Thank you, Chair.
It's great to be back at OGGO after an unusually long hiatus.
Mr. Jeglic, thank you for the incredible work you're doing on behalf of Canadians by bringing to light these various significant problems in our procurement system.
Your report talks about favouritism, favouritism in terms of the government's treatment of McKinsey, how they favoured McKinsey and how they structured systems in order to give contracts to this favourite consulting company of the Prime Minister. McKinsey benefited from this favouritism.
Based on the previous work of this committee, it's clear how this happened. Dominic Barton was brought in to chair the Prime Minister's Canada Growth Council at the same time as he was a managing partner at McKinsey. McKinsey analysts did so-called pro bono work for the growth council.
Andrew Pickersgill, who ran the Canadian operations, supplied the analysts to do the pro bono work, but while he was supplying McKinsey analysts to do supposedly helpful pro bono work for this growth council that was chaired by Dominic Barton, he was also selling to the government.
You have this process where Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Dominic Barton are kind of making this connection at the top between McKinsey and the Government of Canada, and then that is clearly filtering out over time throughout the whole system where the connection at the top was shaping and impacting the kind of procurement that was happening across government to work to the advantage of McKinsey. That led to the establishment of the national master standing offer.
In terms of the analysis you did about specific individuals involved and what roles they played in getting these things established, can you speak about Dominic Barton and Andrew Pickersgill, for example, and where they showed up along the way in terms of looking at how this favouritism manifests itself?