I thought, as usual, there was a lot of cogency in what David Butler-Jones said. He gave an actual scenario that did establish some benefit in regulating level 2s. What I would like to go back to in the back and forth with him is that it was almost that an implicit assumption was that you're regulating them through Bill C-11, where they're completely unregulated. So even taking that scenario, for instance, thinking about the institutional regulatory frameworks, the provincial regulatory frameworks, all the various other regulatory frameworks, which are less intrusive than the criminal law, could not one have achieved, in that or similar cases, a similar result? That's one question I would ask back.
Secondly, for me, this U.S. comparison is very revealing. I'd really appreciate an answer to the question, if the United States, in the wake of an actual anthrax attack, passed legislation that criminalizes stuff that looks like level 3 and level 4, but level 2 pathogens, by and large, as I understand it, in the United States are dealt with through CDC guidelines, and so on, not criminal law, why does Canada need to criminalize more of the scope of pathogens than the United States does?
I also made a point about criminal law being important, even without penalties for scientists, and the day after the attack, which David may or may not want to respond to.
But really, these are the two things I'd love to hear in this back and forth.
One, wouldn't all the institutional regulation, provincial regulation, etc., cover scenarios like the one you described? Maybe not. That would be important to hear.
Secondly, in terms of the U.S. comparison, why should we criminalize more pathogens and more laboratories than the bioterrorism-stricken and more obsessed United States does, where we know that the Patriot Act and select agent rules have already had some unintended consequences, such as in the Butler case--not Butler-Jones, but Butler--that you mentioned last time?