It's quite correct to do that.
There is a particular problem as a result of the refusal of the current government to make any but a very few reappointments. This has a devastating impact on the IRB in terms of the loss of skilled members and morale within the board, because it is clear that competence is not being recognized. There is also a significant impact on the credibility of the appointments process because the decision to not reappoint reinforces the old concerns that appointments are made based not on merit but on links to the party in power.
The CCR continues to have grave concerns about the quality of board members, appointed and reappointed. We have always recognized that there are many excellent board members. Unfortunately, there continue to be some members who do not have the skills and qualities necessary to make the extremely difficult life and death decisions that refugee determination requires.
Since June 2002, when decision-making panels were reduced from two to one, the impact of incompetent board members has been dramatically increased. A refugee claimant is heard by just one decision-maker. Given that the quality of board members varies widely, the system resembles a lottery, where the fate of a refugee can depend on which board member hears the case. Of course, because of the failure of the government to implement the refugee appeal provided in the law, bad decisions by bad board members go uncorrected.
In this context, the CCR could only be deeply dismayed at recommendation 5 of the Harrison report and the news that the government was accepting this recommendation. This pushes an appointments process with some problems in exactly the wrong direction, toward a more politicized and potentially ideologically driven process. Involving the minister in the appointment of members of the selection panel undermines all the efforts made so far to achieve merit-based non-partisan appointments to the IRB.
We see the resignation of the IRB chairperson, Jean-Guy Fleury, as linked to the issue of appointments. Obviously we cannot speak for him or his reasons for resigning, but we were well aware that he was struggling to achieve adequate numbers of appointments to the board based on the merit principle. It is clear that he failed.
I would like to end with a recommendation on this topic that the CCR made in 1998. It remains equally valid today. A depoliticized appointments system should be created with a transparent, effective mechanism for ensuring that candidates are selected and mandates renewed on the basis of their competence for the job.
Thank you.