Mr. Chair, let me first of all thank you for inviting me and my team here today to deal with some fairly important issues on replacement workers. We, the officials, are here to provide you with facts. Of course it is up to the government and Parliament to make decisions of a policy nature.
As you mentioned, I have my colleagues here with me from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service who deal with issues related to replacement workers, and I have a legal counsel from the Department of Justice who works with us in the labour program. Today with your permission, Mr. Chair, we have submitted two documents. These should be available to all by now.
The first document, Mr. Chair, is an update of the “List of Complaints Filed with the Canada Industrial Relations Board Illegal Use of Replacement Workers”. You may recall that a version of this document was submitted earlier, and this is an update to that document, bringing it into line with the most recent information we have.
The second document you'll find in front of you that we are submitting, and actually I would like to present the document to you today, is entitled “Key Observations Regarding the Effect of Replacement Worker Legislation on Workers”. This second document uses the data that the labour program has been collecting for a very long time.
Let me just mention three observations on the data that we are using. First, these data are collected on the same quality basis as data collected by Statistics Canada. Second, these data are used widely. Indeed, if I can mention it, as of April 1, 2007, the salaries of members of Parliament will be adjusted based on the data that we produced on wage settlements. Third, the data we produced on the key variables that I'm going to take you through are quite similar to the data that provinces produce for their own jurisdictions. Indeed I'm going to be comparing some information in these tables, federal compared with provincial. Our data are very similar, for example, to the data that Quebec produces. I can explain the technical differences between the two, but for all effective purposes they're basically the same.
What is the main message that comes out of the document I've given you? The main message is that we, the analysts, are not able to detect any positive impact of anti-scab legislation on workers; at least that is not what these data show. I'd like to take you through these tables and explain to you why we come to that conclusion. The data are in front of everybody, and you can draw your own conclusions from them.
On page 2 of the document called “Key Observations”, we have table 1. There are some shaded yellow boxes in that table. As an example, if you look at the British Columbia number, which is 0.04, this is the number of work stoppages per 10,000 employees for a particular year. In 2005 there were 0.04 work stoppages in British Columbia. This is of course a province that does not allow the use of replacement workers. So the number is pretty low, which is a good thing.
If you compare that number, however, with that of Quebec, you find that Quebec's number is more than six times the number for B.C. If you compare the B.C. number with that of Ontario, you find it is three times larger than British Columbia's number.
My conclusion in looking at these data is that I really cannot relate the anti-scab legislation to the number of work stoppages. There is simply no relationship between those two variables.
Table 2, which is on page 3, is a table about the average duration of work stoppages--how many days a work stoppage lasts. Again let me do the same thing. In this table, Mr. Chair, to avoid the cycles that are normal in any economic data, we have taken averages to get a more basic trend in the data.
Let's take the average for 1975 to 1977 as an example and look at British Columbia. The average duration of a work stoppage over that three-year period in British Columbia was 27 days. It was 37 days in Quebec--a bigger number than in British Columbia, and as you know, both have anti-scab legislation. Ontario's average was 28--before the legislation in both provinces--which was about the same as B.C. but lower than Quebec.
Let's go to the bottom of this table. For the period 2003 to 2005--for British Columbia and Quebec this was a post-legislation period--B.C. had 28.9 days, Ontario had 38.1, which of course is higher and Ontario doesn't have that legislation, but Quebec had 46.6. Looking at the average for those three years, if you asked me to conclude what the relationship was between those two variables, my conclusion would be none.
The second thing we can do in this table is go from the historical period pre-legislation to now and see what this legislation does. Looking at the Quebec numbers, the average duration of work stoppage went from 37 days in the three-year period before 1977 to 46.6, an increase of 10 days. The legislation didn't seem to have any effect in reducing the average duration of work stoppage. It went up.
The same is true for Ontario. It went up from 28 days pre-1977 to 38, about the same increase as in Quebec. In B.C., on the other hand, there was not much of an increase--from 27 to 29--but if you look at the average for B.C. in the middle of the page, which is again the pre-change issue since the B.C. legislation came in 1993, you will see that there was a drop from 44 to 29.
The simple message from these numbers again is that I really can't find a link between the average duration of work stoppage and anti-scab legislation.
I take you now to page 5, which is a third variable of interest to us. This is the number of person-days not worked. If we look at the bottom of the page, for B.C. the number is 59, which is the lowest number on the table. For Ontario, which doesn't have that legislation, the number is 81, which is higher than B.C.'s number. But the Quebec number is 132.
Again I can't establish a link between this type of legislation and the number of person-days not worked.
The most important variable, as shown on page 7, was in the wage gains of workers, based on whether or not a law of this type was available.
The federal wage gain in 2005 was 2.7%. We don't have this legislation. The British Columbia wage gain was 2.3%, lower than the federal wage gain. Quebec had a gain of 2.4%, again lower than the federal wage gain. But I'm not going to conclude that if you don't have this law workers get bigger benefits, because that certainly is not true. The Ontario number was 2.3% as well, which is the lowest number in the table for wage gain.
So I cannot draw a conclusion that this type of legislation can help workers achieve larger wage gains.
I have mentioned the four variables of wage adjustments, the number of work days lost, the average duration of strike, and the number of work stoppages. My data are quite credible, have been used by many analysts, and are of the same quality as Statistics Canada's data. If we use the averages over these periods, we cannot establish a link between the legislation and the variables we are looking at.
So that is the conclusion we draw from these data. Of course I can use these data to draw other conclusions, but I would argue that those are not reasonable conclusions based on the use of data. I can give you many examples, just looking at these tables, of how that can happen. Some people have tried to do that, but I would suggest that is really not very scientific.
That's all I have to say. We're here to answer your questions on these tables or other questions of fact and analysis that we can deal with, as I said, in order for the minister and the government of Parliament to come a decision on policy.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.