Thank you. Thank you for inviting us to present before you.
My name is Carole Dahan, and I'm the director of the refugee law office at Legal Aid Ontario. This is my colleague, Andrew Brouwer, a staff lawyer at the RLO.
As I said, we're a staff office of Legal Aid Ontario, and we're a very small office; there are five lawyers and five support staff. About 50% of the work we do involves persons in detention. I have visited the immigration holding centre, the IHC, that was spoken about this morning on numerous occasions, and I concur with Janet Cleveland's assessment of it as a jail, and certainly not, as Minister Kenney has characterized it, as a hotel.
I'm not going to spend my precious minutes talking about the IHC, but if any members have further questions about the IHC or about the provincial jails where detainees are also held, we have lots of experience with those facilities and I would be happy to address that later.
In the work that our office does with detainees, we're often the last resource, the last chance for representation of the most vulnerable clients. Many of our clients have, for one reason or another, been unsuccessful in their refugee claims and are facing imminent removal. Because we are a very busy and very small office, we only take cases where there is evidence that the person is at real risk of persecution.
For example, one gentleman who found us while at the IHC had come to Canada from war-torn Chechnya and had made a refugee claim right at the airport. He was one of the lucky ones who had the presence of mind to bring a number of documents establishing his identity when he was fleeing. They were submitted to the IRB, and they in turn submitted them for what's called forensic testing, because of the prevalence of forged documents coming from that area of the world. The IRB lost the documents before they were ever forensically tested. While they accepted his Russian citizenship, they found that he was not a convention refugee because he had failed to establish his identity as a Chechnyan.
Shortly after that, he began the process of trying to get a new document, a new birth certificate. He contacted his sister, but because we were dealing with a war-torn nation at the time—his house had been bombed and been burned down—his sister had to travel to another city, to the registrar of births, to obtain a new birth certificate. In the meantime, he was served with what's called the pre-removal risk assessment, his PRRA, which he completed himself, but without this new evidence, it, too, was rejected.
The new evidence arrived 17 days after his PRRA was rejected. It was at that moment that he found us, while detained, and we were able to assist him in submitting a new, second PRRA, with the new birth certificate that conclusively proved that he was, indeed, Chechnyan. With that evidence he was found to be a convention refugee and at long last given the protection that he was seeking all along.
Why am I telling you this story? I'm telling you this story because it illustrates several issues with respect to Bill C-31.
Number one, it shows that human errors do occur.
Number two, it demonstrates that the very tight time lines, the 15 days for the basis of claim form and the 30 days and 60 days for the hearing are simply not enough time to obtain proper and supportive documentation from back home, let alone psychological assessments, which Cécile Rousseau and Janet Cleveland spoke about this morning, or even just physical medical examinations to support a claim.
Third, it demonstrates the need for a safeguard. Even when there has been a recent negative decision, when there is new and persuasive evidence that goes to the heart of the person's claim of persecution, there must be a mechanism by which evidence can be examined and evaluated. Without it we run the risk of refoulement.
Bill C-31 would have barred my client from submitting a new PRRA for one year from the date he had received his IRB decision, and he would have been sent home to face persecution.
To be clear, I'm not suggesting that everyone be given a further PRRA after the IRB has made a decision, but when there are exceptional circumstances and when there is new evidence, then the bar should not exist. There must be a mechanism to review this new evidence before the person is sent back.
I'm very conscious of the time, so I would also add that in the circumstances there would be no automatic stay of removal. My colleague is going to talk about that in a different context. Just as now, we would have to convince either a removal officer to defer the removal, pending the new PRRA, or we would have to convince a Federal Court judge to defer the removal pending a new PRRA. So we're not adding another layer to the process, but we are asking that the one-year bar be reconsidered.
I have some other recommendations that I'm happy to share with you later.