Citizenship and Immigration Committee on Oct. 3rd, 2012

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

I just wanted you to get your hopes up there for a second. I thought you had seven minutes.

Earlier on I heard a response about a study you had to demonstrate the responses you were giving to Député Opitz. Is it possible to get it to the committee so that we have that available for us to read?

[Dr. Benjamin Muller]

Yes. It's not a study I completed, but I can certainly submit that information to the committee.

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

That would be great. Thank you very much.

I'm going to suggest that we take a three-minute break, and then we will resume with the second part.

I want to thank you both, Dr. Tyndall and Benjamin Muller, for the presentations you made. Let me assure you that we're not always this entertaining.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

I'd like to call the meeting to order, please.

We have two speakers for this section. I don't know whether both of you are speaking or only one of you.

[George Platsis, Program Director, Centre of Excellence in Security, Resilience, and Intelligence, Schulich Executive Education Centre, As an Individual]

I'm going to tee it up, and then my partner is going to take over.

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

Okay.

We have George Platsis and Donald Loren. Welcome. You will each have 10 minutes to speak.

[George Platsis]

We had arranged for 10 minutes combined.

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

Ten minutes combined is even better. You will have 10 minutes to speak, and then we will have a round of questions.

Just so you know, the meeting is televised. If you need to use the audio devices, they are right there in the table, and you may need them at one time or another. But you may be perfectly bilingual, in which case you don't need them.

Without further ado, we'll go over to you, George.

[George Platsis]

Thank you.

We thank the vice-chair and the members of the committee for inviting us to appear before you once again. My name is George Platsis. I am a program director with the Centre of Excellence in Security, Resilience, and Intelligence at the Schulich School of Business at York University in Toronto.

With me today is one of our centre's senior distinguished faculty members, retired Rear Admiral Don Loren of the U.S. Navy.

Please note that our comments are our own today and do not reflect the views of any of the organizations we may be associated with.

The realities of the 21st century have shown us that technology has given access and ability to a larger number of actors, including small groups and individuals, all with differing intents and interests. The net result, even for a single actor, can have an asymmetric effect upon society.

Discussions focused on Canada's immigration policy, which are vast and broad, will define our ever-evolving Canadian identity, economic success, and security landscape. But for the purposes of this conversation and this session we will focus on a very narrow range of issues specifically related to intelligence-gathering capabilities and information handling, both domestically between departments and internationally with our partners and our allies.

Technology should be used as a tool, not as a crutch, and the foundation for any technology to protect our borders is intelligence. From information gathering to analysis to intelligence that is actionable, we need to ensure that the information we collect and analyze is kept confidential, maintains its integrity, and is made available only to those who have a legitimate use for it.

This issue is daunting in an inter-agency and international context, especially as organizations use differing levels of internal security protocols. Consider that on the issue of admissibility, upwards of 10 or more Canadian departments and various statutes could apply. Depending on the case, you have IRPA, the Security Offences Act, the National Defence Act, the CSIS Act, and the Aeronautics Act, just to name a few that could apply. In the example I just gave, CIC, the RCMP, CSIS, CSEC, and CATSA would all have some jurisdictional responsibility. And we have yet to consider our international possibilities.

In addition, the creation of Shared Services Canada has tasked it with streamlining more than 100 e-mail systems, 300 data centres, and more than 3,000 overlapping and uncoordinated electronic networks.

While this decision should reduce inefficiencies, there are other inherent risks associated with a fully integrated system. As we become more reliant on these systems to store personal information and make critical decisions, we also have a responsibility to harden these same systems, both from a technological perspective but also from a human-use perspective.

These same principles must also apply to more sensitive areas that fall outside the mandate and domain of Shared Services Canada; these relate to our national security. There's a very simple concept that we must never forget: you are only as strong as your weakest link.

Going forward, we must be able to assure the information we acquire and use. In an information-sharing context, this requires both human and technological safeguards. Furthermore, our own Canadian ability to gather, validate, and protect information from our uniquely Canadian vantage point benefits Canadian interests and intents as we go forward, so that we can make our own assessments that meet our own needs.

Ultimately, it should be sound information that acts as the basis for admission into Canada. We must be cognizant that, given that our systems and networks are interconnected, an information breach in one department may have an effect in many others, including upon the decision-making process for admissibility.

It is at this point that I would like to invite a very great friend of Canada, Admiral Don Loren, to share and give you the benefit of his experiences in these matters from an American and international perspective.

Thank you.

[Rear-Admiral, Retired) Donald Loren (Senior Distinguished Faculty, Centre of Excellence in Security, Resilience, and Intelligence, Schulich Executive Education Centre, As an Individual]

Thank you, George.

Madam Vice-Chair, members of the committee, thank you for having me here again. I'm a great friend of Canada, and it is at my colleague's request that I appear before you.

Please note that all the comments made today are my own and are not reflective of any organizations I may be affiliated with.

As noted in my previous testimony before this committee, I'm not here to address any laws in specific terms, as it is not my place as an American to do so. What I can offer is my perspective as the former deputy director for operations support at our National Counterterrorism Center. As the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security Integration, I can offer my specific observations on issues of intelligence gathering, information sharing, particularly within the inter-agency and international context. I can also give you a view to assist you to define your own unique Canadian interests as they may relate to immigration policies.

The degree to which we can be proactive is the degree to which we both shall succeed or fail as we face the challenges that lie ahead for both our nations. Within that context, the challenges that both Canada and the United States face with respect to border security and immigration can only be resolved through both nations working together, as we have done in the air and missile defence of North America through NORAD.

The key to working together is to ensure that not only are the policies and programs implemented in both nations aligned, but that each nation is comfortable with the measures that are in place to address our customs and immigration challenges.

I can state that in my professional experience, addressing these challenges is not only about ensuring that the necessary equipment and resources are in place, but equally, if not more importantly, it's about ensuring that the intelligence and law enforcement information upon which decisions are based is sound.

For example, biometrics are often presented as a potential solution to solve many of the immigration issues we both experience, but it would be naïve to believe that implementing expensive technical solutions without the necessary intelligence to inform the technology is the sole answer.

Canada's membership in the Five Eyes provides access to significant amounts of information that can be used to better assess the potential risks posed by individuals attempting to enter the country. This information must be readily available to the appropriate decision-makers and shared across agencies, something that both of our nations can do better. Even if the information were made available and utilized properly, there are secondary and tertiary concerns that must be addressed before courses of action are undertaken.

For example, the security and assurance of the information must of course be protected. This means it is paramount that the infrastructure and architecture of the security and intelligence apparatuses used create a level of confidence amongst Canadian allies in order to have a more open flow of information, as this information will ultimately help ensure that only legitimate persons enter Canadian territory.

The strong relationship between Canada and the United States must always consider political dynamics that face our respective countries, as these same political dynamics could have significant impact on moving border and inter-agency initiatives forward. A mutual respect and understanding of the political winds of both countries should be considered when any courses of action are taken, thus ensuring that there are no misconceptions or misunderstandings.

The United States works hard to ensure that its border, immigration, and security policies are corrected, as does Canada work hard on these very same issues. Our nations have built our relationship on trust and mutual cooperation, and that should continue to be the case. As we work to constantly improve that sense of trust, that spirit of cooperation, and the practice of sharing information between nations, we must each work on similar relationships between our own departments, ministries, organizations, states, and provinces.

We must constantly strive to eliminate the cultural and procedural barriers that exist within our own nations and across domestic departments. We must consider ways to collect vital information that impacts our respective homeland security, yet protect methods and sources. We must learn to integrate intelligence and law enforcement information, yet protect the individual rights of our citizenry.

While the focus of today's homeland security has brought the threat closer to home, we must remember that the environment is not only intelligence-centric, but it is rule-of-law-centric as well. In the 21st century, where transnational crime and terrorism pose substantial and increasing threats and risks, it is worrisome for both our countries that the growing nexus between criminality and terrorism force multiplies the threats we face today.

We require a better understanding of today's and tomorrow's challenges in order to best address them, and we must move away from our past definition of those challenges. We must address the challenges in context as they are today and will be tomorrow, not as they were yesterday, for it is proactivity that shall determine our collective future successes or failures.

Your country, much like my own, was built on sound immigration policy, and ensuring these policies remain sound and go forward will be a determining factor in the positive growth of both our great nations.

In closing, both the United States and Canada have talented security and intelligence professionals to perform the work that lies ahead. These people exist both within and outside the government. It should be a priority of government to engage these professionals and use to the fullest capability the sound knowledge and practical solutions they offer to the security problems our nations face together.

We must ensure the right personnel are in the right positions. This human capacity, supported by sound and safeguarded intelligence, operating collaboratively between domestic agencies and international partners, will ensure that the legitimate traveller and the legitimate refugee are properly admitted to our countries, thus enjoying all the wonderful opportunities your country and mine have to offer.

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

Thank you very much for your presentation.

We will go to Député Opitz.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Welcome back, Admiral, and welcome back, Mr. Platsis. It's good to see both of you again.

Admiral, from your former job as deputy director, you mentioned the intelligence gathering capabilities of what you were doing, which obviously impacts military situations and the overall security of a nation, but it also impacts migratory patterns of human beings, whether it's through immigration or just travel and movement back and forth.

You discussed at length the value of intelligence. The previous speaker talked about human intelligence in particular and how some of that is gathered. From that specific point of view, you also said that human intelligence and intelligence generally has to interact with the machinery, literally, of biometrics to be able to give you the whole intelligence picture so you know who's coming and going. Could you comment on that, sir?

[RAdm Donald Loren]

Sure, I'd be very happy to comment.

One of the things we both have to deal with as nations is trying to describe and identify today's problems and our future problems and challenges in yesterday's terms. When I say intelligence, we all immediately conjure thoughts of 007, Cold War definitions, military intelligence. In our IRTPA of 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, and I will quote that law as that's our own, we go to great lengths to use the word “information”.

This is where the two areas start getting very grey. We have to be very cautious in the United States, as do you, I would suspect, as to what is information, what is intelligence, what is military intelligence, what is national security intelligence, what is law enforcement intelligence. These areas get grey.

We have to learn to understand how to collect that information, whether it be from what we call open sources, from clandestine sources, from international sources, or from specific activities, and piece that information together, yet absolutely respect the rights of our citizens. The last thing we want to have are non-law enforcement government agencies collecting intelligence on individual citizens. We are constantly very cautious of that. It would violate our Constitution. It violates the ideals and beliefs we have as a nation. That doesn't make the challenge any easier.

We have to make sure there is a sharing of information. There has to be a hands-off at some period. There has to be a turnover to those who are duly vested with responsibility for law enforcement, who can gather that type of intelligence, or information, whatever you choose to call it.

One of the things we have to realize is that we cannot stereotype terms and apply them across the board. We have to be very cautious of how we use those terms.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

How does the information, from a law enforcement point of view, now combine with biometric technology to create a picture for, say, a CBSA agent at the border?

[RAdm Donald Loren]

I listened to your former panellist's comment. I am not a biometrics expert by any means, but I do want to distance myself a bit from the use of biometrics to gather intelligence and to conduct profiling. I'm a nuts-and-bolts kind of guy. Biometrics is using the technology we have at hand to ensure you can prove who you say you are.

We've evolved throughout history. We had letters of mark, we had credentials, and then we invented photography and we were able to use your photographic image. We had to deal with cultures that thought using your photographic image captured your spirit, yet we worked through those sorts of things.

As the technology changes, I simply want to be able to ensure that when you use that government ID card and put it into your computer, and if you take your index finger and put it on the reader, I can prove that the fingerprint identification of the person using the card that has the information is confirmed and you are who you say you are, and you did not simply come by that card.

So I'm very cautious about staying away from biometrics as intelligence gathering; it's purely identification.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Platsis, in terms of interoperability, of sharing information between nations, whether it's the United States and us, or the U.K. and others, and even within our own departments here, what would your comment be? You talked about the interoperability of these departments and Shared Services Canada trying to basically integrate and aggregate a lot of that information. Can you comment on that, sir?

[George Platsis]

Sure.

My concern when all different types of information are conglomerated...as I mentioned, you have differing levels of security protocol. I gave one example, that the one issue of admissibility crosses a whole level of different departments. All of these departments have differing levels of security in what they use on their internal protocols. Yes, Shared Services Canada does want to streamline. But again, it's protecting the integrity, the confidentiality and availability of that information. For example, if CIC or CBSA has information on some person and then they need to verify it with, say, CSIS or the RCMP, at some point along that line it may be possible—it may not—that the information goes from being something that's unclassified to it being a person of interest. At what point do we ensure that the information hasn't been contaminated and hasn't been altered at all?

From a biometrics standpoint, for example, yes, we can get a retina scan, and, yes, we can get a fingerprint and we can do all this, but when we actually have our electronic document, are we sure that this information has been safeguarded in a particular way?

I noticed from the previous session that you pulled out your NEXUS card. I have a NEXUS card as well. For anyone who has a NEXUS card, you'll see that you actually get this little sleeve that you're supposed to keep your NEXUS card in, because of technology that's actually embedded inside the card—it's NFC, near field communication. Lots of passports are actually starting to use this right now with e-passports....

Is that it?

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

Finish your sentence.

[George Platsis]

Okay.

I only want to say that we need to ensure that that information is also protected, because there have been cases to show that even electronic documents can be forged and can be manipulated.

[The Vice-Chair (Ms. Jinny Jogindera Sims), NDP, Jinny Sims]

Thank you very much.

I'm now going to go to Député Freeman.

[Mylène Freeman, NDP, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

I'm new to this committee—

[George Platsis]

Welcome.

[Mylène Freeman, NDP, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

—but I understand you have presented to this committee before, Mr. Platsis, on this specific study. I went to the evidence of March 15 when you were here and pulled out some questions I have from looking at your testimony.

You mentioned that the Auditor General made numerous recommendations with regard to the improvements of the integrity and security of our immigration system. He revealed that officers have no idea who should be coming to Canada, as they do not have enough specific data to make an assessment on admissibility. Additionally, there is a lack of performance reviews, guidance, and training.

While biometrics may assist with the information collection, these recommendations by the Auditor General are not addressed. Officers may still not be administering the current laws accordingly, with little oversight.

You stated on March 15:

The situation becomes even more daunting because of inadequate ongoing training and an overreliance on technology, which risks both increased danger and complacent behaviour.

What human resource improvements should accompany the implementation of biometrics, if there were to be future legislative changes?