Thank you very much.
Thank you for inviting me to join you today via videoconference.
I am going to give my presentation in English.
I will take questions in English as well, but I look forward to the committee's inquiries.
I'm going to confine my presentation as well to the revocation provisions. Within that I will limit myself more narrowly to the legality of those provisions.
First, I'd like to clarify the provisions regarding revocation for fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of material facts.
I understand that you have heard testimony from the minister that the inclusion of a condition requiring an applicant to intend to reside in Canada after citizenship is a provision that would not be applicable after obtaining citizenship. Perhaps the minister is there expressing the way he would desire or intend to use the law that is proposed, but I'd like to clarify that's not, in fact, how the law presently drafted is written.
What Bill C-24 does is take existing conditions for citizenship by naturalization. These are: that one reside in Canada for a certain length of time, that one pass language and knowledge of Canada tests, and that one have, broadly speaking, a clean record. The way these conditions work is that if they are not fulfilled or if an applicant conceals, misrepresents, or commits fraud with respect to any of those conditions, then citizenship obtained through that means can be revoked after the fact.
The proposed law adds a requirement that one intend to reside in Canada after acquiring naturalization to the conditions of citizenship acquisition. It follows from the structure of the provision that, if the minister takes the view that one committed fraud or misrepresentation or concealment of facts in one's intention to reside in Canada after citizenship acquisition, then the minister could, in principle, seek revocation for fraud or misrepresentation. Whether the minister chooses to do so or not, of course, is a matter of his discretion, but I'd like to insist here that the law, as presently drafted, does grant the minister power to seek revocation for an individual who, after obtaining citizenship, the minister believes did not honestly state his or her intention to reside in Canada after obtaining citizenship. So that's one clarification about the law and the legality.
Secondly, I'd like to turn to the constitutionality of the revocation provisions. Here I'm going to begin not with the revocation on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation, but the provisions that our two previous witnesses testified about, which is revocation for misconduct as a citizen; in other words, the use of citizenship revocation as punishment.
Here I think it is important to understand that we have a jurisprudence in Canada that deals with the constitutionality under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of certain forms of punishment. The most relevant case for our purposes today is a case called Sauvé. In Sauvé we had a law that denied the right to vote to inmates of Canadian prisons serving more than two years. In other words, they were denied their constitutional rights under section 2 of the charter to vote for the period of time that they were prisoners.
This law was struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada as a violation of section 2 of the charter that could not be justified under section 1 of the charter. I'd just like to reference a couple of parts of that judgment that are particularly relevant to considering revocation as punishment here.
Can you revoke somebody's citizenship in order to punish them for what we'll call crimes against citizenship? Let me draw to your attention what the Supreme Court of Canada said, because it goes directly to this claim that was made by the two other speakers about this idea of the social contract, this idea that it's a part of the social contract that people do not commit certain kinds of crime, and if they do, they have broken their part of the social contract, and it follows from that they could have their citizenship revoked from them.
Here's what the Supreme Court of Canada said about that kind of approach:
The social compact requires the citizen to obey the laws created by the democratic process. But it does not follow that failure to do so nullifies the citizen’s continued membership in the self-governing polity. Indeed, the remedy of imprisonment for a term rather than permanent exile implies our acceptance of continued membership in the social order.
In other words, the Supreme Court of Canada stated quite clearly that punishing somebody by depriving them of their constitutional rights, indeed, by denying them all constitutional rights and casting them out in the name of the social contract, is not constitutional. It isn't constitutional to deny somebody the right to vote, just in order to punish them. That's one right under the charter. It seems to follow that denying them of all constitutional rights, which is the effect of stripping someone of citizenship and exiling them from Canada, could not be constitutional either.
So it seemed to me that reading the Sauvé case provides a fairly complete answer to the constitutionality of banishment as a valid punishment under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
But certainly if one wants to go further and consider other aspects of citizenship ratification under the charter, there are certainly other dimensions of it that also appear unconstitutional on their face. For example, it is required under section 11 of the charter that if somebody is going to face a penal consequence for their actions—in this case, punishment by citizenship revocation—they're entitled to certain procedural rights.
Those rights include, under section 11 of the charter, the presumption of innocence. In the present legislation, the presumption of innocence is violated in the following way. If the minister believes that the person is a dual citizen, and therefore exposed to the risk of denationalization through citizenship stripping, the minister puts the burden on the citizen to prove that he or she is not a citizen of another country, in other words, to prove a negative in order to escape the consequence of citizenship revocation. A reverse onus violates section 11 of the charter and has been found to be unconstitutional. Bill C-24 contains a reverse-onus provision.
The charter requires that before somebody is found guilty and sentenced to a crime and punished, that person be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bill C-24 requires no such standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Our charter requires that if somebody is going to be punished, that they be tried in an open and fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration doesn't qualify as an independent and impartial tribunal. He's a government minister, not a judge.