In that case, we saw favouritism in a different way, through what I would describe as “transparent favouritism”, which was by having overly restrictive criteria so that anyone who looks at those criteria will be able to assess whether in fact there is a desired outcome.
Here, it's not happening at surface level. It happens below the surface, so the change of procurement strategy wouldn't be made transparent to suppliers, whereas in ArriveCAN I would argue the restrictions were made transparent to other suppliers and they were aware of the restrictive nature, and that may have caused a chill effect in terms of the number of bidders.
What I'll also say is in the seven competitive processes that McKinsey won they were either the sole bidder or the sole compliant bidder in every one of those processes. That also tells you that on the supplier community there's something not working, right? It's not just on the governmental side. It's also on the supplier community side, because if there's a known buyer that pays, why is the community not participating in greater volumes? There are legitimate questions to be asked across the board, and that's why I posit the idea that this is the time for action.