Okay. By having clusters of products that have equal benefit, with the health technology assessment showing that there is equal therapeutic benefit between, for instance, two active substances, the person will receive the maximum reimbursement in this cluster. The prescriber has the freedom to prescribe either one of those products. But when there is a copayment of one product—let's say, the maximum price is $100, and there is one product that has a maximum price of $100, and one that goes above that, so $120, for instance—then you will often see a tendency for prescribers to prescribe the drug that has no copayments, that has no additional contribution by the patient. You do see some movement towards that.
When there is a generic product in that market, basically the generic has the same maximum reimbursement level as the originator. But because it's a generic, as soon as there is competition in generic markets, and we see for the majority of products there is competition, we will see that price drop really low because the insurance company actually determines what it will pay for this product. Based on the expected volume within the insured population, often the larger insurance companies, with a larger patient population of sometimes one or two million, will be able to negotiate a lower price for a specific generic supplier. Then, because it's ascribed an INN, 96% of the population almost immediately goes to the generic product that's been handed over.
Is that a sufficient answer to your question?