I didn't mean to...when I referred to legacy, right? It just was the existing stuff; that's just a term.
We can't forget that in 2010 there was an Auditor General's report that looked at five major systems. If you look at those recommendations, you'll see they didn't say the legacy is glowing, is working great, is all interconnected, and is sustainable. They said quite the opposite. They said you need to make major investments. The recommendation, just on the five systems studied, was two-billion dollars' worth of investment.
When SSC was created, it did not inherit, or the departments that came into the marriage for the most part did not show up with systems that were not in need of investment.
I'll use some examples, because I think Chris made some great points, and I don't disagree with anything he said.
When you look at Canada Border Services Agency and the importance of that organization from a security perspective, you see it links into 17 different departments and agencies.
During my tenure in operations, we went from hundreds of outages across that ecosystem of departments, and using and leveraging the power of working together where back office—I'll say back office—employees now were working under the same roof, we were able to analyze single points of failure.
We were able to analyze, when we make these kinds of changes from a maturity perspective and development of systems, that we have to go through the testing procedures in a certain way to make sure that, when they move to production, they actually work.
My point is that we actually uplifted the performance of some fairly dated systems around managing the border. There was no singular place where security operations came together, where all government departments were actually hooking into the Internet except for at various places, and that wasn't always the case. We were able to work with our security partners, pull the security teams from multiple partners together, and manage cyber-attacks in a coordinated way: what's the problem, who has the problem, etc.
There were some major benefits to bringing them together for the first time, for example, with the Heartbleed or whatever virus you want to talk about. You remember the one that brought CRA systems down, where someone actually infiltrated the systems. That was the first time we were able to work in a coordinated fashion and bring major systems down in order to protect government systems going forward.
The idea behind shared services to improve security is absolute. What I think Chris's point, if I could say it very briefly—