I think that is the overall thrust of the statement that this is a strategic challenge, but the strategic challenge then also needs to understand that, inherently, out of the umbrella remarks that have been made about the geostrategic engagement by China flow definite risks.
The problem is that we often, as Professor Carvin pointed out, start the conversation on the wrong end. We start focusing on the micro risks the particular technology poses rather than the broader macro scale, the macro elements, both in terms of strategic policy orientation as well as how that then is not reflected in adequate procurement practices and in adequate national security vetting that would then forgo having to have the micro conversation about the threats.
Make no mistake. These are real threats. As Professor Burton pointed out, any software ultimately needs to be updated, so the updates in and of themselves pose a significant risk.
This is the part that people don't get about Huawei, where people ask, “How is it that there are no back doors?” Well, there's no back door to date, no compromise today, but you need the back door built in by definition so that you can actually update the software in the actual equipment. Overnight, the hostile actor can embed malicious technology. Look, there's a lot to be learned, for instance, about traffic that comes through the embassy, the types of material and when that traffic comes in at unusual hours and so forth.