Thank you. I guess what I'm trying to say is that the issues you uncovered in 2018 may very well have existed back in 2012 as well. They are not necessarily new issues.
I understand also.... The issue that you raise in your report is an interesting one, and I'd like to just question you further on that. In paragraph 3.52—and now I'm talking about the jets—you conclude that the additional operational requirements needing to conform to the highest level of NORAD requirements as well as NATO commitments put National Defence in a “difficult” position until the replacement fighter jets are in place.
But can I just understand, based on our NORAD commitments and our NATO commitments, are the new requirements not sensible? If we have obligations in both cases to meet certain norms and NORAD was at its highest level of alert, don't we need to be able to meet the highest NORAD level of commitment plus the NATO one?