That's a great question. I don't really have an answer for you. I'm very much hoping that the independent panel the health minister has struck to look into this question will get to the bottom of it. Their interim report suggested that they hadn't been able—at that stage, when that interim report was prepared—to fully understand why the GPHIN alert system had been put on hold, which it had. They confirmed that reality, which we learned about through Globe and Mail investigative reporting.
I think it speaks to a larger, frankly, cultural problem in the Public Health Agency of Canada, which is that it took its sights off global health early warning and didn't feel this was a priority. For that reason, GPHIN was kind of put on the blocks. The risk assessment process wasn't properly instituted and staffed and resourced and fully understood.
This speaks to the significance of a real cultural change that needs to take place at the Public Health Agency of Canada, alongside much greater integration between health security practices and the national security community, which was exactly what was called for in 2004 and not implemented.