I would like to thank the honourable members and the committee for giving me an opportunity to speak today. I'm here on behalf of the Canadian Society of Microbiologists, of which I am the president--that's an elected office, and it just happens to be me this year. This is a society of about 400 to 500 members that represents all microbiologists in Canada who are willing to join. They're primarily research microbiologists in universities and government labs, but we do have some clinical microbiologists who are members as well. We do liaise quite a lot with some of the other societies in Canada, including the Canadian College of Microbiologists, which is a professional accreditation organization, so they've given me some feedback as well.
I'm a professor at the University of Calgary. My own research is in microbial genetics. I don't work with pathogens, so this legislation does not affect me personally. I don't have any axe to grind. I have based my comments on what I think is going on and largely on responses to this bill from my members. Usually when you send out a request for input from members in a society such as mine you get nothing. I've been overwhelmed with the response I've received about this bill, by e-mail comments, phone calls, conversations. This was also reflected last year at our annual general meeting; we've devoted a considerable amount of time to the discussion of C-54.
People are concerned because they don't really understand the necessity for this legislation in its proposed form. The track record of the microbiology community in Canada is excellent. Existing biohazard guidelines that are in practice for university and government labs are respected and they seem to be working, so there is a lot of concern within our society. Most of this arises from the fact that the level two containment you find in the guidelines from the Public Health Agency of Canada state explicitly that organisms in this group pose little risk to the community, and thus many members of our society feel there's no need to legislate to include them in any toxins and pathogens act.
I got lots of comments about this. Perhaps the most apposite is from one scientist who said I'd be much safer camping in his lab for two weeks than going to a hospital because I'm much more likely to get a serious infection in a hospital. Really, it's the inclusion of level 2 pathogens in this bill that has people concerned.
A second major concern is that E. coli is included in the bill on the list of level 2 pathogens, when under current guidelines, only pathogenic strains of E. coli are listed. This is very important to our members because almost everybody uses E. coli to do genetics experiments. This applies not only to microbiologists but to anybody who's doing anything involving gene cloning. The types of E. coli strains that are used for gene cloning are non-pathogenic; they've been recognized as non-pathogenic for many years, so some statement should go into this bill saying that not all E. coli is level 2.
There's additional concern within the society about the costs to research and delays in research and in hiring students, which may be occasioned by a strict adherence to the terms of the bill, as opposed to the feedback we're getting from the Public Health Agency of Canada. There's a lot of concern that it may be very difficult to employ foreign students and post-docs because it's already hard enough for them to get visas. If we have to go through security clearance for them, there may be issues with that.
There's a lot of concern about the disconnect between the language of the bill and the much more reassuring tone we get from officials of the Public Health Agency of Canada. When they speak at information sessions, they are addressing the issues very well, but all the documents they give to us say this is proposed, it's not fact. We'd like to be reassured that what they're talking about is what's going to happen.
Some of the other questions from our membership relate to: how does this licensing system increase safety and security over the status quo via safety regulations that are used in universities and government labs? The list of microbes on the schedules is presented as species when we as microbiologists realize that it's the strains that are pathogenic. Many members of the species on those lists are non-pathogenic; they don't pose any threat to human health. Of course, with the constant reclassification of micro-organisms, things could be lumped in with another species when in fact they don't pose any threat.
There was a question about whether the licences will be awarded at the level of the institution, the group, or the individual, because the legal definition of person includes all those, and the bill just talks about persons. There was a suggestion it would be more effective to license facilities rather than individual researchers. We don't understand what the conditions for awarding licences to carry out work with pathogens might be, or whether there will be an appeal process if your request for a licence is turned down.
The cost of the licences is not addressed in the bill itself, whether that will be borne by the researchers or by the government. The Public Health Agency preliminary documents suggest there will be no cost, but we'd like to be reassured of that. We don't know how this is going to affect undergraduate education in microbiology laboratories, laboratory space shared between researchers, some of whom are working with pathogens and some of whom aren't. How will custodial staff have access to labs? Will they require security clearance as well? These are on the whole list of questions I'm getting back repeatedly from my membership.
The eligibility for security clearance is a major issue. That could quite easily become a basis for some human rights problems, as we see it. We don't know who the inspectors will be, how they will be trained, and how they will carry out their tasks.
I'd like to draw the committee's attention to the international journal, Science, which on March 6—last Thursday—published a brief article about Bruce Ivins and anthrax. This is the person who is believed to have been responsible for the anthrax attacks in the United States a few years ago. Some of the things said in that article really hit the nail on the head as to the concerns of members of my society. For example, they're suggesting that the security risk assessment in the States is going to take 45 days. We frequently have visiting scientists from other countries who are only spending a month in our lab. We could just never get them in, and maybe it wouldn't be worth going through this process for such a short period.
The security risk assessment in the U.S. has suggested to exclude persons with substance abuse or mental health problems. That seems to be an issue to me. This is the real scary one: being a citizen of a country the U.S. deems a sponsor of terrorism. Now, this could in fact be used against many Canadian citizens who hold dual citizenship and happen to come from one of those types of countries.
The last thing I would like to mention is that there could potentially be a health risk associated with a risk assessment licensing procedure if the delays are too long. If a diagnostic lab, in the face of an emergency like SARS, has to hire additional personnel or is short of personnel and has to have them in place to do the work, and this bureaucracy interferes with that process of hiring, this could actually backfire in terms of public health.
That is all I have to say. Thank you for your attention. I'd be happy to answer any questions in French or English.