finances are well managed.
The deficiencies in Canada's estimates process are caused by a number of factors. I'll briefly list them in a general way, and if you wish, I can go back and offer more detailed comments on each broad set of factors.
The first set is constitutional and legal factors, and this is familiar to committee members. All spending must originate with the crown making spending proposals based on the recommendations of responsible ministers. The passage of the estimates is seen to be a confidence convention. There are a number of other sort of conventions and rules that are constitutional and legal in nature.
The second source of limits for the parliamentary estimates process is procedural limits. For example, committees cannot change votes except to eliminate or reduce them. They can't add to spending. There were rules in the past, which I think no longer apply, that committees shouldn't make substantive recommendations, and should limit themselves to comments and actions or proposals related to the estimates themselves so there are procedural limits.
There is the factor of time. There is a short time period between the tabling of the estimates and May 30, when they have to be reported back to the House, so the committees have to rush through the estimates if they propose to examine them in any way. Most of the estimates are deemed to be reported upon when the deadline arrives.
A fourth factor is informational and formatting issues around the presentation of financial information. You can't really say that you lack for information, because a mountain of information is tabled in Parliament annually. There is a virtual alphabet soup of documents presented to you, whether we're talking about reports on plans and priorities, departmental performance reports, MAF reports, audit reports—the list goes on and on. You have not only multiple documents, but also multiple departments and agencies.
There are informational and format questions that give rise to problems, because most of these documents, frankly, go unread. Somebody needs to do a cost-effectiveness analysis on producing all of this information, at least for purposes of external accountability. One of the problems is that many of those documents are produced by bureaucrats for fellow bureaucrats inside the government.
I think the biggest source of problems is my fifth one, and that's the political, cultural, and attitudinal problems or factors. A fundamental fact of Parliament is that it's dominated by competitive, disciplined political parties, and reforms that ignore or seek to stifle partisanship are bound to have limited success in my view.
I say in my document that fixing the supply process is not mainly about finding the right rules for how estimates will be voted, the optimal number of committees, the appropriate staffing for such committees, and the best formats for presenting evidence to such committees. These things matter, but only at the margin. What is more important is a bargain that recognizes the divergent interests of the competitive parties represented in Parliament.
It seems to me that one of the things we have to look at more seriously is how to create the right set of incentives and disincentives to motivate more MPs to take their financial duties seriously. I talk about the way in which government and opposition MPs, the leadership of parties, and backbenchers in parties have different incentives to take this process seriously.
Most MPs see the work on estimates as an exercise in futility. They feel they can't change anything. Even in minority parliaments when your committee for example, the operations and estimates committee, has changed estimates, either for the Governor General or the Privy Council Office, it's usually been a symbolic victory and not one that is attempted very often. MPs also, it should be noted, tend to favour restraint in the abstract, and when it comes to their own constituencies, they are usually advocates for additional spending.
That's a summary of the diagnosis I offer.
The prescription is that I think you might be better off looking at a relatively large joint committee, a standing joint committee of the House of Commons and the Senate, and give it a title of something like “Government Finances and Public Administration” so that it's broader than the estimates in many ways. The committee could be perhaps 40 members. It might have a balance between a larger number of MPs and a smaller number of senators, recognizing that the House of Commons, at this stage at least, is the body that holds government responsible, in the sense that it can defeat governments if it so feels.
The mandate of this committee should be to examine government spending on a cyclical basis, perhaps over a five-year span, and in each year take a number of major departments and agencies and examine not only their spending but also performance reports and administrative issues that have surfaced from bodies like the Office of the Auditor General and so on. Rather than focus on the details of estimates, the committee would focus on the evidence of the success of policies and programs in delivering value to Canadian taxpayers.
The membership of this committee should be relatively permanent. There's too much mobility on the committees. MPs, particularly, need to settle into a committee. It would give them the opportunity to acquire the knowledge they need to understand government finances better. It would also allow the committee to plan its program of study and investigation over a number of years. Adding senators, I think, would be useful because senators [Inaudible--Editor]...at least until Mr. Harper gets his wish and has an elected Senate. The partisanship in Senate committees tends to be somewhat more muted than in House of Commons committees.
In the submission I recommend that staff support to the committee be provided by the Parliamentary Budget Office, which I note was launched on the basis of an unclear mandate. It was given an inappropriate organizational home in the Library of Parliament and, shortly after its creation, was drawn into the swirl of successive minority governments and nonstop campaigning within Parliament. All of this made the office and its leader, Kevin Page, the subject of controversy. He's a person with very strong opinions, obviously.
One thing that Mr. Page told a student of mine, who did a master's on the evolution of the Parliamentary Budget Office, is that his office had not done a very good job in assisting committees with examining the estimates. I think the office should create a designated division simply to serve the new joint committee that I'm recommending. This committee would then become the parliamentary home for the Parliamentary Budget Office. It's the committee to which the PBO would answer in explaining what it proposes to study and in submitting its own budgetary requirements on an annual basis.
I think the joint committee might divide itself, depending on how many members it has, into a number of smaller subcommittees and, over time, those subcommittees would develop specialized knowledge in the various domains of public policy.
You would really use your activities of studying to influence longer-range thinking of government. I say in my submission that there's nothing really all that magical about the lapse of 12 months in terms of government spending. Most government spending is done over multi-year horizons, and Parliament needs to become aligned with that sort of orientation.
To promote the cultural and attitudinal change I talked about would require endorsement by leaders of the parties represented in the House of Commons and Senate. You want to reduce the amount of partisan gamesmanship that goes on in this committee and allow MPs and senators on this joint committee to relate more to the evidence and to engage in a search for greater efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in public spending. My hope would be that this would be launched with the endorsement of all party leaders.
There's no guarantee that you'll bring about this cultural and attitudinal change. I supported the work done by the McGraw committee back in 1985 and the work done in 2003 when the late Ron Duhamel was involved in the reform of the supply process, and we had a debate about whether structural and procedural change produced attitudinal changes, or whether that relationship is reversed and attitudinal and cultural changes have to precede structural and procedural changes.
I think it's a bit of both, but unless the party leaders get on board and say they're prepared to allow their MPs to work with a minimum amount of partisanship, this won't work. Individual MPs and senators will have to recognize that this is a job for which there's not a lot of publicity and a lot of glamour. It's about contributing to sounder, better-quality government and getting value for tax money.
We know that the public respect for Parliament and its members is low. The esteem in which the institution is held is not as high as it used to be, and we have to get away from political gamesmanship and spend more time constructively inquiring about what works and what doesn't work.
Those are my opening comments, Mr. Chair. I'd be pleased to respond to questions and comments.