I'd say a couple of things on that. First of all, experts around the world, including our national shipbuilding adviser, have long identified that production gaps cost government—or the people paying for ships—money. We know that when a workforce tools down, it costs more money to tool them back up. We also know that job loss is not good for a yard, in terms of both the workforce's ability to have a living and also the loss of the talent that will inevitably go elsewhere.
To address an identified production gap at Irving between AOPS 6 and the commencement of the CSC build program, we have announced these two AOPS—AOPS 7 and 8—which will go to the Coast Guard. The benefit of that, of course, is that AOPS 7 and 8 are going to cost a lot less than AOPS 1 and 2. There are economies of scale and efficiencies from having 7 and 8, and we don't have to wait for an MPV in order to get the Coast Guard a new ship quicker. That's what's being done specifically at Irving.
At Seaspan, there's been a creative ability.... The caveat here perhaps, Mr. Chair, is that because we treat the national shipbuilding strategy as a program of work instead of a series of projects, we're able to move, if you will, the pieces around the chessboard quite nimbly and quite agilely. It's not a sequential series of projects. We have a program of work that needs to be done, and we can look at the chessboard and decide who's best positioned to do it when and for the least amount of cost. For example, we did early blocking of some of the JSS work, which allows us to get ahead of the game on the JSS and which was during a period in which Seaspan needed the work.
It's quite an interesting chessboard to manage.