Health Committee on May 25th, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome, everyone, to meeting number 23 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health. Pursuant to the orders of reference of April 11 and April 20, 2020, the committee is meeting for the purpose of receiving evidence concerning matters related to the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Firstly, in order to facilitate the work of our interpreters and ensure an orderly meeting, I would like to outline a few rules to follow. The interpretation in this video conference will work very much like in a regular committee meeting. You have the choice at the bottom of your screen of either floor, English or French. Please speak slowly and clearly and hold your microphone in front of your mouth, as directed during the sound check. If you will be speaking in both official languages, please ensure that you switch to the language that you will be speaking on the translation icon. That will help the interpreters and people listening to the feed, and also allows for better sound quality for interpretation.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. When you are ready to speak, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike. Should members need to request the floor outside of their designated time for questions, they should activate their mike and state that they have a point of order. I'll remind you that all comments by members and witnesses should be addressed through the chair.

Should any technical challenges arise, please advise the chair or the clerk immediately and the technical team will work to resolve it. If necessary, we will suspend while that happens.

Before we get started, can everyone click on their screen, on the top right-hand corner and ensure they are on gallery view. With this view everyone should be able to see all of the participants in a grid-like fashion. This will ensure that all video participants can see one another.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses now.

Each witness group will have 10 minutes for an opening statement, followed by the usual rounds of questions from members. As individuals, although appearing together, we have, from McMaster University, Dr. Gerry Wright, director of the Michael G. DeGroote Institute for Infectious Disease Research and David Braley Centre for Antibiotic Discovery; and Dr. Karen Mossman, acting vice-president, research. We also have, as individuals, from the Université de Montréal, Dr. Caroline Quach-Thanh, full professor, department of microbiology, infectious diseases and immunology, faculty of medicine, and medical microbiologist and epidemiologist, CHU Sainte-Justine; and Dr. Cécile Tremblay, professor of microbiology, immunology and infectious diseases.

Welcome, and thank you all for sharing your time with us today. We will begin with Dr. Wright and Dr. Mossman. You have 10 minutes between the two of you. Please go ahead.

[Dr. Karen Mossman, Acting Vice-President, Research, McMaster University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to thank you all for inviting my colleague and me to appear today to discuss Canada's response to COVID-19. My name is Dr. Karen Mossman and I am the acting vice-president, research, at McMaster University. I am also a professor in pathology and molecular medicine, and a virologist by training.

Very early on, my team was involved in isolating SARS-CoV-2, the agent responsible for the outbreak of COVID-19. Isolating and propagating the virus has enabled researchers across Canada to better understand the virus and work on potential solutions.

At McMaster University, our researchers pivoted very quickly to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes working on the development of home test kits, leading a national trial for plasma transfusion and leading a trial on anti-coronavirus therapy. A great deal of work is being done across the university to innovate respiratory ventilators and N95 masks. Thanks to funding from the CIHR, my own lab is studying SARS-CoV-2 pathogenesis in human and bat cells.

The university is also doing its part as a member of the community. We donated our stock of personal protective equipment to our community hospital, and our residences are currently being used to host medical residents as needed.

Many of our researchers are at the forefront of the global coronavirus research. This pandemic is the very reason that we established our Institute for Infectious Disease Research. We have built infrastructure to respond to crises and outbreaks like COVID-19. One of our researchers with the institute, Dr. Dawn Bowdish, is currently looking at how the immune system responds to infection and will provide insight for the prevention and management of COVID-19 which may lead to potential treatments.

I will now pass it over to my colleague, Dr. Gerry Wright, who is the director of our Institute for Infectious Disease Research and who can speak more to the work that is being done there.

Thank you.

[Dr. Gerry Wright, Director, Michael G. DeGroote Institute for Infectious Disease Research and David Braley Centre for Antibiotic Discovery, McMaster University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for the invitation to speak here.

The COVID-19 pandemic is revealing what we in the field have known for decades—that is, despite the tremendous advances in medicine over the past century, we remain highly vulnerable to infectious diseases. We knew this because of the lessons of other pandemics, epidemics and outbreaks that we experienced in recent memory. These include HIV/AIDS, Ebola, the first SARS epidemic, MERS, H1N1 influenza and now COVID-19.

My own research is focused primarily on addressing the other pandemic we are simultaneously experiencing, that of antibiotic resistance, or AMR. AMR is slower-moving than COVID-19, but it has the potential to be even more deadly and create greater economic burdens than the current crisis. I will return to AMR in more detail later, but first I want to frame my remarks around what I see as the current reality.

Despite these past experiences with epidemics and pandemics, we must be honest and recognize that we have, time and time again, failed to learn that we must continuously support research and development in infectious diseases to be prepared for the next problem. To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, in infectious disease there are the “known knowns”, the things that we know are a problem, like AMR. There are the “known unknowns”, the things that we know will happen but can't easily predict, like a new viral pandemic such as the one we're experiencing. Then there are the “unknown unknowns”, the things that we don't even see coming, like the emergence of prion infections like mad cow disease, which took us all by surprise.

The only way we can prepare for these eventualities—that are, eventually, going to occur—is to support a robust, nimble and multidisciplinary community of infectious disease researchers in Canada.

The parallel to fire departments is often made. We as a society support the purchase of fire trucks, the very best and reliable equipment, and employ well-trained firefighters, because we have learned to be prepared for fires. We value this protection. Even though we hope that as individuals we never need it, if we do, then we sure are happy that we invested in it.

To be prepared for the next challenges in infectious disease, we need to invest in and develop a vibrant community of scientists, clinicians, engineers and social scientists who will dedicate their careers to solving our current problems and the ones that we know will emerge. However, given the lack of sustained funding in this area, our best and brightest young researchers and clinicians do not see great opportunities to thrive—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I'm sorry, Dr. Wright, interpretation isn't on any more. They're not getting anything.

We will suspend the meeting briefly and sort this out.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

We will resume the meeting.

Dr. Wright, please carry on. We will set your time back to five minutes. Please go ahead.

[Dr. Gerry Wright]

Again, I apologize for the technical problem.

I was making the point that to be prepared for the next challenges in infectious diseases, we need to invest and develop a vibrant community of scientists, clinicians, engineers and social scientists who will dedicate their careers to solving our current problems and the ones that we know will emerge. However, given the lack of sustained funding in this area, our best and brightest young researchers and clinicians do not see great opportunities to thrive by studying infectious diseases. We do not have sufficient support to maintain our existing key facilities such as the biosafety level 3 labs that are so important today, let alone expand our capacity in an emergency.

I want to be clear that I'm very grateful for the funding that my team and I have received from CIHR to address the COVID-19 crisis. We're working with a great team of virologists, chemists and experts in human responses to infection to find new candidate drugs to treat COVID-19, but this is challenging, as you can imagine, in the midst of a pandemic. Had we invested in the past in programs that sought to build these teams and support them, we might have been in a position to lead the globe in this crisis. Canada can and should be leading the world in infectious disease research.

This takes me back to AMR, the other pandemic we're now experiencing, a known known. No one can argue that antibiotics haven't changed medicine, perhaps like no other group of drugs has. Antibiotics not only cure infections caused by bacteria; they have enabled much of the progress in modern medicine over the last 75 years by being there to prevent infection. For example, in major surgeries, cancer chemotherapy, organ transplants or hip and knee replacements, antibiotics are used to make sure that these procedures occur infection-free.

Imagine where we'd be without these miracle drugs. It's actually pretty easy to imagine. We'd be exactly where we are right now with SARS-CoV-2, with no therapies and all the devastation that results. Ironically, we may face even more pressure in AMR due to the current pandemic as we deploy more of these drugs to avoid secondary bacterial infections, and due to untested claims of the use of antibiotics such as azithromycin in COVID-19 therapies that put pressure on drug supply and derail antibiotic stewardship efforts.

We haven't had a new class of antibiotics since the 1980s. Since then, bacteria continue to evolve and have become resistant to, actually, all of our drugs. Paradoxically, the pharmaceutical industry does not see antibiotics as profitable, and they have systemically shut down antibiotic discovery programs over the last 15 years.

At McMaster, we're trying to buck the trend. Aided by remarkable philanthropic investments, we created the Michael G. DeGroote Institute for Infectious Disease Research and the new David Braley Centre for Antibiotic Discovery. We've built a culture of innovation and dedication to solving the most challenging infectious disease problems we face today, including AMR and now COVID-19. The team is multidisciplinary. It spans medicine, biology, chemistry, math, engineering, computer science and social science. This is essential to respond to future waves of COVID-19 and future pandemics.

In closing, I'd like to again express my gratitude for the rapid research funding programs that have been deployed to address the current pandemic and for the unity of the House in supporting these investments. I can assure you that the researchers in our teams, who I note include many young people—graduate students, medical students and post-doctoral fellows—are working day and night to solve this problem.

What I, frankly, worry about is what's next for these amazing young people. They are our firefighters, but are we prepared as a society to invest in a world-class fire department for them?

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Dr. Wright.

We go now to Dr. Quach-Thanh.

Please, go ahead. You have 10 minutes.

[Dr. Caroline Quach-Thanh, Full Professor, Department of Microbiology, Infectious Diseases and Immunology, Faculty of Medicine, Université de Montréal, Medical Microbiologist and Epidemiologist, CHU Sainte-Justine, As an Individual]

I want to thank the chair and the members of the Standing Committee on Health for the invitation to speak. I also want to acknowledge the work of our public health authorities. Both Dr. Tam, at the federal level, and Dr. Arruda, in Quebec, are doing unenviable work. They must all make public health decisions with imperfect data and with scientific evidence that's emerging as we go along.

I'm a pediatric microbiologist and infectologist and a clinician-researcher at CHU Sainte-Justine. I'm also a full professor at the Université de Montréal's Department of Microbiology, Infectious Diseases and Immunology. I'm a past president of the Association of Medical Microbiology and Infectious Disease Canada. I'm a member of the COVID-19 expert panel established by the chief science advisor of Canada. I'm also a member of the COVID-19 immunity task force's leadership team.

My clinical and research expertise is in infection control, from the hospital to the community, and it also extends to immunization. I want to thank the Fonds de recherche du Québec en santé for supporting this research topic from the start. What stands out in the current situation is how much infection control generally isn't seen as essential, but rather as a necessary evil.

Back in 2001, the Public Health Act already acknowledged that infectious diseases could pose a threat to public health. In 2005, in the wake of the Clostridium difficile outbreak, the Aucoin report, entitled “First do no harm...Nosocomial infections in Quebec, a major health issue, a priority,” revealed that successive budget cuts had prompted facilities to reduce resources not related to the direct care of users.

This led to a decrease in the already insufficient number of infection control professionals and a reduction in housekeeping services, which had the impact that we know. The report concluded that competent and stable infection control teams were required and that a culture of prevention needed to be developed and nurtured.

Following the report, terms of reference were established in 2006 and reviewed in 2017. This document recommended that prevention teams conduct simulations as part of their preparations for managing outbreaks of virulent or emerging pathogens. The document also recommended that facility managers create clinical and administrative teams to manage major or persistent outbreaks in order to facilitate decision-making and implement recommended measures.

In this situation, management must give the designated infection control officer and the nurse manager of the department the necessary authority and resources, including line authority to suspend activities that could put people's safety at risk.

The terms of reference also recommended adherence to ratios of infection control professionals per number of beds adapted to the various types of facilities, including residential and long-term care centres, or CHSLDs. These ratios are one of the monitoring indicators at the departmental level. It would be useful to see whether the facilities monitored these ratios in the run-up to the current pandemic.

Despite the Aucoin report's findings and the resulting terms of reference, clearly many recommendations took a back seat over the years because of a significant lack of human, financial and material resources, or because they weren't considered important enough.

Infection control expertise remains key in all health crises. It must be included in the steering and management committees of facilities and networks, which isn't always the case. The infection control officer and the nurse manager, along with the other managers, must be at the decision-making table at all times, not just in times of crisis.

Prevention expertise must be recognized in all settings. We must continue to promote the prevention role played by the officer, nurses and professionals in order to attract quality people who have the necessary leadership skills and the desire to pursue a long-term career in the field.

In addition, hygiene and health workers play a key role in infection control and must be properly recognized. Occupational health offices are also understaffed, which prevents them from conducting fit testing of N95 masks and tracking workers exposed to COVID-19 cases in a timely manner.

Everyone knows the saying “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Yet in Quebec, preventive medicine accounts for only about 3% of the health care budget. Infection control is no exception, and it has suffered from chronic underinvestment.

The current devastation in our seniors' residences and centres is partly the result of insufficient infection control resources in these places. Obviously, the prevention measures implemented in these places must be thoroughly reviewed. The public will only be better for it.

The current pandemic also exposed the lack of personal protective equipment, which forced the infection control advisory committees to take this factor into consideration in their recommendations.

This situation shouldn't have occurred. After the severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, crisis in 2003, stocks were built up. However, some stocks don't appear to have been replenished over the years.

In addition, the inability of our industries to manufacture personal protective equipment and certain drugs locally has exposed our dependence on other economies. The necessary steps must be taken to address these shortcomings in the near future.

The growing complexity of treatment and care and the fragility of our patient population in pediatric, geriatric and neonatal care increase the risk of infection, morbidity and mortality. To protect this vulnerable population from infections, both during their hospital stay and after discharge, we need well-enforced infection control practices. In the current pandemic situation, clearly proper knowledge of prevention concepts is needed in all care settings. However, this hasn't been the case.

Despite scientific progress, infection control research is still in its infancy. Grants from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, or CIHR, are hard to come by. Infection control projects differ from other projects. They're generally transdisciplinary projects involving the social sciences, engineering, and basic and clinical sciences.

These clinical projects, along with other prevention projects, are often less well recognized than projects with a curative focus. They don't receive proper funding. The failure to invest in learning how to change behaviours and prevent antibiotic resistance, to prevent respiratory infections in CHSLDs, or to assess the effectiveness of wearing gloves, in addition to hand hygiene, are just a few examples of the shortcomings that undermine our ability to prevent infections, including the current pandemic.

Many infection control measures and recommendations are provided empirically without solid evidence. This constitutes a major barrier in ensuring that medical personnel take ownership of the recommendations. Prevention measures must be assessed. However, the diversity of monitoring approaches across Canada, along with the difficulties involved in pooling data from province to province, makes the centralization of data on a Canada-wide basis almost impossible.

This makes it difficult to assess prevention measures with a large enough sample size to draw conclusions and interferes with the smooth and timely management of outbreaks. Moreover, this doesn't give us the chance to learn from our successes or failures.

I applaud the CIHR's quick launch of competitions for operating grants for a rapid research response to COVID-19 to address the pandemic issues in real time.

Ironically, in the current pandemic situation, clinician-researchers who serve as infection control officers and who identified relevant research issues as part of their daily work were unable to submit a project as principal investigators in the first CIHR competition. These clinician-researchers were all managing the pandemic in their respective facilities with an increased workload. At the same time, the CIHR cancelled the March competition and asked everyone to apply again for the regular September competition.

However, in the current situation, the researchers involved in the management of COVID-19 will be at a disadvantage, since no preliminary data will be available to improve the application submitted six months later.

Infection control research is critical, whether or not it concerns COVID-19. The research provides the necessary input to the federal and provincial advisory committees, which make recommendations to departments. The departments will ultimately make the decisions. The research also helps improve techniques and approaches used in facilities and in the community.

Lastly, we can't overstate the need for infection control and the associated research to prevent the development and spread of infections in the community and in health care facilities, including CHSLDs. Proper investment in this key health care sector would have saved lives and public money.

We must learn from our past mistakes and take the necessary steps to ensure a proper and quality infection control system. Infection control improved dramatically after the Clostridium difficile crisis. Hopefully, further progress will be made after the COVID-19 crisis.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Doctor.

Dr. Tremblay, please go ahead. You have 10 minutes.

[Dr. Cécile Tremblay, Professor, Department of Microbiology, Infectiology and Immunology, Faculty of Medicine, Université de Montréal, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of the committee members for inviting me to speak in front of the committee.

I am a medical microbiologist and infectious disease specialist at the Centre hospitalier de l'Université de Montréal and full professor and director of the translational HIV research chair at the Université de Montréal, where I led two pan-Canadian cohorts on HIV research. I was the director of the Quebec public health laboratory from 2012 to 2015 and was co-chair of the Canadian Public Health Laboratory Network during this period.

Today, I'm talking to you as a researcher, a clinician and a public health scientist.

Let's talk research. First, I want to congratulate the Canadian government on its rapid response to the pandemic with the investment of specific funds directed at COVID-19 research very early on in February, and then again in the month of May. There was an urgent need to support research teams already in place in order to advance innovation, mostly in treatment and vaccine development, to counter this pandemic. That's the good news, but there is still so much we need to learn to better understand this disease pathogenesis and, as well, to analyze our response to this pandemic and better prepare for the future.

To date, the funding opportunities that were launched were short-term opportunities only—less than a year—yet look at what needs to be done to win this battle. We have to characterize the host responses to the virus, such as, for example, what drives these multisystemic inflammatory responses and how to treat them; understand SARS CoV-2 replication and its genetic evolution over time; characterize the quality and durability of natural as well as vaccine-induced immunity in various populations, such as the immunosuppressed, the elderly and children; and, understand the dynamics of pandemics in terms of what went wrong, and whether we can build tools, models, to better predict the next phases or next pandemics.

All of this takes time—time and money. However, as I mentioned, the last funding opportunity was directed at one-year projects only. Over 1,800 applications were submitted, which reflects the interest and innovation potential of our Canadian research community, but only a few of these will be funded, and then what? There are no more announcements regarding future funding opportunities. The Canadian Institutes of Health Research cancelled their spring competition, and we don't know what will happen with the September competition, which is directed at research projects in all domains outside COVID-19.

It is urgent to invest more funds for COVID-19 research. The government needs to launch a phase three in its COVID-19 research investments. This phase should be directed at gaining three things. They are to get a better understanding of the virus and its complex interactions with humans; to better understand our immune responses; and, equally important for the future, to learn the clinical, social and epidemiological lessons from this pandemic in both the mid-term and the long term.

Furthermore, why not take the opportunity to create a research infrastructure to monitor viral diseases over decades? This observatory would follow a cohort of individuals across the country who regularly would donate blood and clinical data that would become an extraordinary platform to identify, characterize and predict future zoonotic viral illnesses.

From a clinical standpoint, I'm concerned about our preparedness for the second wave of the pandemic. Do we have enough personal protective equipment, swabs and reagents for laboratory testing in the fall? What does our stockpile look like right now? Will we be caught in the same unprepared situation as at the start of the pandemic? It seems vital that, both in the short term and long term, Canada be self-sufficient in terms of manufacturing these essential materials to manage an epidemic and protect our health care workers.

In addition, the current epidemic has highlighted the shortcomings of our health care systems, especially the shortage of personnel in all categories, from nursing aides to maintenance workers to nurses. Governments should reinforce training programs that will encourage young people to enter different health care professions, through scholarships, enhanced university programs combined with support for universities, and better working conditions for all personnel. They are the health care system.

Lastly, we've hardly touched on the use of new technology to manage epidemics. It's 2020. Artificial intelligence should be at the forefront of research activities. Tools should be developed to serve public health needs while respecting individual confidentiality. Artificial intelligence should become a research and development priority. The tools should be standardized across Canada to synergize our capacity to control a pandemic.

Many lessons will be learned from this pandemic. Researchers in basic science, public health, social science and clinical fields should play a pivotal role in analyzing the determinants of this crisis and preparing us for the next one. We must review our pandemic preparedness plans. The time has come to invest in research and to train the next generation so that these lessons are based on science and so that the solutions are anchored in evidence and sound scientific thought.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Dr. Tremblay.

We'll start our questioning now. We'll do three rounds of questioning. We'll start our first round with Dr. Kitchen.

Dr. Kitchen, please go ahead. You have six minutes.

[Robert Gordon Kitchen, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, all, for your presentations. They were so short. I wish I could sit down with each one of you individually because I have so many questions and so many angles I'd love to ask you about. I'll try to be as concise as I can. I'll follow in order of who presented.

Dr. Mossman, you talked about N95 masks and talked a little bit about reutilizing the masks by making them sanitary. You may know this as well, that VIDO-InterVac in the University of Saskatchewan is also doing that sort of thing. I'm wondering if you could comment on that for us, please.

[Dr. Karen Mossman]

We have been working with a number of local companies that have a variety of different devices that they would like tested for the ability to sterilize and reuse N95 masks, because we all recognize that they are in short supply. We have set up the ability to have our engineering faculty members ensure the integrity of the masks, and there are different types of sterilization. Then we have a number of our virologists testing that the methodology will properly sterilize the masks and kill the viruses.

Our engineering faculty is also working on looking at different types of materials that could potentially be used to generate sufficient types of masks.

[Robert Gordon Kitchen, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

That was my next question to you. It's not just N95s that we're looking at, because N95s are more specific respirators versus other masks we see a lot of people using. We're also looking at the material that they're using to see how much it protects.

The 95, as you're aware, indicates purely the percentage of microns that it minimizes. Correct?

[Dr. Karen Mossman]

That's correct.

[Robert Gordon Kitchen, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

Thank you, Dr. Mossman; I appreciate that.

Dr. Wright, you talked about AMR. I have a background in it, not a great one, but I do have one. A lot of people on the committee may not be aware of it.

When we're talking of antimicrobial research, we're talking about protection from four things: bacteria, fungi, viruses, protozoa. Ultimately, the research is not there, as you've indicated. The concern is that we have people going into long-term care facilities, into hospitals, where the hospitals are using materials, disinfectants, in my opinion not to the strength they should be, such that they're not protecting the public when they go to these facilities. Is that the area that we maybe should be focusing on a little more? We have long-term care practitioners who are only going to one facility now instead of several. They're now changing their clothes when they get there. They're wearing their clothes at work then changing back to their street clothes, etc. Could you comment on that, please?

[Dr. Gerry Wright]

Certainly you raise a really important point. That is, as health care workers move between facilities, they take with them any organisms that are on them, any bacteria or viruses that they happen to be in contact with, and they can transfer them to other spots. This is one of the big challenges with antibiotic resistance, in that these bacteria can move around on people and on other surfaces.

It is an issue that I think we have to be very aware of. I'm very happy that, at least in Ontario, we're trying very hard not to have people move around among these facilities, because I think it does present an unnecessary risk.

[Robert Gordon Kitchen, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

That's great. Thank you.

Dr. Quach-Thanh, thank you for your presentation. It's tremendous. I look at your research, and I'm interested in a number of things in it.

First of all, if we go back to the issues of 2001, 2005, where we were looking at infections, we started with the concept of infection control teams. Over time—and I think you're alluding to it—we've been left behind. Many of our witnesses have indicated things we've brought up that have not been followed through on. For example, research started up for one or two years after the SARS epidemic, then all of a sudden it seemed to be forgotten.

You talked a little about infection control teams and doing simulation ratios. I think those are part of what PHAC was supposed to be doing. Do you know how many simulations have been done since 2005?

[Dr. Caroline Quach-Thanh]

It's hard for me to speak at the Canadian level. That responsibility lies with PHAC, but also with provincial public health institutes and with hospitals.

I know that at the Canadian level there have been simulations around pandemics. They did one around Ebola. They did one around the H1N1 influenza pandemic. They were supposed to be doing another one now, but the real thing happened before a simulation could be done.

At the level of our hospitals, I think that most of us have done one or two, whether doing Ebola or now with COVID, but it's not something that we do on an ongoing basis because it requires resources, time, as you can imagine. Yes, absolutely, we should be keeping that in mind and doing more of that so we're not taken by surprise when something like this happens.

In my hospitals we've done some. I was at the McGill University Health Centre before, and we also had them. It should be somewhere on a checklist, that you should be doing them every year or every other year, just to make sure you know how to think through a new pandemic or an outbreak.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

Mr. Van Bynen, please go ahead. You have six minutes.

[Tony Van Bynen, Liberal, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair; and thank you to all our witnesses for joining the committee today and for sharing their valuable expertise.

I've heard of a lot of collaboration happening out in the field, and I'd like to learn more about the virus and finding the potential treatments, developing the vaccine.

Dr. Mossman, I understand that your findings were a product of collaboration between Sunnybrook hospital and the University of Toronto. I wonder whether the amount of collaboration we're experiencing during this pandemic is something you've experienced in the field prior to the pandemic, and are there any challenges you are facing with respect to collaboration?

[Dr. Karen Mossman]

We are very fortunate that we have really strong collaborators, especially within Ontario and within Canada. Even at the initial phases, when COVID first started in Toronto and we were working with Sunnybrook to isolate the virus, it was a very natural and very quick collaboration.

What I am seeing that is different as we move through the pandemic is the international collaboration and the willingness of scientists to share information before it is published. That is fairly new, but we were able to very quickly collaborate. I think it's because of that Canadian spirit that we have phenomenal collaborators. We have not seen any challenges with collaborating either with our colleagues in Toronto or across Canada.

[Tony Van Bynen, Liberal, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

How can the federal government foster a more collaborative or innovative environment between research groups in order to find and support future treatments, for the vaccine for COVID-19?

[Dr. Karen Mossman]

One mechanism that has become very useful is the CanCOVID platform. It's a platform that is now linking all COVID-based researchers in a number of different areas. It's very expensive to maintain. I know there have been discussions about having the government help fund initiatives such as that.

The CanCOVID platform really helps you to find the right collaborator, if you don't know who that is, who you should be asking your questions to. The platform allows individuals and individual researchers to find the collaborators and to initiate conversations. It has been a really excellent resource, and funding resources such as that can be very helpful.

[Tony Van Bynen, Liberal, Newmarket—Aurora, ON]

Thank you.

My next question is for Dr. Wright. It's my understanding that you have received funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research as part of the government's investment to fight COVID, to support medical research focusing on targeting genetic and chemical vulnerabilities of the virus.

Could you share with the committee a bit more about your research and how it is supporting the development of treatments for COVID-19?