Thank you.
I will answer in English, so that I can be more specific.
My colleague, Benjamin Muller, will be here on Wednesday, I believe, and he is far better equipped to talk about biometrics than I, so I will leave that question for him.
But on the question of centralization of information, we are in a challenging time, in that many of the countries that provide the breeder documents we base our intelligence analysis on do not have robust document infrastructure. For example, in the United States alone there are over 300 kinds of identity documents. That's just in the United States, which has a very robust government. But when we go to places like India, Indonesia, or Malaysia, those breeder documents can be extremely insecure.
My concern is that we mistake personal interaction for automatic risk assessment, if that makes sense. It seems to me that if we use watch lists or profiling to say that it is “this set of names” or “this set of behaviours” that sets off a flag, then that seems to give us the impression of increasing our security because we've run a check, but it does not in fact actually increase security.
Does that make sense?