Health Committee on March 12th, 2009

[Ayoob Ghalami]

That would deal with the clinical side. Unfortunately, my side of the clinical area is only dentistry, and I don't deal with the other side, so I can't make any comment on it. I do not have the expertise.

[Carol Hughes, NDP, Algoma—Manitoulin—Kapuskasing, ON]

Do the others have any comments?

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

Is it going to have some impact on research? Sure, but if you work with animals, the red tape surrounding the use of laboratory animals is far more onerous than the red tape proposed for level two pathogens by Bill C-11. The red tape surrounding the use of radioisotopes in laboratories is more onerous than the red tape for level two pathogens proposed by Bill C-11. We have to have inventories of all the chemicals in the laboratory; why shouldn't we have an inventory of all the pathogens in the laboratory too?

The Public Health Agency of Canada, over the years, has produced MSDS sheets for just about all of these pathogens, with really good, detailed instructions about how to handle them. So there's really no excuse not to go this one extra step and just have a list of who's got what. I would hope that the Government of Canada would like to know who's got what—and where they've got it, as well. That's the whole essence of Bill C-11, knowing where pathogens are kept.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Thank you, Mr. Conlan.

We'll now go to Dr. Carrie.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, because we have heard some other things from different witnesses.

Mr. Ghalami, you brought up something that I found to be quite an interesting way of putting things. You said “you get used to your bugs all the time”. I remember years ago working on a construction site, where there were guys who were explosive experts, who got used to working with their dynamite. You'd see these guys and you'd think they're handling the dynamite quite clumsily, but they get used to it. But it's still dynamite, and it's still explosive.

We've had other witnesses who say this level two stuff isn't that bad, but could you let us know what can happen with some of these level two pathogens? You mentioned that HIV is a level two pathogen, and you said that salmonella and different strains of E. coli were too. What can happen to the public if these things aren't controlled?

[Ayoob Ghalami]

A part of my job that I like is the fact that “it depends”. That's one typical answer I give to individuals. The strain of E. coli is one factor; the health status of the individual is another factor; the dose the individual gets is another factor. So there are lots of combinations of those factors.

You could check at CDC. I don't think we have a statistic on this in Canada, but I do go to the CDC for data. I do teach a course on biosafety at U of T, and I show different examples of lab-acquired infections to the attendees. As I mentioned, there are lots of them all the time.

The consequence would be different. If someone is immune-compromised, or let's say someone is pregnant and walks through a room and is exposed to listeria varicella, they would most likely no longer be pregnant after that. So that is a consequence. Is it a big consequence, or a small consequence? You be the judge. It's really hard for me to say, but that is one example.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

I've noticed from different witnesses that they almost say that if there weren't a requirement for biosecurity.... As you mentioned regarding labs that are just level two, you wouldn't even have a problem implementing this right away—

[Ayoob Ghalami]

Yes.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

—that it would be something you could put right through. So that's maybe something we should think about.

Dr. Conlan, you mentioned that you have experience with level two and level three pathogens in the same labs, or that your lab runs level two—

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

We run both level two and level three labs.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Is it a concern that labs who don't import can just pass these things around, lab to lab?

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

For sure. It used to be common practice for researchers to share their pathogens.

As far as level two pathogens are concerned, the most risk is to the researcher, unless there's malicious intent. If there's malicious intent, you could do a lot of damage with a level two pathogen, if you decided, as they did in the U.S., to take some listeria and go to several Pizza Huts locally and spike the salad bars with listeria or salmonella or shigella. So there's potential to do harm, but what's the likelihood that people would do so?

But in day-to-day research, the people who are primarily at risk are the researchers. So it's more a workplace hazard than anything else. Level two pathogens don't tend to be that contagious, so the primary risk is to the individual who's working with them.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

You mentioned a little bit about research, because we did have some researchers here. Do you think there would be a serious effect on research with the bill written as it is right now with the people who do mostly level two?

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

If there's a requirement for a formal security clearance by a federal agency, yes.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

We keep hearing that it's the security issue, and you did mention that in Bill C-54 you don't remember that being--

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

In Bill C-54 the intent was that people engaged in levels three and four work would require security clearance.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Okay.

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

All government employees undergo an enhanced security clearance, so I guess it's a matter of what level of clearance and how fast it can be done. That fact is that the federal government is a big agency, and most of its employees have some level of enhanced security screening before they're employed. So clearly at one level it's possible to screen large numbers of people at a very superficial level.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

If we clarify the fact that level two wouldn't have the same security necessities as the ones that have levels three and four, do you think that would be a very good solution to put forward?

[Ayoob Ghalami]

If security is lifted, and if the operation of licensing would be adopted like the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission does, I can confidently say that we don't have to do anything different at the University of Toronto. Everything should run that way, and it should have been that way, because we have signed a memorandum of understanding with the tri-council to abide by the guidelines, third edition, that the Public Health Agency has put out there.

Regardless of that, it is a good practice to do, because we're making sure--just going back to the previous question you asked--risk group two are considered moderate individual, low community. So if something could be aerosolized like TB, it will never be risk group two; it will be risk group three. Risk group two is always the individuals, as my colleague mentioned, the individual who is performing the research.

But do we want our researchers to get sick? No. Again, it comes to the fact that you want to make sure the mandatory training is there. You want to make sure you have a reporting system, and if you get lots of people who are exposed to the agent, they work. Maybe the institution needs to revisit how they practice to train their individuals, or what means they have. So it goes back to that route.

As I said, you don't have to do anything at my institution because we have everything in place as the guidelines mandate.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

You mentioned that this is bringing the levels up to a level playing field. How do we fit and how do we match up internationally? Are you aware of the regulations in the United States, and do you work with them a lot, being an importer yourself? Are we going to come up to that same level internationally?

[Dr. Wayne Conlan]

As I receive a lot of my funding from the U.S., I have to abide by the equivalent of Bill C-11 with the select agent rule. That's a little different because pathogens are considered select agents not based on their risk group. So you can be a risk group two pathogen and still be a select agent, and then you are governed by the select agent rule, whereas in Canada you would be a risk group two pathogen, and some risk group two pathogens would certainly be treated even under Bill C-11 with less concern than they would be if they were being handled in the U.S.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

Thank you, Mr. Conlan.

We're now going to go into our second round of questioning, which is five minutes per person, and we'll start with Ms. Murray.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Thank you.

I find a little confusing, Mr. Ghalami, your huge enthusiasm for this project, and then, on the other hand, your acknowledging it would make absolutely no difference to your operations or your lab whatsoever. I guess you're responsible for security, and not responsible, I presume, for the quality and productivity of research that comes out of your lab, the hiring and training of researchers, and the meeting of deliverables in terms of research grants and so on.

[Ayoob Ghalami]

It's completely to the contrary. I'm not the security officer. My background is molecular biology, so I relate to the science part more than anything else. If you are the only scientist, you've got to talk the talk and walk the walk, so--