Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting me to appear once more to discuss the review of the PSDPA, as we refer to it. It's a pleasure for me to be here this morning and to continue the discussion we began last month.
I am pleased to have with me my general counsel Brian Radford, who I am going to invite to take an active part in the discussions today. Mr. Radford has a long history with the legislation, including being part of its initial government-wide implementation planning before the actual creation of our office. I'm sure he'll be able to provide useful background and context as our discussions continue.
I am very pleased to have tabled, on February 14, 16 concrete proposals for positive and progressive change to enhance Canada's federal public service whistleblowing regime.
Since my last appearance before this committee, Mr. Chair, my office has tabled two case reports on founded cases of wrongdoing, and we have published a research and discussion paper on the fear of reprisal, authored by Dr. Craig Dowden, copies of which I understand committee members received earlier this week. This is the first such paper produced by my office—and I believe in the country—and it is an important contribution to the ongoing discussion of whistle-blowing in Canada. I spoke about the need for cultural change when I was here last month, and I note that several witnesses before the committee have since raised that same important issue. This research paper addresses this as well, including making recommendations that will support the ongoing process of that change.
As I told you when I was last here, one of my goals as Commissioner is to normalize whistleblowing. I believe that the activities we conducted last month represent significant progress toward achieving that goal.
I have followed the committee's deliberations since my appearance last month, and I am heartened by the level of focused interest on the part of so many witnesses to make real and significant progress in advancing the whistle-blowing regime. While I don't necessarily agree with the view that the regime is a failure and the law must be redrafted from the start, I can say that I enthusiastically support what I believe to be a collective will to support effective whistle-blowing, recognizing that there's not one off-the-shelf model that exists and works for every country or regime. The goals of this evolutionary process are shared by all witnesses, from what I can tell, including me.
I note the depth and focus of discussion about the process for dealing with reprisals and the fact that it is daunting and even discouraging when someone has to first wait for an investigation to be completed by my office, only then to have to go through a formal tribunal hearing—a process not unlike a trial—in order to get a final ruling. I look forward to what I hope is a fulsome discussion on these issues, including the issue of more direct access to the tribunal, which is something I'd like to say I support.
This brings me to a very important point, and one that I did not have the opportunity to fully address when I was here last month, and that is our authority to conciliate and settle reprisal cases. To date, we have successfully conciliated nine cases, resulting in settlements that the complainant participated in and willingly agreed to. In five other cases, the Tribunal used mediation to settle the matter, or the parties reached an agreement themselves during the course of the Tribunal process.
My first job in my legal career was as a private practice litigator, and my last job at the Department of Justice was heading up the alternative dispute resolution program. I think you can see where my interests and beliefs lie in respect of providing people with access to justice and to meaningful involvement in the resolution of their own disputes, and in avoiding, when possible, unnecessary litigation and the high costs associated with it.
Yes, I'd say every case my office conciliates means one less case for the tribunal, one less public decision on a reprisal complaint, and one less precedent. These are all important, but it also means that one more reprisal victim is able to get restitution for what they went through; save time, money, and emotional turmoil; and move forward with their lives. This isn't a failure, in my view, of the reprisal protection regime that I administer under the act. I should also point out that every conciliated complaint is reviewed by my office and signed off by me to ensure that no one is coerced into a settlement or otherwise makes an uninformed or involuntary decision to settle.
I was initially going to end my remarks here this morning. However, following testimony that I heard earlier this week—and that you heard earlier this week—I felt it was important for me to clarify some key points from my perspective in the aim of ensuring a clearer understanding of some important issues that the act addresses, which in turn, I hope, can contextualize some of the legislative changes I put forward last month.
I will start by saying that the act is complex, and it is drafted in a way that makes it difficult to navigate and understand, and this is again from my personal experience.
I would like to touch on three issues that I think are relevant, given the discussions before this committee to date, and which concern the extent and the effectiveness of the protections and redress mechanisms for whistleblowers and other parties involved in our activities.
First, the act does not prohibit and, indeed, it expressly provides in section 51.2 for access to the Federal Court for any party involved in the disclosure or reprisal to have a decision of my office review it. Like any other administrative decision-making body, these decisions are subject to judicial review and under the Federal Courts Act, the powers of the court are considerable. Furthermore, nothing in the act precludes a public servant from exercising any other recourse that they may otherwise have in relation to the situation.
Second, the issue of contractors with the federal government is specifically addressed in the act. It is prohibited to terminate a contract or withhold payment because a contractor has come forward with a disclosure. Further, the contractor's disclosure cannot be taken into account in the awarding of future contracts. To do so would constitute a criminal offence.
Related to this is the fact that, if someone in the private sector provides information about a wrongdoing to my office, their employer commits a criminal offence if they reprise against them. These people also have access to the courts for any other appropriate remedy.
Third, section 51.1 of the act provides chief executives with the power to temporarily assign other duties, inside or outside the department they currently work in, to a public servant who is involved in a disclosure or a reprisal complaint with the consent of the whistle-blower or the complainant.
The committee may wish to review and strengthen these elements. I would be pleased to be part of that discussion, but I do want to address what I believe is a potential misunderstanding that the act is silent on these very important matters.
I would also like to take a brief opportunity to offer a technical briefing on the PSDPA by my legal team to any committee members who would be interested, if you think this would assist in your ongoing and in-depth review of this important legislation. Our shared goal is to have a responsive and complete whistle-blowing regime in the federal public service and anything I can do to support this, I'm happy to offer.
In closing, I would like to say that I remain confidently in support of the 16 proposals for legislative change that I tabled with you on February 14. I hope that committee members are able to support them as this review process draws to a close. I look forward to our discussions today.