Human Resources Committee on Feb. 11th, 2014

[Hassan Yussuff, Secretary-Treasurer, Canadian Labour Congress]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

On behalf of the Canadian Labour Congress and its 3.3 million members, we want to thank you for giving us the opportunity to present our views regarding the private member's bill, Bill C-525.

The CLC brings together Canada's national and international unions, along with our provincial and territorial federations of labour and our 130 labour councils across the country. Our members work in virtually all sectors of the Canadian economy within occupations including workers under federal jurisdiction.

Bill C-525 makes three significant changes to the current certification process in Canada: one, it adds an unfair, redundant, mandatory vote, giving employers time to interfere with the workers' choice for collective representation; two, it imposes a threshold of 45% to access a certification vote, a threshold that a committee of experts from the International Labour Organization, the ILO, has found to be excessive; three, it proposes that the voting rules require a majority of workers—not voters—to form and retain a union, which is undemocratic. It considers workers who don't vote as casting a “no” vote ballot on the question of having a union. This gives those who don't vote power over those who do.

The CLC is of the opinion that the proposed Bill C-525 will make it virtually impossible to form a new union in the federal jurisdiction. It will thus restrict workers' freedom of association and collective bargaining rights protected by section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The bill politicizes labour relations and starts a dangerous pendulum swing in the federal labour relations regime. It disturbs labour peace in the workplace and will promote confrontation instead of cooperation. It will reduce productivity and increase intimidation from employers while costing business and the federal government. It will give an undemocratic right to a minority of workers to dissolve a union in a workplace and will contradict fundamental principles of our democracy. It will continue the deterioration of working conditions and increase income inequality in Canada.

For all these reasons we call on members of Parliament to defeat this bill.

In support of this bill, MP Calkins makes several claims that members of this committee should examine more closely.

First, Calkins claims that the federal legislation has lagged behind that of our provincial counterparts. This is false. The majority of jurisdictions in Canada use a card-based certification process, with many moving back and forth between card, check, and mandatory vote over many years. This pendulum swing politicizes labour relations between employers and workers and creates instability. We echo the finding of Andrew Sims in the 1995 report examining potential reform to the Canada Labour Code. Sims stated that swings in the labour relations pendulum with successive changes in government will, over time, adversely impact a labour relations system that is working rather well.

Second, MP Calkins claims that the current certification and decertification process has to be changed because it leaves open the opportunity for employees to be intimidated. He refers to a mountain of complaints from workers being intimidated during a certification process. The current federal certification law protects workers against intimidation from other employees, a union, or their employer. A search of CIRB decisions shows no evidence of a mountain of complaints from workers being intimidated during the certification process. In actual fact, most cases of intimidation and unfair labour practice during the certification process involved the employer. Here are two simple but well-publicized examples: retail giant Target showing anti-union videos to employees, and Couche-Tard's CEO video threatening employees with closure and layoffs should they consider unionizing. Amending the certification process will increase the opportunity for intimidation mainly coming from employers.

Third, MP Calkins claims that Bill C-525 will strike a balance in the certification and the decertification process. How does the MP know that these proposed changes in Bill C-525 will achieve the right balance in labour relations? The sponsor of the bill lacks relevant experience in labour relations. Labour relations between employers and workers are very complex in nature.

To be effective, labour relations laws have to reach a balance between the interests of all stakeholders, and this balance is best reached when all parties are involved. Neither employer nor worker groups has called for changes to the certification and revocation process. They have not been consulted by MP Calkins for these proposed changes.

The current federal labour regime works relatively well. Since 2005-06, 85% of certification processes mandated by the CIRB, Canada Industrial Relations Board, were conducted without a secret ballot vote.

Finally, MP Calkins called for more democracy, but the bill does not respect two elements of our democratic system: the principle of political equality, by giving people who don't vote the power of those who do, and the principle that the greatest number of votes is required to win the election.

The fact that the voting rules proposed under Bill C-525 require the majority of workers, not voters, as a threshold for having a union is unfair, hypocritical, and undemocratic. If it passes, the outrageous part of this bill is it will require a union to gain more than the majority of votes. It will do this because it will consider workers who don't bother to vote as casting a "no" ballot on whether to have a union. This will arbitrarily assign a position to those who don't vote, giving them power over those who do.

Furthermore, if the proposed bill passes, an employer could simply find ways to convince employees not to attend the vote. It would then be safe to assume that all those who attended the vote support the union. Such a process defeats the entire rationale for a secret ballot and encourages employers to intimidate and commit unfair labour relations against workers.

Even worse and more hypocritical, the proposed section 96 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act will decertify a union if only 45% of employees in a bargaining unit have not voted in favour of continued representation. Again this rejects the general principle favoured by our democratic society that winning the most votes is required to win an election.

In conclusion, we urge the federal government to stop the introduction of one-off changes to the Canada Labour Code. Amendments should not be made through private members' bills. They should be made with concerted, pre-legislative consultation that engages employers, unions, and government. Bill C-525 is tampering with the labour relations system that has worked very well for many decades in the federal jurisdiction.

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

Thank you, Mr. Yussuff. You're right on time.

We'll move on to Mr. Farrell from FETCO.

[John Farrell, Executive Director, Federally Regulated Employers - Transportation and Communications (FETCO)]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

FETCO consists of most of the major companies in the federal jurisdiction. FETCO members employ approximately 450,000 employees. My comments will cover two main themes: FETCO's concerns regarding the use of private members' legislation to amend the Canada Labour Code, and our specific recommendations regarding Bill C-525.

First, FETCO has serious concerns regarding the use of private members' bills to amend the Canada Labour Code. The preamble to the code notes that one of the purposes of the code set out by Parliament is:

...to continue and extend its support to labour and management in their cooperative efforts to develop good relations and constructive collective bargaining practices, and deems the development of good industrial relations to be in the best interests of Canada in ensuring a just share of the fruits of progress to all;

Good labour relations and constructive bargaining practices promote stability and limit conflict and the economic impact of conflict in the federal jurisdiction, which provides critical infrastructure services to Canadian business and Canadians.

Over the years this preamble has been given practical application through the support of successive governments, by putting in place an effective consultation process covering labour relations in the federal jurisdiction by engaging employers, unions, and government. This process ensures that fact-based and informed decisions are taken with respect to federal law and regulations. FETCO believes that this consultation model has permitted federally regulated employers to successfully advance the interests of its members and has contributed to both the stability and the economic well-being of these important sectors to the Canadian economy.

This critical consultation process is completely bypassed when changes to the labour relations regime are proposed through the mechanism of one-off private members' bills. It provides no meaningful way for pre-legislative consultation to take place in an open and transparent manner, and it seeks changes without the required engagement of practitioners, recognized third-party neutrals, and the resources of government agencies charged with the responsibility to implement, adjudicate, and monitor the industrial relations system in the federal jurisdiction.

We believe that the use of private members' bills sets the federal jurisdiction on a dangerous course, where, without adequate consultation or support, unnecessary or unworkable proposals come into law, and the balance, which is so important to the stability of labour relations, is upset. We strongly believe that it is not in the long-term best interests of Canadian employers and their employees, and it has the potential to needlessly impact the economy by destabilizing the basic foundation of union-management relations. Again, it is our view that federal employers can only adequately represent their interests and those of the economy to which they contribute, through the consultation process that has been the practice in the federal jurisdiction.

In sum, FETCO believes that Bill C-525, as currently drafted, will disrupt the widely respected and stable process through the labour law reform, which has traditionally been developed at the federal level. The use of private members' bills as a method of labour law reform may create a situation in which the pendulum will swing between labour law extremes, as successive federal governments with different political perspectives attempt to reverse their predecessors' reforms. This will create labour relations instability.

FETCO believes that the consultative process in place in the federal sector will ensure that the principles established in the code's preamble, noted above, are best and truly served.

I can elaborate in more detail, Mr. Chair, on a process that we would propose and I will cover that if time permits. I would also be prepared to cover that in the question period.

Now I want to turn our attention to Bill C-525, in particular.

The major issue, of course, is the question of certification/decertification of employees under the code. It appears that under the system proposed by Bill C-525, the Canada Industrial Relations Board could only issue a certification order if a majority of bargaining unit employees actually vote in favour of union representation. This is a standard that does not conform to the democratic norm in Canada. It requires amendment.

FETCO members prefer a secret ballot vote to a card check system for the purpose of determining if a union acquires the right to be a certified bargaining agent for the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.

It is FETCO's view that, in order for a union to become the certified bargaining agent for an appropriate bargaining unit, fully 50 % plus one of the employees in the unit who cast secret ballot votes must vote in favour of union representation. The vote should be conducted by the Canada Industrial Relations Board.

We believe that this is the most appropriate democratic process. It allows employees to express their true wishes by secret ballot without undue influence or disclosure of how they choose to cast their ballot. This is the mechanism that is used for the electoral process in Canada for good reason. This is the fairest process that permits all employees to express their true wishes. Indeed, that is how most unions conduct their own ratification votes.

Furthermore, the certification process by means of a secret ballot vote exists in many of the jurisdictions in Canada, namely: Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan.

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

One minute, Mr. Farrell.

[John Farrell]

The other issue that we must deal with, of course, is the question of decertification or the revocation of bargaining rights. Under Bill C-525, in the event that the Industrial Relations Board receives a decertification application with 45% support, then the onus would shift to the union to prove, in a secret ballot representation vote, that it retains the support of a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit as opposed to the majority of employees casting a secret ballot vote in favour of decertification. The standard for decertification proposed in Bill C-525 goes beyond an acceptable norm. FETCO believes that the decertification process should require a vote of 50% plus one of the employees in the bargaining unit who cast their secret ballot votes.

For both certification and decertification, FETCO believes that the threshold in order to call a vote should be somewhere between 40% and 45%.

In sum, obviously, Bill C-525 poses a genuine dilemma for FETCO.

It pits the long-held and consistent view that employers in the federal jurisdiction prefer a secret ballot vote for certification over a card check system against our strongly held view that the legislative process of using private members' bills to change labour legislation without the opportunity for genuine pre-legislative consultation is the wrong approach.

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

Mr. Farrell, I'm going to have to end it there. Your other comments could perhaps be addressed through questioning.

Now on to the Public Service Alliance of Canada. Ms. Benson, are you going to be the spokesperson, or sharing your time?

[Robyn Benson, National President, Public Service Alliance of Canada]

Good morning.

I'm going to be sharing my time with Magali Picard, who is the regional executive vice-president for Quebec. And of course, should there be any questions, then I also have Shannon Blatt, who is our legal officer, and she'll be able to respond.

I want to thank you for inviting us to appear before the committee.

Bill C-525 proposes to change how unions are certified and decertified under three pieces of legislation. It affects hundreds of thousands of workers in the federal public service, in the parliamentary service, and in all federally regulated industries and crown corporations.

The purpose of labour law is to ensure fairness and balance in the workplace, to protect the rights of workers, and to promote harmonious labour relations. Bill C-525 upsets some of the democratic safeguards in the current laws that enable workers to express their wishes free from interference and intimidation. As a private member’s bill, it was introduced without the usual broad consultation process that involves employers, unions, and the government. It was introduced without any evidence that the rules for certification and decertification need to be changed in this way.

Bill C-525 introduces some disturbing elements that will interfere with the ability of workers to unionize federally. They go against the very spirit of the right to freedom of association enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The bill eliminates the right to automatic certification when a majority of workers show their intent to form a union by signing a union card and paying a fee when they sign. This is known as card check.

Bill C-525 imposes a mandatory secret vote even where a majority has already signed a union card. Contrary to what you may have heard, PSAC has no issue with voting by secret ballot. We do it regularly to elect our officers, ratify collective agreements, and vote for strike action, as examples. What we object to is forcing workers to show twice that they want to unionize. We know that signing a union card is a step that employees don’t take lightly or carelessly. We believe their wishes should be respected. Studies have also shown that the elimination of card check reduces the ability of workers to actually unionize.

We also expect that the labour boards will not be given any more resources, so the time between an application for certification and an actual vote is going to increase. This will allow more time for employers to intimidate workers into not voting. Unlike labour laws in Ontario and B.C., Bill C-525 does not impose a short timeframe for a vote to be held.

Bill C-525 is also profoundly undemocratic in several ways. In the case of decertification, a minority of workers will be able to overturn the wishes of the majority. The bill would change the Public Service Labour Relations Act to allow a mere 45% to be able to dissolve the union regardless of what the majority wants.

I will now turn it over to my colleague, Madame Picard.

[Magali Picard, Regional Executive Vice-President (Quebec), Public Service Alliance of Canada]

Thank you, Robyn.

As you know, votes on certification or decertification will henceforth depend on the total number of employees in a bargaining unit. Currently, the law stipulates that the majority rules when there is a vote, whether it be for certification or decertification. However, Bill C-525 demands that the union get an absolute majority, which is to say the majority of the entire bargaining unit. It also stipulates that not casting a ballot or abstaining means a vote against the union.

Why allow non-voters to decide what is to become of an entire group of employees? If you, as MPs, cannot vote or if you abstain from voting on a bill before the House of Commons, are you presumed to be voting against it?

In Quebec, labour legislation requires an absolute majority for certification and decertification votes. It is the only province in the country to do so. However, this legislation is very different from Bill C-525. Indeed, it allows automatic certification by counting out the cards. A vote is only held when there is no majority. Bill C-525 would remove this mechanism from federal labour legislation. Unlike Bill C-525, Quebec legislation makes it mandatory for each employee to vote, and they cannot abstain without a legitimate reason.

As we have already stated, the more votes have to be organized, the longer the certification or decertification process will be. This favors the employers, who will have more time to encourage workers to vote against the union or to simply abstain from voting. Furthermore, under Bill C-525, an abstention is considered a vote against the union.

Let us be clear. Bill C-525 offers no protection whatsoever to workers' democratic rights. Its aim is to prevent them from unionizing and allowing the employer to interfere in the process.

Barbaric tactics used by the government are of grave concern to us. First of all, it is using a private member's bill to upset the balance between workers' and employers' rights. Furthermore, the government is trying to rush the adoption of Bill C-525 in order to avoid questions and debate.

We strongly urge members of this committee and all MPs to reject Bill C-525.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

Thank you very much for being under time.

Now, as an individual, we'll move on to Mr. George Smith.

[George Smith, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Queen's University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning members of the committee.

My name is George Smith. I'm currently a fellow in the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. I'm also an adjunct professor in the School of Industrial Relations and the School of Business at Queen's University where I teach graduate courses in collective bargaining and strategic human resource management. Prior to joining Queen's in 2010, I practised labour relations for 37 years on the front line of Canadian business where, among other responsibilities, I acted as the chief management negotiator for Air Canada, Canadian Pacific Railway, and CBC/Radio-Canada. I've spent virtually my entire life studying, practising, and teaching labour relations in the federal sector and it is that lifetime of experience and study that inform my comments today.

I'm here on a matter of process and what I see as a disturbing pattern of random intervention and piecemeal change to the Canada Labour Code that flies in the face of decades of consultative and consensus-based reform of which I was part. That consultative process was developed and supported historically by both Liberal and Conservative governments with recognition that in the complex world of federal labour relations, legislative stability provided one less wild card for labour relations professionals to deal with.

While provincial jurisdictions—and we heard about some of them this morning—experienced legislative instability and politicized labour relations reform, which affected capital investment in those provinces, the federal sector has had an impressive record historically. Despite working with 19 ministers of labour—all of whom I met personally—and under seven prime ministers, both Liberal and Conservative, I experienced only a handful of significant changes to the Canada Labour Code and most often with consultative input.

The most comprehensive changes to part I in recent history were the result of a full consultative process chaired by Andrew Sims with labour and management co-chairs producing a report seeking a balance, which formed the basis of legislative reform. That tripartite consultative process is recognized internationally as a model of labour relations legislative reform. Unfortunately, that model and the labour relations stability that accompanies it are now threatened. Federal labour relations risk becoming politicized as they were in Ontario, British Columbia, and other provincial jurisdictions. And last I heard, the federal sector is the leader not the follower of the provinces.

Bill C-525, when taken with the interventionist approach to labour impasses, changes in the way labour negotiations are conducted at crown corporations, and the way unions are funded, signal a new role for government as a player in the labour relations arena when they have historically been a neutral referee or facilitator.

We currently face a situation where the right to strike and the right to join a trade union are being threatened, all without any of the big-picture public policy debate necessary when challenging such fundamental Canadian rights. The irony of this rush to judgment approach is that it's justified on the basis of the economic recovery. But the destabilizing and politicizing of the labour relations system in the federal sector will negatively impact the economy in the run long.

Today we are dealing with a private member's bill to amend a significant section of the Canada Labour Code without any view of how this change will impact overall labour relations policy in the federal sector, without any of the necessary due process and public consultation to examine the intended and unintended consequences to such amendments. Who knows, this legislation might even be a good thing. But without full exposure to, and scrutiny by, the affected parties, we can't judge its overall impact. We need to see and debate any supporting research or studies, and this simply can't be done under the current approach and with the current timelines. One thing for sure, this legislation creates another “us versus them” circumstance in the Canada Labour Code when that legislation still speaks of labour-management cooperation being its purpose and “....the encouragement of free collective bargaining and constructive settlements of disputes”.

My position is that this significant change to the Canada Labour Code requires a full consultative process with all potential amendments on the table, a tripartite consultative process that gives unions, companies, and citizens an opportunity to understand and react to proposed changes in their entirety. After such a consultation the government may decide to act but with full knowledge of all perspectives and with some comprehension of the potential impact that the amendments might have. This approach recognizes that consensus, to the extent possible, trumps unilateral action, which may be reversed by future governments.

In the words of Andrew Sims, “We want legislation that is sound, enactable, and lasting”.

My contention is that citizens, both unionized and non-unionized, and the key affected parties deserve to be part of that labour relations policy debate. If this is truly what Canadians want, then the Conservative government should welcome broader public debate. Canadians deserve nothing less.

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

Thank you again, Mr. Smith, for being under seven minutes.

Now we move to Mr. Banks via video conference from Queen's University.

[Kevin Banks, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, As an Individual]

Good morning. Thank you very much for the invitation to speak.

I'm appearing as a researcher. I've worked in labour relations law and labour employment law for about 20 years as a practitioner, and now as a teacher and a scholar, and I also serve as an arbitrator. I'm appearing to offer personal observations on what the research can tell us about the issues you're dealing with today and not to present my personal views or to take a partisan position on this bill.

I'll begin with some observations on certification procedures. A secret ballot vote is normally understood as safeguarding employee choice. The reasons for this are fairly obvious. It provides an opportunity for quiet reflection and private decision-making, but voting procedures, research shows, can also pose risks to employee free choice. Specifically they tend to increase the opportunity for—and the effectiveness of—coercive employer tactics such as retaliations, dismissals, or threats of dismissals.

Not all employers are inclined to do this, but there's good evidence that some employers are, for economic reasons or because they are opposed to unionization. Experience suggests that a significant number of employers will do this from time to time. There is also good empirical evidence from research done in Canada that those kinds of tactics can be effective in reducing employee support for unionization. It's also well known that it's challenging for labour relations boards to provide timely and effective remedies in the face of those kinds of tactics. The reasons for this are multiple. It takes time to fairly adjudicate allegations of unfair labour practices. Labour boards need to be able to expedite hearings, to provide interim remedies, and so on.

Now why might it be the case that a secret ballot vote procedure would provide an opportunity for more effective employer opposition to unionization and in particular for unfair tactics in certification campaigns?

First of all there's more time, so an employer who's inclined to engage in those kinds of tactics has more time to mount such a campaign, and there's less opportunity for those who are sympathetic to unionization to respond to the effects of such a campaign on those whose support is wavering.

There's a very good study by Chris Riddell, an economist who looked at something of a natural experiment that took place in British Columbia when the labour relations regime there moved from card check to vote and then back to card check. In B.C. there was a relatively short time period within which the vote needed to take place; it was a ten-day time period. Nonetheless the study found that the success rate of unionization in the private sector dropped about 20% and in the public sector barely moved at all, suggesting that the economic incentives that affect private sector employers had a lot to do with it.

Riddell then went on to study the effect of unfair labour practices on the level of support for unionization and found that during the period in which votes were permitted, unfair labour practices were more than twice as effective as they were under the card check regime. He also found they accounted for at least 25% of the drop in union success rates. He notes that the rate of applications by unions declined significantly during this period as unions probably tended to pick their stronger cases for certification and to leave others behind.

All of this suggests that if you're going to consider moving away from card check to a vote, part of the package might usefully be a short time period within which to implement the vote, effective interim remedies for unfair labour practices, expedited unfair labour practice procedures, and the availability of remedial certification—none of which seem to be addressed in the bill as it currently stands.

The only other observation I would offer with respect to the certification provisions is that in most jurisdictions, the failure to vote is treated as a decision effectively to let others decide the outcome rather than as counting against certification of the union.

The decertification procedures outlined in the proposed bill focus on voting, which is quite normal in this kind of a process, but it is anomalous to base the outcome on what percentage of employees do not vote in favour of continued union representation. As others have observed, this effectively counts the decision of those who abstain from voting as a decision against continued union representation.

Among the provinces, all legislation but that of Nova Scotia expressly require that a majority positively vote that it no longer supports the union before the labour board can decertify. No jurisdiction requires that a board decertify if a majority of employees do not vote in favour of the union, whether the majority be determined on the basis of ballots cast or on the basis of the bargaining unit as a whole. Most jurisdictions measure this on the basis of ballots cast, but some jurisdictions require that those wishing to decertify show that the union no longer represents an absolute majority of the bargaining unit. Why? Well, because a positive showing that the union lacks support is generally thought to be necessary to undo an earlier positive showing that it had support.

Counting abstentions as being effectively against continued union representation is a potentially unreliable measure. It perhaps also puts too much emphasis on the ability of the union to get out the vote. The public sector provisions of the—

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

Mr. Banks, I'm going to have to cut you off there, sir. I'm sorry. You're over time. Perhaps some of your last points can be made when you're answering questions from members.

We'll now move to Mr. Giles for seven minutes.

[Anthony Giles, Director General, Labour Program, Strategic Policy, Analysis and Workplace Information Directorate, Department of Employment and Social Development]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

For those of you who are anxious to get to the questions, you'll be delighted to hear that I don't have an opening statement. I would simply inform the committee that as this is a private member's bill, the department was not involved in the preparation of the bill. Once it was tabled, though, we did undertake some analysis of the implications of the bill, comparisons with the other jurisdictions in Canada, and possible effects of the bill.

I would be delighted to answer any questions you might have in that vein.

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

Thank you for being here from the department to be available to answer those questions.

Now we'll move to our five-minute round of questioning, beginning with Madam Sims from the NDP.

[Jinny Sims, NDP, Newton—North Delta, BC]

Thank you very much.

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today at such short notice. As you know, we believe that this bill is significant and that its study warranted a lot more time than is being allocated here with only two meeting times and two and a half hours for witnesses. Out of that, let me tell you that members of Parliament have only 44 minutes—44 minutes— to ask the six witnesses the myriad of questions we have. As well, you've had very little time to put your perspective forward. But this is what happens when the majority gets its way.

The NDP was afforded the opportunity to have only three witnesses before this committee today—only three—but I want you to know that we had to disappoint many: 27 others are being restricted by not being here. That number is not an exaggeration. We've submitted all names of organizations, unions, and individuals to the clerk. I heard earlier that Unifor had never asked to present. Well, they did ask to present to this committee. I want to be very, very clear about that. All of these organizations want to express their grave concerns and outrage, frankly, over the bill. We did submit all 30 names, as I said. But that's a majority government for you.

Since my time has been extremely limited, I will begin with my first question to Mr. Yussuff and Mr. Roberts.

Can you tell me what the normal process is to amend labour law federally, and do you consider the politicization of labour relations in this bill to be appropriate?

[Hassan Yussuff]

We've had, up until recently, a fairly robust system in terms of the federal jurisdiction in regard to amendments to the Canada Labour Code, whether it be part I, part II, or part III. In all three of those reviews that have taken place over the past, the congress has been fully engaged with a very broad consultative process that went on for quite a long time.

Subsequently, with any changes brought forward, both the CLC and FETCO worked very diligently to ensure that the right balance was reached in regard to what the government was proposing.

More importantly, we were on record saying that we supported those changes when they were brought forward. A large part of that is because of the collaborative approach we've taken, but more importantly, we also figured out that our views were represented in the consultation process. The review was very broad and extensive, and it allowed us to air any misgivings we may have had in terms of a proposal that was made.

Historically and contemporarily, in the last bit, that has changed significantly because most of the changes have come about through private members' bills with very little or no consultation, as has been previously noted before the committee and by our witness here today.

[Chris Roberts, Senior Researcher, Social and Economic Policy Department, Canadian Labour Congress]

I would just very quickly add to that, that it's not just the Canada Labour Code. In 2005, when the Public Service Modernization Act amended the PSLRA and the PESRA, there was extensive consultation at that point as well.

[Jinny Sims, NDP, Newton—North Delta, BC]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith, I was really struck by the comment you made about random intervention, and the need to have a coherent and consultative process when we put together the labour code that governs, as you said, millions of people across this country. Can you expand on that a little bit more, please, and how will politicization actually harm labour relations?

[George Smith]

I think Mr. Yussuff has given you some of the background in terms of how historically employers, unions, and others, were consulted in legislative reform. That includes under majority governments, both majority Liberal and majority Conservative governments.

The recognition seemed to be at that time that this is complex business, and it's not business for parliamentarians. It's not business for bureaucrats. It's business for labour relations professionals. The labour relations professionals can't stop the will of Parliament, but they can certainly assist in terms of legislative reform, which may be coming from different directions, and make sure that all the unintended consequences are discussed.

What we've seen recently with the intervention in collective bargaining, and an apparent removal of the right to strike in spite of that being enshrined in the Canada Labour Code, is unprecedented in my 40 years in the business.

Private members' bills to amend significant parts of the Canada Labour Code, politicizing it, creating a situation where another election, another political party, may be forced to have the pendulum swing back another way, is fundamentally against the principles of sound, stable labour relations systems, which the federal sector has had for decades.

[Jinny Sims, NDP, Newton—North Delta, BC]

Fundamentally flawed process.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Phil McColeman]

The time does move fast, we realize this.

Mrs. McLeod, for five minutes.

[Cathy McLeod, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

I just have to make a brief comment. I would presume, given the NDP's comment, that they're going to vote against their own private member's bill, Bill C-504 because of course it does seek to amend the Canada Labour Code. I think that when you have a principle around Canada Labour Code amendments, I would presume that you'll follow through on that.

I hear a number of concerns that have been raised. Perhaps if I could just ask you to do a quick yes or no, and I'll go quickly around the table because I do want to try to get in a number of questions.

Do you believe that if there is a secret ballot, it should be 50% plus one of those who vote, and not those who are present members?

Mr. Yussuff.

[Hassan Yussuff]

The 50% plus one is the norm.

[Cathy McLeod, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Mr. Farrell.