I am happy to see you back in this excellent committee.
I am very sorry that you had to cut short your trip to London. I am sure that would have been much more interesting to you than being here.
I am submitting a motion in evocation to you, in accordance with the delegatus non potest delegare principle — a delegate cannot delegate. You surely noticed that the first sentence in Mr. Dykstra's original motion begins with the words “Pursuant to Standing Order 97.1(1)”. The word “pursuant” essentially implies that we must respect all of Standing Order 97.1(1), where it is indicated that we may ask for “a single extension of thirty sitting days to consider the bill, and giving the reasons therefor.” However, in Mr. Dykstra's motion, no reasons are provided.
The committee cannot delegate to the House a power that is delegated to it through regulations, and this is why I invoked the delegatus non potest delegare principle, because Mr. Dykstra's motion is out of order given the way in which it is worded, since it does not provide any reasons, as required by Standing Order 97.1(1).
I can understand that on such a technical point, you may need jurisprudence and various elements to confirm this. Essentially, the delegatus non potest delegare principle concerns this type of situation.
This committee is entitled to ask the House for an extension of 30 sitting days. However, that request for a 30-day extension must imperatively be accompanied by a justification. It is the committee's duty. It cannot ask the House to provide reasons in its stead. The power that is delegated to us pursuant to Standing Order 97.1(1) cannot be subdelegated to the House.
Mr. Chair, with all due respect, I would like you to comment on this point of view. If my request is justified, I would like you to ask Mr. Dykstra to withdraw his motion since it is out of order. However, if my request is not well-founded, I would like a legal opinion.
Thank you.