Evidence of meeting #25 for Citizenship and Immigration in the 41st Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was muslim.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Good afternoon. This is the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, meeting number 25, Tuesday, March 6, 2012.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study on “Standing on Guard for Thee: Ensuring that Canada's Immigration System is Secure”.
We have two witnesses for the first hour. One witness is speaking to us from Toronto. I'm going to try pronouncing your name and I hope it is correct.
We have Ms. Renuka Rajaratnam. Is that close?
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
That's all we can do.
We have, all the way from London, England, John Amble.
Can you hear me, sir?
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Thank you for appearing at such a strange hour. We appreciate that.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Mr. Amble is a Ph.D candidate at King's College London, where he studies regional violent Islamist groups and is the managing director of Global Torchlight, LLC, a political and security risk consultancy. He has also served as an intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency as part of the U.S. military's chief counter-terrorism intelligence task force. His extensive military training includes resident professional courses at the U.S. Army Intelligence Centre and the JFK Special Warfare Center. Mr. Amble's previous research is examining patterns of radicalization and homegrown terrorism in North America and Europe.
Thank you very much to both of you for appearing before our immigration committee. We're going to ask each of you to speak to the committee for up to ten minutes each.
Mr. Amble, we will proceed with you first. You have the floor, sir.
As an Individual
Thank you.
Mr. Chair, honourable members, it's a privilege for me to speak to you today, and I thank you for the invitation to participate in these important hearings.
The value of considering the place of Canada' s immigration system and laws within a broader national security context is immense. My comments will focus on only one piece of this process, namely, radicalization and the threat of terrorism. But it is an important piece and I hope I can contribute to your efforts. The topic of homegrown terrorism is broad and I will do my best to focus my comments on those aspects that are relevant to this committee's undertaking.
My testimony is based on research I conducted on the recent experiences with homegrown terrorism of three European countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark. I identified a few of the dominant characteristics of each country's experiences and applied them to a study of conditions in the United States to make an assessment of how such a threat is likely to evolve in the U.S.
While I did not directly examine Canada, I believe that similar immigration patterns, and perhaps more important, the very similar cultural patterns of the U.S. and Canada will make my research useful for this committee. Certainly I found several characteristics that are instructive for any country seeking to craft policy that minimizes the risks of radicalization among immigrant communities and, ultimately, the risk of terrorism that arises therefrom.
In looking at the U.K., I reached three key conclusions. First, ineffective crafting and lax enforcement of certain immigration policies and border controls have had a direct impact on the threat of homegrown terrorism. Secondly, there is a discernible geographic component to immigrant radicalization patterns and terrorist activity in the U.K., with a statistical over-representation of ties to certain countries in both categories. Finally, radicalization in the U.K. is principally driven by group dynamics.
In Germany, I found that radicalization tends to revolve around several large, high-profile mosques, and that jihadists in Germany have developed strong ties to a particular group, the Islamic Jihad Union, which is active in Pakistan and also historically in Central Asia and has also been linked to plots to conduct attacks in Germany.
In Denmark, I found that so-called basement mosques have developed as incubators of radicalization, particularly among certain immigrant groups, and that a distinct failure to effectively facilitate integration of immigrants into Danish society is a major contributor to the spread of the jihadist ideology.
Now, what are the salient lessons for Canada? ln applying immigration laws and border enforcement to strengthen national security, the U.K.'s history is particularly noteworthy. According to one security expert from Harvard University, the U.K. is “known to take an extremely soft line toward the Islamic terrorists operating on its soil; indeed on occasion its levels of tolerance border on masochism”.
Central to such charges is the so-called covenant of security, an alleged tacit agreement under which British authorities would give Islamist radicals a great degree of tolerance as long as the Muslim community's self-policing would guarantee the British state and its people a sense of security from jihadist violence. As the past several years have shown, such an approach has failed to keep the U.K. homeland secure.
In addition to being granted this great degree of freedom, key figures in the jihadist milieu in the U.K. benefited from the lack of enforcement of immigration and asylum laws. For instance, a man convicted in connection with a 2003 plot to use poison to target the London Underground was found to have been in the country illegally. The convicted man was an Algerian immigrant who had been refused asylum but had stayed in the country nonetheless.
An investigation revealed that only one in ten Algerians who were refused asylum actually left the country. Recognizing the danger of this fact, a former MI5 director general argued in 2007 that "We have realised that the free movement of people is a great concept--but if you have people who would kill you, there have got to be a lot more checks. It is sad that the ideals at the end of the Cold War turned out not to be possible."
Even with appropriate immigration policies and adequate enforcement, another difficulty arises when immigrant groups are not integrated into host societies, an issue Denmark has struggled with. The failure to integrate into Danish society has made immigrants of particular ethnic descent, according to one researcher I spoke to, among the most stigmatized minority groups in Denmark. This stigmatization, the integration failures that both produce and compound it, and the community isolation that results from it are all critically important to understanding the recent phenomenon of radicalization from within particular immigrant communities in Denmark.
Any discussion that appears to link the threat of radicalization and homegrown terrorism to a particular ethnic immigrant group is bound to be controversial. Indeed, I do not intend to argue that particular ethnic or national groups are inevitably more vulnerable to radicalization than others. But important questions can be asked that can help determine whether effective immigration policy can support the process of immigrant integration.
Why, for instance, are members of the largest segment of the U.K.'s Muslim minority population, the South Asian community, statistically over-represented in cases of homegrown terrorism, while in Hamburg, a city at the centre of Germany's jihadist environment, only 5% of terrorism suspects are of Turkish origin, which is the country's largest Muslim population?
One important factor in such a discussion is the way in which immigrant communities organize once they arrive in a new host country. Both the U.S. and Canada have a much stronger sense of civil society than most European countries, and this certainly goes a long way in mitigating against patterns of radicalization. But when immigrants who come to North America move directly into areas characterized by their ethnic isolation, this important impact of a strong civil society is muted. Here too is an instructive lesson from the United Kingdom.
A 2005 report by the Royal Geographical Society found an increasing level of isolation of immigrants to the U.K. from parts of South Asia in polarized enclaves. Such enclaves can become incubators for radical and dangerous ideologies. In North America, the Somali diaspora community has emerged as one that organizes similarly, settling primarily in a few cities, with an estimated 25,000 ethnic Somalis residing in Minneapolis, Minnesota, alone.
It was from Minneapolis that at least 20 young Somalis, who had spent most if not all of their lives in the U.S., chose to leave their adopted country behind and travel to Somalia to join the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab. Similar Somali population centres exist throughout North America, including in Toronto, where the majority of Canada's Somali population resides.
Finally, the unique conditions present in each of the countries I examined led to the emergence of specific hubs of radicalization and radical activity, particularly among immigrant communities. In the U.K. and Germany, large mosques have emerged as such hubs. This is a reflection of the sheer number of jihadists in these countries. But the comparably small universe of jihadists in North America and the fact that there is no equivalent on the North American side of the Atlantic to the skyline of Hamburg, dotted with the silhouettes of 60 to 70 mosques, means that this emergence of high-profile large mosques as bastions of jihadist ideology is unlikely to be replicated here. Instead, Canada and the U.S. are more likely to see similarities with Denmark, where one other defining feature of radicalization is important to note: namely, the emergence of what have been called basement mosques.
These study and worship groups, convened in private, divert potential jihadists out of the mainstream mosque-based Muslim society and into environments where ideologues can influence the thinking of attendees with carefully selected religious texts, a distorted perspective on world events, and stories of adventure, piety, and heroism from jihadist battlefields around the world. Such facilities may be particularly attractive to newly arrived immigrants, both legal and illegal, who seek a comfortable set of surroundings in a new and unfamiliar country.
One area of growing concern to Danish authorities is the existence of these basement mosques in the Somali community. Observers note that in an already isolated ethnic community, these underground meeting places may not even be open to other Somalis. In North America, such isolated basement mosques may not need to emerge for a similar dynamic to take place, as many of the existing mosques, including those that cater primarily to particular immigrant communities, are already surprisingly nondescript. The Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center in Minneapolis, for example, where several local youth were alleged to have been radicalized, is a plain brick building that is nearly indistinguishable from the apartment blocks that surround it.
With these lessons from Europe in mind, I would suggest three broad priorities to consider when crafting a policy to ensure that Canada's immigration and border control mechanisms support the country's fundamental national security objectives.
First, effective laws that are adequately enforced should ensure that those not granted the right to stay in the country do in fact leave, particularly if the grounds for such refusal are related to national security concerns.
Second, such laws should facilitate maximum awareness of not only who is entering the country, but also, critically, who is travelling between Canada and those regions of the world with which terrorism dangers are most closely associated.
Finally, terrorism is perhaps the best example of a security issue that thrives when barriers exist between various agencies with very different mandates. The risk of radicalization among immigrant groups highlights this fact. As such, immigration and border control policies should form a mutually supportive relationship with the work of law enforcement agencies at all levels to provide the maximum degree of security against threats of homegrown terrorism.
Complete foresight regarding radicalization and the threat of homegrown terrorism is unfortunately impossible, but seeking an understanding of each is important and can serve to support the critical task of crafting policy that protects both the Canadian people and the fundamental values on which free societies rest. In doing so we should learn from the experiences of other countries, including those that I have just briefly discussed.
With that, Mr. Chair, I will end my remarks. I thank you again for the privilege of appearing before this committee. I will be happy to answer any questions.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Mr. Amble, thank you for your presentation and your recommendations to the committee. I'm sure there will be some questions from members.
We're first going to hear from another witness, Ms. Rajaratnam, from Toronto.
You have the floor, Ms. Rajaratnam.
As an Individual
Thank you.
My name is Renuka Rajaratnam. First, let me thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak out.
I'm a proud Canadian and have been living in Canada for over 25 years. Last year, in 2011, I was celebrating my 25th wedding anniversary, on September 17, 2011. I thought this was an event I would celebrate with my family here in Toronto and in Sri Lanka. We are a family of eight, my siblings, with five of us living here in Toronto and three living in Sri Lanka. My two oldest brothers and my youngest sister are the people who live in Sri Lanka. In order to process the celebration, along with my husband I sponsored my three siblings for visitors' visas through my lawyer. All three applied at the same time, with all relevant documents.
My two older siblings were granted visas to come to Canada to attend the function, but not my younger sister. I was so disappointed with the decision of the Sri Lanka High Commission, and I just couldn't come to understand why two members of the same family were given the opportunity to attend, while one person was left behind. This is a reunion I have waited for for 34 years, and it was shattered due to a decision made by the Sri Lanka High Commission, and to date I don't know the reason. They haven't given me the reason for turning down my sister.
My sister did produce all the relevant documents and she had a return ticket, and I vouched through my lawyer for her departure date. She was leaving behind her husband, two young daughters, and her employment in a leading law firm in Sri Lanka. With all these reasons I've given, she was still turned down.
I just want to say here that I had sent out invitations to permanent residents as well as for visitors' visas for numerous friends and family. None of them have violated so far any of the stipulations given by the government. This rejection was very disappointing, and it really took a big toll on our family. I just need reasons for why the Sri Lanka High Commission did this to us. The emotional stress was more than the expenses we incurred. I have produced all the documents that incurred the expenses.
I just want to find out the details, find out the reason for the future, if the commission can come up with the reason why she was turned down. Here's a lady, my younger sister, who travels widely. Why is she not allowed to come to Canada when the rest of her family members are living here? It's just for a visitor's visa. If I could have one good reason, I would accept it. It would really give closure to this whole thing. I would not have to pursue it any more and go through the emotional trauma. I'm looking forward to hearing from the commission, if you could come up with the reasons and find a resolution to this.
That's all I've got to say. Thank you very much again for giving me this opportunity to present my side of the story.
Thank you.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Thank you for your presentation, Ms. Rajaratnam. The committee will have questions.
I want to draw to members' attention to the fact that the clock in here is wrong. We will be going by the chairman's clock. The chairman's clock is 3:48.
We first have Mr. Opitz.
Conservative
Ted Opitz Conservative Etobicoke Centre, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Amble, thank you very much for your presentation. It was very detailed. I did read your biography, and you're quite accomplished, given what you've done in your past with the U.S. military, the intelligence, and the military training you have.
Sir, my first question to you is on situational awareness in terms of security, and who is coming into this country. In broad terms, first of all, how would you recommend that Canada improve its situational awareness about people coming and going into this country?
As an Individual
Thank you very much for your comments.
I guess to begin I should qualify my response by saying that I'm not an expert on Canadian immigration and border control law. However, the research that I did in these three European countries led to one very clear conclusion—and that's in the U.K.: that not only were immigration laws inadequately crafted, but more importantly, they were inadequately enforced. There were simply too many cracks, in terms of not only getting into the country, but then also of people staying in the country. Part of that is also just a matter of scale.
The vast majority of the homegrown terrorism cases in the U.K. have ties to Pakistan. More than three-quarters had individuals who had trained in Pakistan, which is significant and unique to the U.K.
U.K. residents make 400,000 trips to Pakistan per year. The average duration of each one of those is 41 days, which, quite frankly, is enough time to receive dangerous training in a training camp. And yet that duration alone isn't sufficient to be able to determine the actual reasons people are travelling to Pakistan.
I think there needs to be a broad and detailed process to develop a means of tracking people, finding out when people are leaving, when they're coming back, how long they're going for, and what they're doing. They have to eliminate some of the cracks that are certainly present in the U.K.
Conservative
Ted Opitz Conservative Etobicoke Centre, ON
On that attack, we are developing an electronic travel authorization, ETA, and its entry and exit provisions in the perimeter agreement to prevent foreign criminals from abusing what we consider to be our generous immigration system.
As you may be aware, with electronic travel authorization the government will be able to know every single time somebody enters or exits between Canada and the U.S., even at a land crossing. In your opinion, do you think this will help the government crack down on residency fraud and people wanting Canadian status without living here or paying into the system?
As an Individual
Absolutely, I do.
One of the problems that all of the European countries have in terms of a terrorism threat—and that's really what my research was limited to-—is the Shengen visa programs, the free border crossings within European countries, which means that once an individual enters Europe or any one of the Shengen countries, they can travel across borders without really being tracked in any meaningful way whatsoever.
I've done it myself, crossed many borders, and from the time I left London until the time I came back to London I may have visited five, six, or seven countries, and nobody ever knows those things.
Certainly I think that sort of electronic mechanism will be helpful.
Conservative
Ted Opitz Conservative Etobicoke Centre, ON
What do you think of adding biometrics to that? Do you think that adding that dimension would also be an effective tool to prevent fraud and keep security threats out of the country?
As an Individual
I certainly do. Outside of my research, as the chair indicated, I was a member of the U.S. army. I served both in Iraq and Afghanistan. We used biometrics in those places with great effect in terms of keeping track of individuals we needed to be keeping track of. I know the United Kingdom has incorporated something similar, a biometrics procedure, in order to enter the country.
However, I know that there have also been significant problems. I can't speak to those in very much detail, but I know that they have had some problems implementing it and determining who they're going to be scanning when they come into the country, and who still needs to go to speak one-on-one with a border official.
Conservative
Ted Opitz Conservative Etobicoke Centre, ON
I understand that implementing any new technology is often problematic, especially at the front end where you have to work out the bugs. But is there any data right now that has demonstrated the effectiveness of biometrics?
As an Individual
I haven't seen any in the U.K. I think it is too early in the process for them to generate any meaningful data. I do know there's been a bit of controversy, because it's actually created some fairly long lines at Heathrow Airport, which is known for its long lines anyway. I know that, to this point, the government is still planning on sticking with it, confident that ultimately they'll work out some of the kinks in the process and that it will add that element of security they're looking for.
Conservative
Ted Opitz Conservative Etobicoke Centre, ON
Would there be any recommendations you would make to Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Canada Border Services Agency that would help mitigate the risks overall on a global scale?
As an Individual
Yes, there would. I guess that would be, broadly speaking, understanding the threats—again I'm speaking specifically of terrorism—and understanding that the binary distinction between homegrown terrorism and terrorism that originates abroad is flawed. Many of the cases I've looked at in the U.S. with homegrown terrorists have included individuals who have travelled to Pakistan, Somalia, and some other dangerous parts of the world, so it's also understanding that your immigration procedures and your border control procedures need to be linked with the efforts of local law enforcement and law enforcement up to the national level in order to truly be fully effective in fulfilling national security objectives.