Madam Chair, members of the Standing Committee on Health, thank you for inviting me to elaborate on why the appointment of Dr. Bernard Prigent, Vice-President of Pfizer Canada and chair of the scientific committee of Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, in my opinion, is difficult to reconcile with accountable and independent governance of CIHR.
I want to specifically respond in my five minutes to the reasons given by Dr. Beaudet and Dr. Prigent for his ability and competence to function as CIHR governing council member.
First, you were told that Dr. Prigent's appointment is crucial for the realization of CIHR's commercialization mandate and in line with the practice of similar agencies. Some of these agencies do have similar representation, but many others with excellent commercialization records function eminently without it. The U.S. National Institutes of Health, which recently strengthened its conflict of interest guidelines and its independence from industry, pursues commercialization without a pharmaceutical executive on its board. The same is true for the Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, and South African health research councils, and even for the U.K.'s Wellcome Trust. Members with different professional affiliations or special advisory committees bring public-private partnerships and technology transfer expertise to the governing bodies of these organizations without preferential treatment of one industry player.
Second, Dr. Beaudet praised the appointment as part of a strategy to align CIHR's agenda with industry. If this is so, the appointment actually risks undermining CIHR's ability to promote excellent health research that improves the health of Canadians. There is overwhelming evidence that strong influence and control by the pharmaceutical industry of drug research and development has created serious problems of over-prescription, over-consumption, and overemphasis on pharmaceutical treatment in health care and has also resulted in increased costs. As evidenced by legal proceedings and empirical research, these problems are in part caused by the fact that industry-funded research and marketing are often associated with bias, misrepresentation, and the hiding of important safety and effectiveness data. Competitive pressures and huge financial interests explain why troubling practices persist, notwithstanding multi-million-dollar fines. An appointment aimed at aligning CIHR's agenda with these interests clearly compromises its primary mandate.
Third, Dr. Prigent brings the financial interests of Pfizer and his industry with him when he sits at the governing council table. Claiming that he can leave these behind is ignoring his professional obligations towards Pfizer and its shareholders. It also flies in the face of empirical studies and much of the literature and recent reports on institutional conflicts of interest.
Fourth, the committee was also told that Dr. Prigent will not decide any specific research projects. He will, however, be involved in decisions about CIHR's overall agenda, which affects industry. The council might discuss how commercialization can best be achieved, whether through patents, open-source regimes, or non-exclusive licensing. The council might explore whether a new strategy should address the impact of patented medicines on pharmacare programs, such as the Quebec pharmacare program.