Thank you. Good afternoon. I would like to thank the honourable members of this committee for the invitation to present to you today.
Biosecurity is clearly a significant issue for Canada, and I'm pleased to share comments and recommendations on behalf of Ontario's new public health agency.
My name is Vivek Goel. I'm a public health physician and the agency's president. I'm also a professor at the Dalla Lana School of Public Health at the University of Toronto. Joining me today is Dr. Don Low, the medical director of our public health laboratories, microbiologist-in-chief at Mount Sinai Hospital, and professor of laboratory medicine and pathobiology at the University of Toronto. Dr. Low is one of the heroes of SARS, who worked tirelessly throughout the outbreak to help protect the health of Canadians. Since then he has been outspoken in his commitment to the renewal of our public health laboratories.
The Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion was created by legislation in 2007 as a result of a number of expert panels and task forces established post-SARS. Similar to the creation of the Public Health Agency of Canada, the goal is to strengthen the public health system. Among other things we provide specialized scientific and technical advice and on-the-ground support to front-line health care workers, public health units, and government. We have a broad mandate that includes infectious disease control, health promotion, chronic disease and injury prevention, environmental and occupational health, and health emergency preparedness, including assisting in responses to bioterrorism.
On December 15, 2008, the Ontario public health laboratories transferred from the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care to the OAHPP. More than 600 staff work in the public health laboratories, which operate in 12 sites across Ontario. Our labs perform over four million laboratory tests annually. Our ability to generate laboratory data and use it efficiently and effectively to generate tools and technology to inform the public health and broader health systems will be key to our success.
The proposed legislation is laudable in its attempt to codify into statute a number of existing biosafety and biosecurity guidelines, and it addresses an issue of critical importance. We appreciate the information sessions that have taken place and the revisions that have been made. We also appreciate recent assurances we received from Dr. Tam and Dr. Butler-Jones that there will be further consultation, particularly as regulations are developed. We look forward to having an opportunity to truly provide input.
We have concerns related to several specific areas of the proposed legislation, particularly given the absence of draft regulations. We would prefer to see the most critical issues addressed in advance of passage of the legislation.
As drafted, the legislation confers broad powers on the minister in the use of a long list of pathogens and toxins. Based on the legislation alone, the potential for duplicate regulatory licensing and inspection regimes is very significant. The potential workload implications and resulting delays could significantly impact on the operation of clinical, public health, and research laboratories.
The bill provides for broad regulation-making powers. These powers relate to a broad range of topics such as facilities, security clearances, inventories, and licensing. In addition, the proposed legislation includes a provision whereby regulations may incorporate by reference any documents produced by persons or bodies other than the minister.
Given these broad powers, including the incorporation by reference, and the broad range of topics that may intrude into areas of provincial responsibility, it would be preferable if the bill included an explicit obligation on the minister to undertake public consultations. We recommend that the bill be amended to include a specific notice requirement, such as a publication advance of 60 days, and a requirement that the minister consider public comments or submissions and report back on what changes if any have been made as a result.
We understand that there is a clear process for guiding the development and posting of federal regulations, but it does not provide statutory requirements for the type of consultation we have proposed.
Central to Bill C-11 is the requirement for ministerial licences. Our public health laboratories already operate under the laboratories licensing act and follow routine accreditation. The proposed bill appears to create what is, in effect, a duplicate laboratory licensing regime.
We suggest that opportunities for harmonizing the licensing with existing regimes be considered.
The bill proposes that all accidental exposures to listed agents be reported federally. This runs the risk of intersecting with occupational health and safety requirements, and we recommend that overlap with those existing requirements be examined and eliminated.
As others have noted, the requirements for security checks could provide for very onerous burdens. We already have security checks in place for a number of individuals who are working in our laboratories who have access to certain types of pathogens. These security checks, as you have heard, could have a significant impact on training and students, as well as on our ability to bring in additional staff when we have to add surge capacity during an outbreak.
We recommend clarification of the requirements for security clearance for different categories of workers and an assurance that there will be appropriate processes for circumstances such as we have described.
Clause 38 of the bill spells out an extremely broad ability for the minister to order an applicant to disclose personal information. Central to our concern is the excessive breadth of this requirement and the lack of a reasonable test for the information that is being requested. We would like to see much greater detail in the bill regarding these powers.
In conclusion, we support the spirit and intent of Bill C-11 but feel that there are far too many unanswered questions at this stage.
We note that in the United States, following publication of similar legislation, many laboratories simply chose to stop working with listed pathogens rather than face the hassles and costs of complying with the legislation. The net result was diminished capacity to face public health threats.
We believe that an approach to biosafety and preparedness should be comprehensive and engage the laboratory and scientific community. We support the proposal by Dr. Peter Singer, who appeared before you last week, for a comprehensive assessment of Canada's readiness for bioterrorism through the Council of Canadian Academies.
In summary, the proposed bill creates what could become a significant duplicate inspection and compliance regime that imposes administrative burdens and costs.
Thank you for this opportunity to share our concerns and recommendations. We look forward to your comments and questions.