We have some reservations about the choice of the F‑35. It's not that it's a bad choice, but there seems to be a contradiction between the industrial and technological benefits policy that Canada is putting forward and its participation in the joint strike fighter program.
Under the industrial and technological benefits policy, the government requires compensation in the form of industrial and technological benefits when the purchase is made from a foreign supplier. The foreign company that becomes a supplier to Canada must commit to making a series of investments equal to the amount of the purchase.
However, when we look at the agreements signed under the joint strike fighter program, we see that they allow Canadian companies to compete with aerospace companies from other partner countries. In return, Canada and all other participating countries must waive their respective industrial benefits policies if they wish to acquire an F‑35. This suggests that Canada will have difficulty obtaining guarantees that these procurement contracts will have domestic benefits.
Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent Canadian contracts that we would have won by purchasing F‑35s from being cancelled if another company in a partner country manages to bid lower than a Canadian company.
It's as if, prior to signing, the potential impact of the 2006 joint strike fighter MOU on Canada's air defence procurement initiatives was overlooked and the project was assessed strictly in terms of the industrial benefits the partnership could bring in the short term. That is where the main problem lies.