Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the question of defence procurement objectives, and in particular the inefficiencies in the defence procurement process in Canada. In my short three minutes, I want to talk about one factor that Professor Huebert has already referenced, and that is politicization—the efforts of a political party, in government or in opposition, to use a defence procurement project for purely partisan political purposes, to score political points for themselves or against their opponents.
In my view, there's no better example of the corrosive effects of politicization at work than the 25-year process that's been used to replace the CF-18 Hornet fleet. I don't propose to rehearse that sad story here, although, if you'd like, I'd be happy to submit a formal account to the committee. Suffice it to say that the games that were played with the CF-18 replacement over the years were deeply embarrassing. They were paradoxical in the sense that MPs seem to believe that votes will follow their gamesmanship on defence procurement, but every piece of evidence we have is that Canadians will never cast their votes as though defence acquisition matters.
The games were certainly self-defeating, in the sense that playing political games with defence procurement guarantees that what you sow in one Parliament, you're going to reap in a subsequent Parliament.
Finally, they were costly. Playing games always increases not only the financial costs but also other costs. They diminish our defence capabilities, they diminish our reputation and they do a disservice to taxpayers.
When I look at the 25-year process to replace the CF-18s, there are a number of recommendations. First, follow defence procurement rules. They're generally sound and they're flexible enough. Second, be completely honest about costs. Try to explain to ordinary Canadians how a full life-cycle costing in defence works and why it's so difficult. Third, explain as fully as possible the government's thinking about a weapons systems. Finally and most importantly, resist the temptation to play political games with defence procurement.
One of my first research projects, after I was appointed a professor at McMaster in 1976, was a study with Mike Atkinson. It was on the process by which the Liberal government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau chose the CF-18 Hornet to be Canada's fighter. Fast-forward 44 years: When I retired from Queen's University in 2020, the RCAF was still flying those Hornets. The process remains unfinished, partly because of the political games.
In sum, then, I'm hoping that you as a committee will take a critical look at the CF-18 replacement process and recommend to your colleagues that we need to change the norms about the acceptability of politicizing defence procurement projects in Canada.
Thank you. I look forward to the questions of the committee.