Health Committee on Feb. 28th, 2022

[Laila Goodridge]

I think one of the primary influences that we've had in Canada has been our ability to very rapidly enact the governance structure that sits under the FPT public health response plan for biological events. That allowed us to very quickly put in place an effective FPT governance for COVID-19. Bringing together the strength of the collaborative effort of the provinces and territories in all aspects from the beginning of January was a very effective measure for Canada and had a very significant influence.

I don't know if my colleagues, with respect to any of the surveillance or borders, would have anything to add in that regard.

[Brigitte Diogo]

Thank you, Cindy.

I could add that it's because of the layers of protection that we have built in place, both vaccination and the effort made to ensure that we are monitoring the importation risks and taking action as they become evident. As well, the collaboration with provinces and territories contributed to a pan-Canadian effort to really mitigate the risk, with vaccination being at the core of progress that we have made here to deal with and cope with the pandemic.

[Adam van Koeverden, Liberal, Milton, ON]

Thank you.

As a follow-up to that question, if you could put your finger on or isolate one major gap or one major failing that unfortunately cost Canadian lives, where would that gap be? I know it's far more complex than just one issue, but what is a major one that we could address?

[Laila Goodridge]

I think for Canada, one of the critical lessons learned has been with domestic self-sufficiency in regard to personal protective equipment in particular. We saw some fantastic leaning forward by manufacturers in Canada, in everything from face shields to hand sanitizers, to quickly mobilize manufacturing in Canada. We saw a fiercely competitive global market. In the face of that type of competitive nature, we need to build on and learn from the domestic manufacturing that we put in place today to better situate Canada for the future.

Thank you.

[Adam van Koeverden, Liberal, Milton, ON]

I think we're all grateful to see an increase in domestic production of both vaccines and PPE, so thank you for that answer.

Moving on a little bit, again to PHAC, I'm curious to know to what degree the Public Health Agency of Canada agrees with the Auditor General's assessment, findings and recommendations, and what aspects of it they feel are worthy of conversation, perhaps.

[Brigitte Diogo]

Perhaps I could start and then turn it over to my colleague.

As we went forward to respond to the pandemic, a number of programs were stood up very quickly. We absolutely welcome the reports and the recommendations from the Auditor General. There is no question that we could have been better prepared. The answer is absolutely yes. Have we learned from the lessons, and are we making adjustments as we go? Absolutely yes. We will continue to implement the recommendations.

From a border management perspective, one of the points the Auditor General raised was about the electronic system and our quarantine management system. How do we position ourselves to be ready for future pandemics? That is something we are very much working on and keeping in mind.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sean Casey]

Thank you, Ms. Diogo and Mr. van Koeverden.

Mr. Thériault, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for coming to enlighten us and give us an update on this pandemic so that we can find solutions and face the next pandemic by taking better measures.

My first question is for the Deputy Auditor General, Mr. Hayes.

Mr. Hayes, report number 13 clearly states that several shortcomings were identified with respect to the monitoring and verification of quarantine measures for temporary foreign workers. You mention incomplete or poor quality quarantine inspection, quality issues and delays in outbreak inspections, and a significant backlog of overdue inspections in the agricultural sector.

To what do you attribute these problems?

Don't you think it would have been more effective in terms of controlling the pandemic and the risk of outbreaks if the government had taken over the management of quarantines when the workers arrived, and then sent them on to their facilities or farms?

Wouldn't this have avoided the problems you raise?

[Andrew Hayes]

Thank you for the question.

I'm not in a position to comment on the government's choice of policies, but to answer your first question, I would say that the agreements between the federal government and the provincial and territorial governments were important to ensure that we received good information to deal with or manage the pandemic.

With respect to quarantine measures, I would say that the information that comes from travellers is crucial in determining what quarantine measures they should follow.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

I was talking about temporary foreign workers.

[Andrew Hayes]

Sorry, I misunderstood.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

You raised a problem with the management of on‑site inspections in each of the living environments.

Firstly, from your analysis, what are the problems due to?

I understand that your role is not to criticize the government's choices, but, according to your analysis, wouldn't it have been simpler to take charge of these workers immediately and then dispatch them to their workplaces, rather than deploy them and then conduct inspections at each of the living environments?

[Andrew Hayes]

In our report, we found that the department had not conducted good quality inspections. Foreign workers have been coming to our country for two years and we have not seen any significant improvement in outcomes. The problem lies in the way the department manages its inspections.

Again, I can't say that a different policy would be better. It is important to us that the department conduct good quality inspections.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

All right.

I will therefore put my question to the agency's representatives.

I assume you acknowledge the shortcomings raised in the Auditor General's report.

For the coming months and beyond, what lessons have you drawn?

To ensure adequate sanitary conditions while facilitating and simplifying processes for temporary foreign workers, inspectors and employers, what should be done?

[Brigitte Diogo]

Thank you for the question.

The current temporary foreign worker program is managed by Employment and Social Development Canada, or ESDC, but the agency has indeed worked closely with that department in the management of the program.

Decisions regarding the management of the quarantine of these workers were made in conjunction with the provinces and territories. Certainly, the best way to manage the risk of infection, even after foreign workers have entered Canada, is to ensure that they arrive at their quarantine location or destination.

We are indeed working with ESDC to make sure that we find ways to improve the processes when these workers arrive and to work with private sector partners to manage the risks and make sure that these workers leave healthy.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sean Casey]

Thank you, Ms. Diogo and Mr. Thériault.

Next we have Mr. Davies, please, for six minutes.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Thank you.

To Public Health Agency, the global public health intelligence network has been part of Canada's contribution to the World Health Organization, which has described GPHIN as a “cornerstone” and also “the foundation of the public early warning function at the global level.” They said that approximately 20% of the WHO's epidemiological intelligence had come from GPHIN before it was silenced effectively in 2019. In that year, we were told that a department edict was issued that all such alerts from GPHIN had to be approved by senior managers.

My question is, who issued that edict and has it been reversed?

[Laila Goodridge]

Mr. Chair, the number is correct. Twenty percent of the information that is fed into the World Health Organization's epidemic intelligence does come from the global public health intelligence network. However, I would like to clarify for the committee that at no point was the global public health intelligence network silenced.

There are a number of products that come out of this program, and the feed to the WHO is one of them, as are the GPHIN daily reports. GPHIN alerts is also a platform that's available—

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

I have limited time, I'm sorry.

My question was about the department's edict that all such alerts had to be approved by senior managers. That was the edict, was it not?

[Laila Goodridge]

Mr. Chair, under the independent external panel review, it was clarified that there was no documentation to identify a specific edict. Nonetheless, the department did undertake to put in place clear standard operating procedures with clarity in terms of the level of sign-off for alerts that are done not at a high, senior management level.

We've brought clarity in the criteria that are used for reports, which align with the WHO's public health emergencies of international consequence.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Can you explain to me why an emergency alert was not issued by GPHIN about COVID-19?

[Laila Goodridge]

What the GPHIN review did identify is that the GPHIN program did what it was intended to do. The GPHIN program did identify the outbreak in Wuhan on December 30, 2019, and included that in a report on December 31, as well as in a special stand-alone report. At that time, the information was already circulating with international partners. Adding an additional alert would not have provided additional support to the international community.

The independent review panel did confirm that it saw no evidence suggesting an earlier identification by the GPHIN was possible and that it would not have impacted on the actions taken by the Public Health Agency.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Thank you.

The Office of the Auditor General, as you heard summarized today, issued a number of scathing reports. The deputy Auditor General just stated today that the problems arose because PHAC had not addressed long-standing problems going back a decade. If there was one overall take-away, he said that long-standing known issues must be dealt with.

My question to PHAC is, who has been held accountable for not addressing the problems going back a decade and for long-standing known issues not being dealt with?

[Laila Goodridge]

We thank the Auditor General for the attention to these important issues. A number of steps have taken place, and our focus at this time remains on continuing the fight against COVID-19 that's hurting Canadians. We've laid out a path towards addressing the recommendations from the Auditor General across a number of the audits. Certainly we are here today to answer questions in terms of that forward-looking plan.

Thank you.