Government Operations Committee on April 5th, 2022

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you very much, gentlemen. I really appreciate all the witnesses being before us today.

I think, from all sides, we agree that defence procurement should not be politicized. I don't think that is something that would be in doubt and all of us on all sides have to live up to that. I'm in complete agreement with that.

You talk about transparency and a lot of what you're saying is right. The more people understand where things are in the process, the more people have a factual basis for understanding why decisions are made and the more concretely they'll understand decisions. That's on the understanding, of course, that a lot of negotiation is confidential between suppliers and the government. Pricing and many other issues are proprietary, and you have to be careful.

In order to improve transparency, whatever the government in place, what are the steps within the procurement process where you feel that transparency can be improved? Take in the other considerations that may be involved, such as confidentiality in the customer-supplier relationship.

I'll start with either Mr. Nossal or Mr. Huebert, because you both mentioned that.

[Prof. Kim Nossal]

Let me suggest that one of the ways has already been mentioned by Professor Huebert. That is the idea of creating, at the parliamentary level, committees where individual MPs of all parties would essentially be bound by the kind of confidentiality requirements that you refer to. It seems to me that that would be one way you could increase the transparency so that you don't get the kind of frustration that Mr. McCauley felt when confronting Simon Page.

It seems to me that that's one of the key ways of doing [Technical difficulty—Editor].

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The other thing that has to be brought in is that we have inversed the role of secrecy. Instead of demanding that we prove what needs to be kept secret, the assumption is we need to prove what can be released. Part of the process would be better served if, as we go through all those issues that you say have a requirement for secrecy, you need to to demonstrate where the secrecy is required and then you assume that everything else is open.

Once again, we go back to the one example of the creation of shipbuilding strategy. Remember, that is a rarity in which the document by which the decision was ultimately formulated was released publicly. In other words, there was an ability and a recognition among those who were tasked with coming up with the strategy to be able to defend their positions without betraying any of the secrecy requirements.

There are techniques by which we can make sure that real information is shared and secrecy is protected, but only if we have the political will to do it. Once again, we're left with that horrible reality that all of this is possible, but it has to have the buy-in of the Prime Minister.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

First of all, thank you, both, for those answers. I think we're in a government where the Prime Minister is not by himself. It's a cabinet-style government, so cabinet needs to consider how to be more transparent. All cabinets do, across the world and in Canada too.

The last thing I wanted to say—it's come up before—is to remind everybody that if you don't have a fair procurement process, you can have complaints filed at the CITT that would delay the purchase of equipment even longer than if you had a fair process. We always have to weigh all of these different factors. There's no perfect answer, but you've got to get the best marriage possible.

I really appreciate all of your testimony.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you, Mr. Housefather.

We will now go to Ms. Vignola, for two minutes.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Huebert, I will address you.

For several weeks, we have been hearing about how obsolete radars are and how we lack a ground-based air defence system.

I feel—and this is very personal—that those factors are especially important for protecting Canada's huge Arctic northern territory.

We cannot change the past. However, I would like to hear you comment on what technologies would be more effective for protecting Canada's north.

What would those technologies be and how many devices should we purchase? You can also add any other comments you feel would be relevant.

Thank you.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Well, we can say immediately, of course, that we do have to update the existing architecture of the north warning system. In other words, the Russians are in the process of modernizing not only their nuclear war-fighting tactical capabilities that we see with the Gazelle missiles and other types; they're also modernizing their ICBMs. We have to continue to have that capability to monitor that threat. That means that the RADARSAT systems have to be updated.

We also need to have the ability, however, to be able to detect the Gazelles, the hypersonics. That requires, of course, a system such as the over-the-horizon radar, but it also requires a mobility. In other words, the Arctic is so large that you are not going to be able to have the old-fashioned DEW line system where you can string a set of radar sites across and have a high degree of confidence that you're going to catch everything. You've got to be able to have an anticipation. That then means that you also have to be developing new space-based systems.

The only way we're going to have a proper surveillance capability of being able to anticipate what the Russians are doing in terms of aerospace—I would add the Chinese as well, going to into a little bit longer future—is to have radar sensors. Now, that means, obviously, that we have to tie ourselves much closer with the American space weapons systems, which will be problematic for some people on a political basis.

There's another part, though. You also need to have the ability to respond. It's not just simply having these three-layered sensor systems. We also have to be talking about what it means in terms of ABM capabilities and what it means in terms of being able to take out these hypersonics. That's another layer of anti-ballistic missile. We're also going to have to do anti-missile systems unless we're willing to have the Americans simply bring us around and do it entirely for us.

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you, Mr. Huebert.

We'll now go to Mr. Johns for two minutes.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

I'm going to expand on that. We know that the F-35 has an operational range of about 1,100 kilometres, which suggests the need for refuelling capabilities. You just talked about some of the infrastructure we might need.

What other additional infrastructure do you think is required to support fighter jets in the far north year round? Should Canada be making these investments now, given that we're heading into this? Also, do you think we should be purchasing specialized refuelling planes?

I'll go back to you, Mr. Huebert.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Absolutely. I mean, once again, because of the difficulty of getting information, there are suggestions that have appeared in some media reports that in fact our ability, a spur-of-the-moment capability, to actually deploy our aircraft into the hangars, particularly in the middle of winter, is problematic. There are issues associated with sort of bread-and-butter issues. We have issues on whether or not the runways of our four forward operating bases can actually provide the ability for all aircraft...including the Americans'. Of course, we have that shared aerospace under NORAD. If the Americans are sending in their very largest refuellers, can they in fact operate out of the forward operating bases? I don't have the answer for that.

We need to have the four forward operating bases, but if we actually start putting in the over-the-horizon radar, that means going to the northern tips of our Arctic archipelago, which means having some facility beyond Resolute and Eureka to be able to resupply, particularly on the western part of the Arctic.

All of that infrastructure has to be worked out and brought forward.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

In terms of the critical path to getting there and ensuring that these aircraft have the equipment, pilots and maintenance, how are we doing on that front, on the human resource side? Do you see us having challenges there?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

We are getting media reports that we are losing pilots and that we are not able to sustain. It goes back to a point that I was raising earlier. Not only do we need to have pilots who can fly the existing fleets; we need to have a surplus.

We have to assume, going into the future, that if we move from this environment that was relatively low-conflict and definitely low-tech in terms of any capability, then we will also need, and this is part of the procurement issue that we have not dealt with at all, to replace pilots who are lost in combat or wounded in combat. At this point in time, I don't think we have any flexibility in that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you.

We'll now go to Mr. Lobb for four minutes.

[Ben Lobb, Conservative, Huron—Bruce, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I've appreciated everybody's comments today. I'm relatively new to this committee, but for many years, I have felt that there's just way too much politics in everything, and especially in procurement.

What is so wrong with having a committee put together of experienced members of Parliament that would ensure that taxpayers' dollars are protected, and that we're getting the right equipment for the Canadian military? Is it such a far-off thought that we could do our jobs?

Dr. Nossal, or Dr. Huebert, do you want to comment on that?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

First of all, I'll remind the committee that in days of yore, House of Common committees provided some of the most cutting-edge information to understand the international system around us. Bill Graham, when he was head of the foreign policy committee, produced a report that I still make students read on understanding the future of security in the Arctic regions. The committee system in Canada has the ability to bring along some of the very best minds to produce this.

We've seen a manner by which committee systems can oversee things, such as intelligence within CSIS. There is no difficulty in saying that there has to be a certain secrecy requirement, which all MPs have shown in the past that they are mature enough to be able to accept. Once again, it then creates that bipartisan understanding that we can all agree that we are dealing with a threat in such a way that, ultimately, has to protect Canadians.

I think that the sense of loyalty of anyone who wants to become an MP in the first place would be very well situated for such a creation.

[Ben Lobb, Conservative, Huron—Bruce, ON]

That's my estimation.

I think back to the time of the F-35 over a decade ago. I think if we had had a committee with all political parties involved in the spirt of goodwill to try to do the right thing, we would have realized that if the U.S. was going with F-35s, Canada was going with F-35s. We would have worked out a way to make sure that the taxpayers were protected, as well as getting the best fighter jet for Canadians and for the military.

Maybe it's not lost on us yet that we can make some changes going into the future.

The other thing was touched on by Mr. McCauley as well. The secrecy is very frustrating. When different civil servants come here—I'm sure they're all great people—you get no answers on anything. There's no transparency. You have decisions costing billions of dollars, and maybe one or two cabinet ministers know exactly what's going on. It's maybe one or maybe two.

In the public service, how many know exactly? It's way too much power and way too much secrecy for that kind of money getting spent.

Are there any thoughts on that? Anybody can answer that one.

[Richard Shimooka]

I'll take a quick stab at it.

I wouldn't mind if I could respond later to Mr. McCauley's question directly.

This is a challenge. Part of the problem is that each department that is involved within the procurement process has its own perspectives and objectives. It is not purely the delivery of a capability alone. It is getting costs.... The process is a major focus of PSPC.... There are the industrial benefits.

When you get into the defence procurement process with all of these groups together, that's when you start getting this issue of a lack of transparency. None of the individuals in that process are willing to stand up and say in testimony, “What's the issue?” or “Where is the problem with the process?”. They have to operate within the collegial format.

That is a major issue that you're seeing in your discussions.

[Ben Lobb, Conservative, Huron—Bruce, ON]

Thank you.

The chair says that I have five minutes left. I'll cede my time.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you, Mr. Shimooka.

We will now go to Mr. Jowhari for four minutes.

Mr. Shimooka, perhaps in the next hour while you're here, you might be able to address that with Mr. McCauley, when he gets the chance to question you.

Go ahead, Mr. Jowhari.

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

I'm going to start with Dr. Huebert.

When discussing NORAD modernization, you've indicated that the popular metaphor for the objective of this modernization is that we need to enhance both the shield and the sword. NORAD, as a system, is referred to as a system of systems. There is a very active dialogue going on between an upgrade, and an upgrade and expansion.

If you can expand on the shield and sword, what areas of the shield do we need to enhance? What areas of the sword do we need to look at enhancing? There's also the interoperability that's needed within the NATO allies, especially in NORAD.

Could you close by highlighting where in the procurement process we need to make sure that we enhance and optimize the process so we don't get...? We don't have another seven years.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Wow. Do I have more than four minutes?

It's a brilliant question. It really gets to the heart of why we are talking procurement. We're talking procurement because we have a new geopolitical security environment.

Traditionally, we've mainly needed this shield because that was the essence of deterrence. As long as the Soviet Union knew that we would know when they launched the missiles—so the Americans could then launch their missiles and we could all die in mutual suicide—the deterrent of...actual nuclear war was stopped. Once the bomber threat faded and we moved into the missile age, we needed the shield. That's why we had the emphasis on the DEW line and then subsequently on the north warning system.

We now need the sword because we are dealing with systems that are directed towards tactical nuclear war. They are of a speed and a stealth capability that simply letting the Russians know that we know that they have one of their Tupolev Tu-95s armed with a nuclear-tipped Kinzhal hypersonic missile that is ready to fire is no longer deterrent enough. We need to convince the Russians, and I suspect the Chinese going into the longer term, that we can in fact shoot them down.

That's where we need both the shield and the sword in this context. We need that surveillance. We need all that we talked about earlier, including RADARSAT, over-the-horizon radar and these satellite assets with our American allies, but we will also need the capability of what the F-35s—with refuellers—will bring us to be able to shoot down incoming threats.

We haven't even talked about the maritime side, but that's the next hour, I suppose. At the same time, when the Russians sell their Sarmat ICBMs, we need to be able to say, “Okay, we know you fired them, so let's commit mutual suicide”.

All of that is expensive. It's difficult to actually comprehend, but it's about deterring and deterring by being able to fight. That's something new in terms of our thinking about procurement.

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

I have about 30 seconds left.

Now that we are focusing on our shipbuilding, on modernizing NORAD, as well as on supplementing it with the proper air defence, which is being negotiated, are we moving toward the very secure, safe and strong commitment that we had made?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

More so, but once again we haven't talked about the submarine threat. We haven't talked about underwater autonomous vehicles. We haven't talked about whatever the Russians and Chinese come up with that we haven't anticipated.

Once again, the Kinzhal missile surprised people, even though they've been developing it for a long time.

What is in the current arsenal that the Chinese and Russians are developing now that we have not anticipated and that we need to respond to? We need to be bringing that dynamic thinking to the entire procurement process.

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Robert Gordon Kitchen]

Thank you, Mr. Huebert and Mr. Jowhari.

That brings us to the end of our air defence procurement hour. We're now going to suspend briefly.

Before we do, I want to thank you, Mr. Nossal, for your testimony and your participation today. You are welcome to stay logged in to the meeting, although you won't be participating in the next hour. We do appreciate your comments.

With that said, we're going to briefly suspend while we bring in one more witness.

I declare the meeting suspended.