The provisions of Bill C-24 that permit revocation for what I will broadly talk of as crimes against citizenship, crimes committed while a citizen—terrorism, treason, and so on—are only applicable against people who are dual citizens, because to strip citizenship from a mono-citizen would create statelessness.
But what this means, of course, is that dual citizens are vulnerable to a kind of punishment that mono-citizen individuals are not. Yet in all other respects one would expect they are similarly situated. For example, there is no reason to think that an offence committed by somebody who is a dual citizen is any more severe, graver, or harsher, as it were, than a crime committed by somebody who is only a citizen of Canada, yet they are exposed to differential punishment. That's a kind of inequality that would breach section 15 of the charter and be very difficult to justify under section 1.
After all, whatever objectives one seeks to achieve through stripping citizenship, apparently you can't do it to people who are mono-citizens. So clearly, whatever the objectives are can't be so significant that you can't achieve them through other mechanisms of punishment. We have lots of ways of punishing people who are convicted of treason, terrorism, and other offences. We have a functioning criminal justice system. There is no reason to think that it is inadequate to deal with people who commit those offences, who also happen to be dual citizens.