I think looking at further assurance, if you like, in the legislation is certainly something we would be prepared to look at. We haven't rushed into this. We have had human pathogen importation regulations for 15 years. The concept of the need to know who possessed what domestically and how we could safely handle these pathogens took place around 1999. Then came the anthrax scare, then came SARS. Nobody knew who possessed the SARS virus. Then the drafting of the legislation began in 2004.
I think the concerns we've heard are the ones we've heard before. We certainly feel that they can be taken care of in regulations. But if we can provide further assurance in some way, then that is good. The proposed program and regulatory framework are also posted publicly on our website.
I think every other day something else happens. The H2N2 distribution happened. Something could happen tomorrow. Someone talked about the polio virus and about the fact that we don't know where the polio virus is in Canada. It's important; I would like to know--by tomorrow, if possible--exactly who in Canada has the polio virus.
While it is not specifically in the schedule, it is captured under the risk group definitions. You can provide examples, but you will always leave out certain examples, or be more inclusive in the list than perhaps others wish. But you don't want something to happen tomorrow, and within the experience of our programs....
A few weeks ago--in “a” province--we came across a laboratory that was abandoned, with nine freezers full of pathogens. In another province, an “underground” laboratory was discovered, and we had no ability to necessarily regulate. There are very non-uniform practices.
I think the good academic labs that have biosafety programs in place are again the ones that we feel could comply with the legislation rapidly. But what you don't want to see is that these other laboratories have issues that will arise without our taking care of it, having thought about this for ten years.