I would agree with your concern with the lack of specific statements of work for call-ups. That was one of the notations that we had as well. I think part of the answer is that in a traditional master standing offer the good or service would be defined with precision. Therefore what we did see are references back to the generic scope and the creation of the national master standing offer, which, in some ways, is not wrong. It's actually right. It's just what happens next is the important part.
This wasn't a great fit, in our view, for a national master standing offer, because the services included the aspects of intellectual property, but the preponderance did not. You saw that 97.5% of the total value of these call-ups was not related to the proprietary tools, but was related to the expert advisory services associated with the tools. What we question is this. If you look at the chart early on in the report, you'll see a shift where McKinsey was winning competitive contracts, and then when the national master standing offer was established, all of a sudden everything becomes non-competitive. That means that not only were they winning benchmarking prior to the creation of the NMSO, they were winning other contracts associated other than benchmarking. After the creation of the NMSO, everything was related to benchmarking.