Thank you very much, Mr. Tilson.
Mr. Chair, honourable members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), I would like to thank the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration for inviting me to participate in the debate on Bill C-425, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act (honouring the Canadian Armed Forces).
We are pleased to have the opportunity to talk to the committee about this bill in relation to the issue of statelessness. However, before I begin, I would like to briefly introduce UNHCR's role and mandate in terms of statelessness.
UNHCR's responsibilities to stateless persons first started with refugees without any nationality, under the UNHCR Statute and the 1951 refugee convention, both of which refer to stateless persons who meet the criteria of the definition of a refugee.
Following the adoption of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, UNHCR's mandated responsibilities concerning statelessness were expanded.
The General Assembly's resolution in 1974 and 1976 designated UNHCR as the body mandated to examine the cases of persons who claim the benefit of the 1961 convention, and to assist such persons in presenting their claim to the appropriate national authorities.
Subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly's resolution in 1995 and subsequent resolutions confer upon UNHCR a global mandate for the identification, prevention, and reduction of statelessness, and for the international protection of stateless persons.
UNHCR'S stateless mandate includes prevention of statelessness. As a result, it is not limited to addressing cases of statelessness which have already occurred. This means that UNHCR works to identify and address risks of statelessness, which may arise as a result of a gap in nationality laws and a conflict in laws between states; administrative obstacles, such as onerous requirements for proof of nationality; the situation of state succession; and discrimination on race, gender, disability, and other grounds.
It is in relation to this intersection, between prevention of statelessness and citizenship, and the office's responsibilities in respect to the 1961 convention, that UNHCR welcomes the opportunity to present to you one specific comment on Bill C-425.
Please allow me to clarify again from the outset that UNHCR can only comment on elements of the bill that relate to statelessness. I will therefore avoid referring to questions of withdrawal of Canadian citizenship for individuals who possess dual or multiple nationalities as in principle, statelessness is not an issue in such cases.
With respect to Bill C-425, clause 2 of the bill amending section 9 on the Citizenship Act provides for withdrawal of Canadian citizenship, as follows:
A Canadian citizen who is also a citizen or a legal resident of a country other than Canada is deemed to have made an application for renunciation of their Canadian citizenship if they engage in an act of war against the Canadian Armed Forces.
In this respect, UNHCR would like to submit that the possible withdrawal of citizenship of a Canadian national who is also a legal resident of a country other than Canada is at odds with the provision of articles 7 and 8 of the 1961 convention, requiring contracted states not to permit renunciation, or provide for loss of nationality—article 7—or deprivation of nationality—article 8—where the individual concerned would be rendered stateless.
I wish to state from the outset UNHCR's acknowledgement and appreciation for the minister's comment before this committee, that since Canada is a party to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the bill needs to be amended in order to ensure Canada follows its international obligation. The minister stated that, as written, the bill would apply to citizens who are legal residents of another country and should they not have dual citizenship, it would render them stateless. The minister urged the committee to consider amendments so that only those with dual citizenship would have their citizenship renounced to ensure that no one is made stateless.
UNHCR fully concurs with this position and highlights that this is the only section of the bill that, if not amended, would be inconsistent with Canada's obligation under the 1961 convention. Therefore, UNHCR respectfully recommends the words “or a legal resident” be deleted from the text.
I would like to add a few words on renunciation laws and the provision of nationality in accordance with the 1961 convention. The 1961 convention prohibits renunciation laws and deprivation of nationality when this results in statelessness. There are exceptions to this general rule, as foreseen in article 7 with regard to loss of nationality and article 8 with regard to deprivation of nationality. These exceptions are not applicable to Bill C-425. The exceptions are narrowly defined.
With respect to loss of nationality, the only exceptions to the general rule are in relation to prolonged residence abroad by naturalized citizens and failure to register for individuals born outside the territory. With respect to deprivation, the exceptions to the general rule relate essentially to nationality acquired by misrepresentation or fraud and conduct that is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty toward the state. However, this latter set of exceptions to the general rule prohibiting deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness may be applied only by those states that made a declaration at the time of signature, the ratification of accession that they retained the right to apply. Canada did not make such a declaration upon accession to the 1961 convention in 1978.
The convention also requires that these grounds needed to exist in national law at the time the declaration was made. Canada, together with the U.K., put forward the drafting for these elements of article 8 of the convention when the text of the 1961 convention was negotiated.
International human rights law foresees differences in treatment depending on the specific circumstances of different groups of people. This approach can be summed up with the axiom that people in the same situation must be treated the same, people in different situations may be treated differently, however there must be a legitimate reason for a difference in treatment. In support of this principle, the United Nations Human Rights Committee states, “The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean identical treatment in every instance”. This is paragraph 8 of “General Comment 18”, the Human Rights Committee, 1989.
It is necessary that the Citizenship Act differentiates between the impact of specific elements of the Citizenship Act on people who have another nationality and on those who do not. The former are left without the protection of another state, while the latter are stateless. The difference in treatment therefore serves a legitimate purpose, which is the prevention of statelessness.
Chairman Tilson, honourable committee members, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for your attention.