Thank you for asking me to be here today on behalf of B'nai Brith Canada.
I'm going to talk only about the revocation provisions in the bill because B'nai Brith Canada has a lot of experience with them.
The proposed changes to the Citizenship Act in this area are a mix of good and bad news. The good news is that the government proposes to remove the defects that had hampered the effort to use revocation as a remedy for international criminal fugitives in Canada. The proposed law is better than the present law because it removes the cabinet from the process, it allows for an appeal, and consolidates revocation and removal proceedings.
The old law required cabinet approval. That meant that the government's legal arm could win in court, and then the political arm, cabinet, could reverse the result. This is what happened in the cases of Wasyl Odynsky and Vladimir Katriuk, who the courts said both entered Canada by hiding their Nazi past.
The cabinet, nonetheless, without reason said they could stay. The League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith Canada, which I represented, went to court to argue that cabinet could not do that, that cabinet had to revoke citizenship.
However, the court said cabinet could do that, could let those who the court found had lied about their Nazi past on entry remain in Canada. It's a relief to see the proposed law takes away from cabinet this power, which has been so badly used.
The absence of an appeal meant the courts could reach inconsistent decisions on the interpretation of the law, and nothing could be done about it. There was no way of straightening these inconsistencies out. The proposed law, by allowing for an appeal, means the courts can speak with one voice instead of several.
The Nazis in Canada who hid their past on entry were brought to court decades later when they were much older. Their strategy was litigation to death, which mostly worked. Even those who lost their cases in court at every stage had to go through so many steps that the process was never completed before they died natural deaths. The proposed law, by cutting down on fragmentation by providing for consolidation of two steps—revocation of citizenship and deportation—into one, combats this strategy of endless litigation. It is a welcome change.
So that's the good news, but there's bad as well. The bad news is it makes citizenship all too easy to lose in cases that have nothing to do with international crimes. Right now citizenship can be revoked on only one ground, false representation, or fraud, or knowingly concealing material circumstances. The bill proposes expanding the grounds for revocation.
One new ground for revocation is convictions for treason or terrorism offences. A second new ground is reasonable grounds to believe the person served as the member of an armed force of a country or an organized armed group, and that country or group was engaged in armed conflict with Canada.
For terrorism offences, convictions can be abroad as well as in Canada. Yet, terrorism is a charge that repressive regimes use against their opponents who resort to violence to attempt to dislodge them.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides in the preamble that “ ...it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law”.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that tyranny and oppression can lead to rebellion. When tyrants and oppressors convict their rebellious opponents of terrorism, and the opponents are Canadian citizens, Canada should not legally be able to revoke the citizenship of those citizens merely because the oppressors and tyrants label that rebellion terrorism.
There needs to be a caveat so not any foreign conviction for terrorism can lead to loss of Canadian citizenship. The foreign conviction, if it is imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, should not be recognized in Canada. This concept of taking into account accepted international standards for convictions is already employed elsewhere in the legislation, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Despite the possibility of revocation for commission of offences, the bill is under-inclusive. It has been an anomaly that you could lose citizenship for hiding on entry to Canada Nazi crimes against humanity, but not for actually having committed those crimes. Often lying on entry is easier to prove than the commission of crimes, but not always. Immigration records may have been lost, but the proof of the crimes themselves may be readily available. Revocation for commission of the major international offences found in the statute of the International Criminal Court—war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—should be possible.
The crimes that allow for revocation, though, should be committed before the person becomes a citizen. Revocation for acts committed after a person is a citizen is problematic, even if one limits revocation to dual citizens, as the proposed law does.
A person can be a dual citizen from birth. A person can be a dual citizen without even knowing he or she is a dual citizen because he or she is unfamiliar with the citizenship laws of the other country.
We should not be revoking the citizenship of Canadians for crimes committed after the acquisition of citizenship, no matter what the crime. Once a person becomes a Canadian citizen and commits a crime, then he is our criminal. We should not pretend otherwise.
The bill also proposes a new procedure for revocation and then allocates the different grounds of revocation amongst the two procedures. I have a relatively lengthy section on this, which I'm going to skip over. The government has introduced a new procedure on grounds of simplification, amongst others. At least one point I would try to make is that it actually complicates matters quite considerably, which you'll see if you read through this material. It also runs the risk of the government losing cases against international criminals that it could otherwise win, simply by choosing the wrong procedure.
In conclusion, let me say that we commend the government for its consolidation of revocation and deportation, its introduction of an appeal, and its removal of cabinet from the process. We deplore the possibility of revocation for crimes committed after one is a citizen, the impossibility of revocation for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity and genocide, and the introduction of a less fair procedure for revocation in some cases.
The possibility of revocation of citizenship for crimes committed after one is a citizen should be dropped. The possibility of revocation of citizenship for commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, where the crimes were committed before the acquisition of citizenship, should be introduced. The possibility of revocation for a foreign conviction of terrorism committed before the acquisition of citizenship should be limited to convictions that conform to international standards. The less fair procedure of revocation through ministerial decision, subject to a judicial review in some cases, should be replaced by the more fair procedure of Federal Court decisions in all cases.
Those are my remarks. Thank you very much.