Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for the invitation to testify before this committee.
First, allow me to introduce myself. I spent the bulk of my public service career at the Office of the Auditor General, leaving in 2007 as the senior principal for national security programs. During my years at the office, I directed performance audits of a dozen capital programs at the Department of National Defence. I am currently a fellow of the Queen’s University centre for international and defence policy and teach from time to time at the Royal Military College.
Turning to the objective of the committee to understand and improve the procurement process for defence projects, I would like to direct the attention of the committee to three overarching issues: the politics of defence procurement in Canada, the nature of the choice between fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft and the capacity of the defence establishment to manage both procurement and sustainment of the aircraft after purchase.
Regarding the politics of procurement, Canada has been afflicted by two basic disagreements. First, there is a lack of consensus amongst Canadians as to whether the armed forces should be war fighters or peacekeepers. Second, there is a conflict between the defence establishment’s desire to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force and the public’s evident desire to have a Walmart-style budget defence policy.
The lack of consensus and the low salience of defence in electoral decisions have resulted in the weaponization of defence procurement to appeal to one side or the other rather than to pursue a coherent national strategy.
These dynamics have disrupted the F-18 replacement project. On Monday the government announced the selection of the F-35. From the standpoint of the aircraft’s mission, this makes sense. Continental air defence is the primary mission of Canada’s fighter force, and the U.S. Air Force intends to base its continental air defence on fifth-generation aircraft. While fourth-generation aircraft might still be useful to NORAD, the role a fourth-generation fighter would play would become limited.
The war in Ukraine suggests that its survivability in contested airspace is essential. Russian air defences are impressive, and their reach extends roughly 400 kilometres into NATO airspace.
NATO and other defence ministries have voted with their feet and have opted for the F-35. The main issue the F-35 presents to the armed forces is sustainment. F-35 sustainment costs are enormous and unknown. The autonomic logistics information system, or ALIS, is problematic, and it's going to be replaced. The U.S. Air Force itself is considering reducing the number of F-35s to be acquired, because of the fleet affordability problem.
The challenge of the aircraft is compounded by the general problem in the Canadian Armed Forces with sustainment. The armed forces had difficulty in estimating support costs for new aircraft and maintaining enough support personnel to support their equipment. The department is reporting that current aerospace readiness is at about 55%, and that significant personnel shortages persist. The addition of a new fighter aircraft without adequate provision for sustainment will make a bad situation worse.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement.