Thank you for this opportunity to speak. I won't take long and I won't belabour points that you likely already are familiar with from perusing the national pandemic plan and other sources.
Yukon itself has a fairly high-level pandemic plan that was revised in 2009 during the H1N1 pandemic, incorporating early lessons learned.
It's important to remind committee members that we are a small territory. We have only 35,000 people in the entire territory. One quarter of our people are first nations. As a small territory, we do not have a great capacity for research or analysis, nor for in-territory scientific expertise which the provinces may enjoy. However, we do have excellent collaborative relationships with our colleagues in the south. As a small territory, we also have the advantage of close connectivity between the public clinicians, political leaders, and public health personnel. In short, when we need to, we think we can get things done.
We were part of the national vaccine prioritization discussions held during pandemic 2009. Prioritization became a question of how best to protect a population with limited vaccine supplies and how we define protection for a population. Is it protecting societal function? Is it protecting the most vulnerable? Is it protecting children? Is it preserving the most life years possible for a population?
In the motion brought to the standing committee, there's reference to “the epidemiology” of the pandemic. What were the important aspects of the 2009 pandemic that related to prioritization? I would submit they were the following. The influenza was relatively mild but occasionally severe, especially for those with underlying medical conditions. There was some evidence of greater susceptibility among aboriginal peoples. There had already been a first wave of the pandemic, so an unknown number of people were already likely immune. The senior population had residual immunity from prior exposure to similar influenza viruses.
You can see how these features would influence prioritization. This would mean that if we were to prioritize, we would be very interested in our first nations people and those with underlying medical conditions, and perhaps we would be putting less priority on societal disruption and the senior population.
Apart from epidemiology, however, there was a key issue. The availability of the vaccine itself was in a tight race with the coming of the second wave. Therefore, for 2009, timing was everything.
In Yukon, though, as in other northern territories, at a certain point we realized we had a huge advantage that left us more or less peripheral to the detailed and angst-ridden prioritization discussions. For pandemic H1N1 2009, because of our small population, we were able to have all of our vaccine supply delivered in one shipment. In addition, we had the logistics to be able to deliver vaccine quite quickly.
Rather than having to triage people by susceptibility, age, gender, and occupation, we felt it was more efficient to offer the vaccine generally to the population. We believe our strategy worked well. Within two weeks we had covered 50% of our population, and after that, there was very little uptake in the weeks that followed.
Since firefighters are specifically mentioned in the motion, I'll offer the following.
Generally speaking and for future planning, protecting first responders and essential services people such as EMS, police, and firefighters has to be balanced with protecting the most susceptible members of the population.
Decisions about how to organize such priorities will of course depend on the epidemiology of the next pandemic and on features such as: whether certain age groups are more susceptible; the rate of transmissibility; the rate of severe disease; the expected demand on clinics and rural health centres, EMS, emergency wards, and in-patient services; and when the vaccine is actually going to be available vis-à-vis the course of the pandemic itself.
Regarding the importance of preserving societal function, we should agree to continually revise our definitions of what essential services are.
You may have heard that Yukon had a total communications blackout only two weeks ago. What use is a 911 system without working phone lines or a cellular network or Internet? That is just one example of the complexities of assigning values to societal importance. In this case, we just might want the cable guys who are out there fixing the lines to be the most healthy.
In summary, I can offer a few lessons from what I have learned.
One, rather than being a purely value-based system, it's crucial that prioritization be based on an ethical framework that is accountable and is free of bias, as should be the best of democratic processes.
Two, technology can change everything. Canada needs to be a leader in investing in immunization technologies for the next pandemic, whenever that may occur. I hope we're not still waiting for chickens to lay enough eggs in which to produce viral strains for vaccine.
Three, even when supplies may be limited, consideration should be given to the inefficiencies and societal distress inherent in assigning values and priorities. There may be lessons to be learned from what happened in the north: wide open access and rapid immunization of the population as a whole, an efficient, democratic, and equitable practice that we were lucky to have.
That's all I have to say. Thank you very much.