Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It's an honour and a privilege to have the opportunity to participate in your extensive study of a national pharmacare program.
My area of expertise is constitutional law, including the division of legislative powers. I will be confining my remarks today to that subject. I'm hoping I can be of some assistance to the committee in thinking about the constitutional pathways that are open to the federal Parliament if you were to decide to move ahead with a national pharmacare program.
I'll talk about several of the most important constitutional powers that are relevant to this discussion. I'll speak about both the opportunities they provide and the limits of proceeding pursuant to particular federal powers.
Let me begin by saying a few words about the federal spending power, which I think is central to this topic. From reviewing some of the transcripts of previous testimony and briefs that have been received by the committee, my sense is that many who have appeared before you to support a national pharmacare program are essentially assuming that the federal spending power and the mechanism of the Canada Health Act will be the route that Parliament would choose to move forward on a national pharmacare program.
The federal spending power is not set out anywhere explicitly in the Constitution, but it has been recognized by the courts as implicit in Parliament's power to levy taxes, which is class 3 of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, put together with Parliament's power to legislate in relation to public property in class 1A, and to appropriate federal funds, which is section 106 of the 1867 act.
In Prof. Hogg's words:
...the federal Parliament may spend or lend its funds to any government or institution or individual it chooses, for any purpose it chooses; and that it may attach to any grant or loan [of federal funds] any conditions it chooses...including conditions it could not directly legislate.
The spending power has been the subject of quite a lot of controversy over the years, including in academic circles. There are many scholars who deny its existence or who question its validity, particularly when it comes to conditional spending in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
However, the courts have not shared the doubts of the scholars who question the existence of the power. On the few occasions in which the courts have been called upon to discuss the spending power, they have recognized its existence, have stated that Parliament is not constrained, when spending funds, to acting only within areas of federal jurisdiction. In other words, spending can take place in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, and it's possible for Parliament to attach conditions to funds that it makes available to provinces.
I go into some of the case law in more detail in a brief I have provided to the committee, but the essence of it is that in a number of rulings, as I've said, the courts have recognized the spending power, recognized that federal governments can spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction and attach conditions to it.
It's not an unlimited power, and the precise nature of the limits on the federal spending power haven't really been spelled out in the case law, apart from the general principle that any federal legislation that is in pith and substance—meaning it has as its dominant characteristic—the regulation of a matter that falls within exclusive provincial jurisdiction is ultra vires the federal Parliament.
That's the fate, for example, that befell the unemployment insurance act when it was first put forward or proposed by the federal government back at the time of the Depression in a bundle of cases that we refer to as the New Deal cases, released in early 1937. The Privy Council struck down a number of federal legislative proposals, one of which was an unemployment insurance act.
Lord Atkin wrote in that opinion that the law that the government sought to defend as an exercise of the federal spending power was, in fact, in pith and substance the regulation of a provincial matter—employment contracts—and therefore was ultra vires Parliament.
More recent decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada have confirmed the existence of the spending power but have reiterated that limit: that at some point, federal spending can be too great an intrusion into provincial legislative jurisdiction and amount to the regulation of a provincial matter.
It's hard to know exactly where that limit is, but I would summarize the case by suggesting that while attaching general conditions like those set out in the Canada Health Act to federal spending in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction is acceptable—that's just a law that is in relation to the spending of federal funds, and general conditions can be attached to the receipt of those funds—at some point, if the conditions become too detailed, too precise an interference with or a dictation, if you like, of how the provinces should deal with matters that fall within their exclusive jurisdiction, like health care, then it will be ultra vires the federal Parliament.
That's the federal spending power. It's recognized. It exists. It has uncertain limits. I think the conclusion we can draw from the case law regarding it is that the least controversial route, I would say, to the implementation of a national pharmacare program is to amend the Canada Health Act so that it includes drugs that are provided outside of hospitals in the definition of insured services that have to be provided by the provinces. Currently, as you know, it's only when drugs are administered in the hospitals that they're covered under the Canada Health Act.
The scope and the details with regard to the funding and protection of drugs would be left primarily to processes of federal, provincial, and territorial negotiations if that amendment were put in place.
I'm not saying that it's uncontroversial in the sense that there wouldn't be any political resistance to taking that step, but from a legal point of view, there would be...I hesitate to say zero risk, but a very low risk of any uncertainty about the constitutional validity of proceeding in that manner.
What about other alternatives? The criminal law power is relevant in this context. Again, in my brief I go through the parameters of the criminal law power and some of the case law on it. There are several cases that have upheld provisions of the Food and Drugs Act and the regulations that have been passed pursuant to it, which, as you know, amount to very a extensive regulation of various aspects of the production and marketing of food and drugs. The courts have not doubted the validity of the Food and Drugs Act and its regulations from the point of view of the federal criminal law power.
The limits of the federal criminal law power are that it authorizes laws that are in pith and substance—that is, in their dominant characteristic—putting in place prohibitions, coupled with penalties, for a typically criminal public purpose, such as the protection of health or safety.
The Food and Drugs Act and its regulations meet that test, but any legislative response that seeks to go beyond a criminal law form—prohibitions coupled with penalties, or a criminal law purpose like protecting health or safety—would not be capable of being upheld under the criminal law power.
Parliament's power to pass laws in relation to patents is also relevant to the discussion of drugs. That's class 22 in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. It's pursuant to that power that the Patent Act has been enacted. The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board is established pursuant to provisions of the act, and is tasked with regulating the prices of patented medicines sold in Canada to ensure that they are not excessive.
These are valid exercises of Parliament's jurisdiction pursuant to class 22 of section 91, but that power cannot enable Parliament to regulate the prices of unpatented drugs, so a comprehensive approach to the pricing of drugs can't be sustained pursuant to that part of section 91 alone.
More ambitious proposals to establish a new national agency that would regulate drugs, including the prices of both patented and unpatented medicines—and you've heard some ambitious proposals along those lines—could not be upheld under the spending power, the criminal law power, or the patents power.
One possibility that could be entertained by Parliament is the “peace, order, and good government” power, which is in the opening words of section 91, which can sustain legislation that is addressing a matter of national concern and also one that is not too diffuse or too broad. That seems counterintuitive, but the courts have been concerned that if we allocate to the POGG power matters such as health, pollution, or inflation, those subject matters are so broad and diffuse that to allocate them to Parliament's jurisdiction would upset the division of powers and would unduly interfere with the autonomy of the provinces.
A subject matter, to qualify under the national concern branch of POGG, has to be quite focused, narrow, and specific, and it's possible the national pharmacare program could meet that definition. It's highly debatable, I think, but it's possible that it's sufficiently discrete and focused to fall within the national concern branch of POGG.
Can I have one more minute, Mr. Chair?