In reviewing the testimony presented before this committee, I note that many have remarked on the difficult nature of defence procurement, and no other area has this difficulty, which nearly caused the elimination of a CAF capability through the failure to make a decision. Submarines are a classic case in this and remain so.
Unless the government makes an explicit announcement that submarines will be replaced in the next update of our defence policy, it is very likely that our present class of these vessels will be our last. The loss of submarines will leave our navy far less capable in a world where the number of navies operating them is growing rather than shrinking.
The present national shipbuilding strategy has no plans for the replacement of the Victoria-class submarines operated by the RCN.
“Strong, Secure, Engaged” only commits to their modernization. This process is already under way, which will keep the four boats working until roughly 2035. At that point, the oldest submarine in the fleet, HMCS Chicoutimi, will be 52 years old. Further operations will be done under considerable risk.
The year 2035 is only 13 years from now. Complex defence procurement projects like the next generation fighter and the Canadian surface combatant have both been extant for two decades and have yet to deliver replacements for the aging systems now being used. While extending the lifetime of a surface vessel is a challenge, with a submarine, it very much places the crew at direct risk.
In the 1990s, the submarine service went through a near-death experience due to the political indifference to the professional advice of the navy. This indifference was extended right up to the last minute, with a level of bargaining for a steeper price discount than what had already been negotiated, end results that may have enhanced some of the problems the RCN has experienced in operationalizing the boats. It is not entirely clear that the political system remains indifferent to the future of Canadian submarine service, but this time around, there will be no fire sale option to rescue it, should that be the case.
The recent AUKUS deal between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia highlights the role of nuclear submarines. The RCN has consistently argued that nuclear boats are preferable to conventional boats. Some may feel that this is due to the icy nature of our Arctic waters, which poses difficulties for conventional submarines due to their need to periodically surface. The travel times involved in getting a Canadian submarine on station, either in our Arctic regions or internationally, however, have more to do with recommending a nuclear option, as such boats can travel at high speeds under water indefinitely.
While either conventional or nuclear, if Canada is to replace its submarines, it will need to make decisions to do so very shortly. The navy has consistently advanced sound strategic reasons for Canada to operate these systems.
Given the complexity of their design and construction, as well as the specificity of our own requirements, we will need to work closely with a company with an established track record in building these submarines. Most off-the-shelf systems will not immediately meet the needs of the RCN, and not every nation building submarines may want to co-operate with us.
Further, despite the investments made by the national shipbuilding strategy, Canadian shipyards have not built submarines since World War I, and re-creating the industrial capital to do so would itself be a highly expensive proposition, as the Australians discovered with their own Collins-class submarine program.
Thankfully, the Victoria-class in-service support contract has allowed for the development of a local industrial ecosystem that will permit any acquired vessel to be supported and maintained. While the Victoria-class has been unfairly maligned in the court of public opinion and within the media, many of the problems associated with the class can be ascribed to the manner in which they were purchased and the dire state into which the submarine service had fallen by the late 1990s. We have a brief window of opportunity to ensure that these events are not repeated.
The government has announced that SSE will be reviewed shortly. In this review, Canada should make the call as to whether it wishes to maintain the capability. The longer the decision is postponed, the more likely it becomes that the Victoria-class will be the last such boats operated by the RCN.
That concludes my statement, and I'm prepared to receive any questions.