Mr. Casey and the committee, thank you very much for inviting me.
Much of what I'm going to say you have heard in different forms from a number of your witnesses, so I'll try to be as fast as I can and give you time for questions.
I'm presenting on behalf of our group, which is an independent group at the University of British Columbia. We have a grant through the provincial ministry of health. I don't want to sound immodest, but we have an international reputation for the quality of our work, and we have no conflicts of interest. That was a policy established when we were founded in 1994—absolutely, strictly no conflict. My colleagues said, “Don't disclose your own conflicts because none of us have conflicts related to the drug industry or this topic.”
I want to show you some of the lessons from our experience over the last 22 years, why we also feel that a national pharmacare program must be based on the best evidence if we want to get the best results, and why evaluation of drugs has to be independent of the pharmaceutical industry. This is a lot harder than it looks, but it's the only possible way to protect the public interest, not only in health but in taxpayers' dollars.
In British Columbia, PharmaCare started in 1973. This was an innovation of the government that was elected in 1972. It was popular policy, but there was no formulary, and any new drug was automatically covered. By 1989, the costs were compounding at 16% per year, which was doubling effectively every four or four and a half years. It was completely out of control, and it was irrational to say that the benefits were doubling every four and a half years. I know some politicians will say, “We will double your benefits every four and a half years”, but everyone knows this is impossible.
In 1994, because of this pressure and a very large provincial budget deficit at the time, the Ministry of Health realized it needed unconflicted advice on whether it should pay for new drugs. It established our group with a very strict conflict of interest policy: no pharmaceutical stock holdings, no money from drug companies, no going to drug dinners, and no contact. This was to protect us and isolate us, not from the intellectual issues but from the possibility of being compromised.
Then the Ministry of Health developed the courage to actually make funding decisions based on the results of this process, which was the real innovation in British Columbia.
The critical elements are to clarify the scientific evidence, free it from conflict and bias, start with an open mind, be rigorous about assessing the evidence, come up with a summary of the evidence, and turn that over to the Government of British Columbia, which then made its funding decisions.
It must be evidence, not opinion. If I say as a doctor that I find, for example, that opioids seem to work nicely for some of my patients with chronic pain, that's not adequate evidence for a policy decision. It might be in clinical practice, but not for government policy decisions. We need randomized clinical trials to have that kind of knowledge.
The results are that by 2007—I'm taking this point of time because we have the Canadian Rx Atlas that Professor Steve Morgan compiled that shows us this—the per capita drug costs were sufficiently lower in British Columbia that had we been at the Canadian average, we would have been spending $701 million more every year as of 2007. That would be much higher now.
We felt that $208 million of that savings came from choosing lower-cost drugs, which is partly referenced-based pricing. Another part of the saving was that PharmaCare did not cover many expensive drugs reimbursed by other provinces. I've chosen two examples to make this point to you. Drugs for Alzheimer's disease are the first example, and the other drugs are the so-called COX-2 inhibitors that were competitors for ibuprofen and naproxen, introduced starting in 1999 for use mostly with osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis.
We found that there was not evidence that these drugs were effective or better. PharmaCare in British Columbia declined to pay for them. Subsequent academic studies demonstrated that this led to no harm, but almost certainly must have saved potentially hundreds of lives in British Columbia alone, and that it saved a bundle of money for the taxpayer.
This became the precedent for the common drug review that you heard about in some of your earlier meetings.
I'll give you an example. The so-called COX-2 inhibitors, first licenced by Health Canada in 1999, were promoted as much safer, and some of you will remember the ads for Celebrex or Vioxx. However, within a few years both the brand name Vioxx, rofecoxib, and valdecoxib were removed from the market almost immediately, so most of you won't have even heard of them. Then lumiracoxib, which caused liver toxicity, was later removed, so you may not have heard of that drug either, but they were all licensed in Canada.
We looked clearly at the evidence and found that it clearly showed that these drugs were not superior to other drugs. We were vilified at that time as an academic group, including by our senior academic leadership. I know what it feels like to have the department head say, “Well, you're with the Therapeutics Initiative, but you may still come to our dinner”, and yet we were right.
The reason we were right is that we read the experimental evidence, such as was available, carefully. PharmaCare, on that basis, did not pay for them. The results were that our consumption was much lower than Ontario's, for which there is comparison. We didn't see the large rise in prescriptions that Ontario did. We had fewer hospitalizations per capita for gastrointestinal hemorrhage. We had much lower costs. The reason we achieved this was that the British Columbia government listened to the scientific evidence in a way that other governments did not.
A second example is donepezil, rivastigmine, and galantamine. Anyone who's had a relative with Alzheimer's disease or dementia will be in some way familiar with the names of these drugs. They were alleged to offer hope for people who have no other hope. They were very heavily promoted and aggressively advertised. The real evidence showed, and still shows, that they were basically not effective. Even an article by André Picard in today's Globe and Mail refers to this. They were dangerous for some patients. They would have almost certainly caused falls, collapse, fainting spells, diarrhea, urinary incontinence, etc.
PharmaCare did not pay for them. Again, both the government and the independent agency that provided the scientific review were vilified because these drugs were so heavily promoted as useful. I don't think there's anyone serious in the world now who feels that these drugs really are beneficial, possibly with rare clinical exceptions. The results were that we used fewer of these drugs in B.C. than in other provinces. I think there's universal consensus around the world that British Columbians didn't miss anything.
We know from certain other studies about the reference pricing initiative that PharmaCare saved very substantial amounts of money. The initiative was a decision that we would pay for the lowest-priced drug of a class where the drugs appeared to all have similar effects. This would include drugs such as ACE-inhibitor drugs for blood pressure, statins—as done in New Zealand—and calcium channel antagonists. Studies done partly by our group and partly by people at Harvard University demonstrated that there were no harmful consequences.
Then why are we here? I put this in to remind you that this is not the goal. The goal is not to have many more drugs. From some of his questions that I read from previous testimony, I think that Dr. Eyolfson is well aware that doctors, increasingly, are relatively poorly informed about drugs. Dr. Anne Holbrook also made this point to you. We don't want a student, like the one in this picture, facing a crazy desk full of drugs and trying to make rational decisions with drugs paid for either by somebody's out-of-pocket private money or by public money—certainly not public money.
Nor do we want what is shown in the next photo.. This one is from September, two months ago. It is a women who is overly sedated with three different sedative antidepressant drugs and is using four antidiabetic drugs. One of those antidiabetic drugs, the long insulin pen there, is a new version of a long-acting insulin that has no possible, conceivable advantage. It was reviewed by the common drug review, which recommended it not be listed. It's not paid for by the taxpayer; it's paid for out of her pocket. This is a women who, as a foster mother, raised a lot of children with fetal alcohol syndrome, as well as children born to mothers with heroin addiction. She needs money, and she's throwing her money away on these drugs. This is not the point of national pharmacare. The point of national pharmacare should be to help avoid that, if possible.
This speaks to what we really need, and Dr. Monica Dutt made this point to you when she raised the case of a young boy with type 1 diabetes. Without insulin, he dies. His mother was apparently begging her, if I understood her testimony correctly, for samples of some insulin, because she literally could not afford it.
That's what pharmacare should be about, in the same way that the purpose of medicare in Canada was to deliver useful treatments to people who really needed them, whether you cite Tommy Douglas or Emmett Hall or whomever as the father or the mother of medicare.
The logical expectation, then, should be—and here I echo many other witnesses—first that we should improve the health of Canadians, should not increase the harms, and should reduce drug costs and be proud of doing it, so that we can be sustainable and can fund the other determinants of health, such as clean water, proper nutrition, education, housing, and physical fitness, which are all suffering now in my province. We're spending so much money on health care, including drugs, that we no longer have music programs in our schools, for example. Also, as you know, we have many reserves all over the country without clean water.
The technical requirements to do this are that we need to base the policy on the best evidence, and it must be derived by people who are not conflicted. This point has been made in the United States for guidelines. We're lagging behind in Canada, but we're getting there.
Also, the independent group requires real expertise. I read again Anne Holbrook's testimony to you this morning and saw that she pointed out that there are very few clinical pharmacologists left in Canada. We need educators and independent expertise to do this.
I'm going to wrap up there. You have in your handout, I think, the list of other members of our academic group who contributed to the Therapeutics Initiative.
Thank you very much.