Health Committee on Feb. 5th, 2026

[Burton Bailey, Conservative, Red Deer, AB]

Then there are 120 new training spots. All right.

Thank you, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Hedy Fry]

You've just gone 10 seconds over.

[Burton Bailey, Conservative, Red Deer, AB]

That's perfect.

[The Chair, Liberal, Hedy Fry]

There you go. It was very well done, Mr. Bailey.

Now we have Ms. Jaczek.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to all the officials here today.

I would like to ask a few questions about Bill C-15, which, as my colleague has pointed out, was what we were going to be considering today.

First, I'd like to understand what motivated the need to amend the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act in the first place. I know that you're addressing biosecurity issues, but could one of you—whoever would be most appropriate—elaborate on the motivation to make this change?

[Kimby Barton, Director General, Centre for Biosecurity, Regional Operations and Emergency Management Branch, Public Health Agency of Canada]

Certainly. Thank you very much for the question.

A number of factors have contributed to the need for the amendments to the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, not the least of which has been significant investments in the biomanufacturing and life sciences strategy of the federal government, which has led to a significant increase in the number of facilities that are seeking to work with higher-risk pathogens and toxins.

The other piece that really contributed to it is an evolving threat landscape. There has been awareness of state actors and non-state actors who are interested in exploiting Canada's open science approach and are doing extremely good research in science, biotechnology and biomanufacturing. Awareness of this increased threat has led to some requirements to amend the legislation.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

We heard about a situation in one of the labs—I believe it was in Saskatchewan—during COVID-19. There was some questioning about some individuals, and I believe researchers from China had been investigated. Was that part of the kind of suspicion leading to these amendments?

[Kimby Barton]

A number of factors contributed. We've certainly taken into account the experience in Canada with respect to some of the situations that you're referring to. We've also commissioned reports. For instance, we've worked with the Communications Security Establishment. Through a threat assessment, it had identified that some of Canada's high-containment facilities were very likely to be targets for espionage from foreign state actors.

We learned from experience in other jurisdictions as well. For example, in 2022, there was a report published by some American scientists that documented their ability to hack into the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system for a lab to reverse the airflow, which would create significant safety issues for workers within the lab.

A variety of different scenarios all contributed to some of the proposed amendments we've put forward.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

I see. It sounds as though the threat was considerable, and it was obviously very important to put these amendments forward, as you have.

As I understand it, an advisory committee was established by the Public Health Agency of Canada back in 2015 to give the kind of advice you're talking about. Could you talk about the role of the advisory committee, how that works, how often it meets, how the Public Health Agency receives the information, etc.?

[The Chair, Liberal, Hedy Fry]

You have one minute and 30 seconds to do that.

[Kimby Barton]

Thank you. I tend to speak quickly.

The advisory committee meets in person once per year, and it often has an ad hoc meeting a second time per year that occurs virtually. It tends to provide advice more on pathogen risk assessments. We have pathogens that are broken down by risk group, so it tends to provide more information related to biocontainment and biosafety.

We are increasing the biosecurity expertise, however, on that panel as well so that it's better able to provide us with advice on that. As it relates to other biosecurity expertise, we often ask for input from other parts of the federal government.

It is there as a resource, and we use it frequently as we look at things like changes to our incident reporting and anything we're looking at in terms of changing pathogen status.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Is that my time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Hedy Fry]

You have 36 seconds.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

I have just a bit.

I understand that you've added some particular definitions. On the definition of “sensitive information”, could you very quickly tell us what you've been doing?

[Kimby Barton]

The specific definition for “sensitive information” will probably be finalized when we go through regulatory consultations, but as an example, the location of high-risk pathogens within a facility and the type of high-risk pathogens within a facility are both examples of what we would consider sensitive information.

[The Chair, Liberal, Hedy Fry]

Thank you very much. That's excellent. You're bang on time. Extremely well done to both you and Ms. Barton.

I'll go now to Ms. Konanz for five minutes, please.

[Helena Konanz, Conservative, Similkameen—South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

I'm just following up on my question for the minister and asking the question of Ms. Weber.

When you came to the health committee, you confirmed that Health Canada funds are used to purchase crack pipes, but when we asked the minister on December 11, she said the government does not fund crack pipes.

Who is telling the truth? You can't both be right, and you can't both be wrong. Who's right on this?

[Kendal Weber]

Thanks for the question.

It's an important point to clarify. Health Canada doesn't purchase harm reduction tools under our substance use and addictions program. What Health Canada does is provide transfer funding to community groups, municipalities, other levels of organizations and indigenous communities.

I think—

[Helena Konanz, Conservative, Similkameen—South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Excuse me. You're saying that crack pipes are considered to be harm reduction, and the government supplies the funds, but it doesn't follow up on exactly what is being bought.

Crack pipes have been bought. For example, SUAP gave $190,000 to a meth pipe pilot project in Manitoba.

Why would the minister not know that?

[Kendal Weber]

On the point that I made, there is a clarification. Health Canada doesn't purchase them under the program. There's that understanding. What Health Canada does is transfer funding to communities.

Communities in crisis, under our emergency treatment fund or substance use and addictions program, recognizing what they're seeing in their community, may come forward with a proposal. That often includes harm reduction—

[Helena Konanz, Conservative, Similkameen—South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

When communities say they need crack pipes, they—

[Kendal Weber]

It includes safe inhalation kits to minimize the risk of infectious diseases, such as HIV, hepatitis C—

[Helena Konanz, Conservative, Similkameen—South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Crack pipes are considered to be harm reduction in communities. Okay. That's—

[Kendal Weber]

Safe inhalation kits are used to prevent the transmission of infectious diseases, such as HIV, hepatitis C—

[Helena Konanz, Conservative, Similkameen—South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Okay. Thank you. It's safe inhalation—or crack pipes.

My next question is for Ms. Weber again.

Now that the government's decriminalization program with British Columbia has finally ended—in disaster, as many will say—will Health Canada be reporting any results on the effects of decriminalization on addiction and overdose rates in British Columbia?