I think we will be able to tag team on this one.
Certainly, we have seen in the post 9/11 environment that the al-Qaeda narrative has become more popular, and al-Qaeda itself took significant steps to propagate that narrative, resulting in increased threat. We've seen that for the past number of years. As a result, CSIS has actively expanded its counter-terrorism capacity in order to be able to identify and track individuals. CSIS has, within Canada, upped its game on the counter-terrorism level, and in addition to the pure investigative role, it has upped its game in regard to an understanding and appreciation of radicalization. One of the biggest issues is individuals who are radicalized in Canada, who become a threat to conduct violent extremist activity, and who may travel.
In addition, CSIS has expanded its international footprint because of the numbers of individuals who travel and the threat that arises with their travel. It's a threat to Canada's reputation. As I outlined in my opening remarks, it's a threat because it brings overseas the threat to Canadian interests, and it also facilitates others engaging in threat-related activity against Canadians.
In general, the response is that we've upped our game very significantly on counter-terrorism, on tracking, and on the study and understanding of radicalization. There's no question that the threat has changed over the last few years. The international terrorist threat has changed. Al-Qaeda and the core leadership of al-Qaeda, for example, have suffered significant losses, and that has disrupted the al-Qaeda core capacity. What we see, though, are related cross-affiliated groups, so groups like—