I'll try to use it all.
Thank you for inviting me to speak on this important piece of criminal legislation. As was mentioned, I practice criminal law in Ottawa, and I'm a partner at the firm Abergel Goldstein and Partners. I'm a past board member of the Criminal Lawyers' Association. I'm currently on the CLA's legislative committee, and I'm vice-president of the Defence Counsel Association of Ottawa.
I've represented individuals charged with murder, have been involved in the peace bond process, and have litigated cases involving the use of provocation. I'm used to appearing before the justice committee, and I'm happy to appear before you here today, although it is a bit strange, given that this is essentially a criminal law bill.
It's a bill that, I submit, is consistent with this government's legislative history, which I submit to you, is designed to obscure major legislative changes and ultimately limit debate. In that context, I think it's important to detail the impacts that this bill will have on criminal law. I want to specifically speak about provocation and peace bonds.
Provocation is currently governed by section 232 of the Criminal Code and provides for a defence of provocation and in some cases can reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter. Actually understanding what provocation means is fundamental.
When the minister testified before you, there were some comments likening provocation to premeditated murder. Legally, of course, that's completely inaccurate. Provocation requires that there be a wrongful act or insult that is sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control and would cause that person to act on the sudden, before there was time for any cooling of the passions.
Provocation reflects mitigating circumstances. In other words, provocation is an allowance made for human frailty. It recognizes that a killing, even an intentional killing, may be extenuated by the complete loss of self-control and is less heinous than an intentional killing by a person acting with rational intent.
Now, there are limits on provocation. The minister told you that measures in Bill S-7 would amend the Criminal Code such that legal conduct by a victim cannot legally be considered provocation. That's already the case. The Criminal Code makes it clear that one cannot be legally provoked by someone who is doing something they have a legal right to do or by doing something that the accused incited them to do.
As I said, provocation requires that there be a wrongful act or insult that would be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control. Honour killings, the purported justification for the amendments to provocation in this bill, don't meet that criteria. Our courts have time and time again rejected religion and honour as a basis for provocation.
Provocation, after all, deals with the “ordinary person” test. The Supreme Court made it clear in the case of Tran that the reasonable person, the ordinary person, is informed by the contemporary norms of behaviour, including fundamental values such as the commitment to equality. The Tran case, 2010 SCC 58, actually upheld a conviction, which was entered on appeal, for a murder in which the accused claimed to be provoked by the sight of his wife having sexual relations with another man. What is crystal clear is that whether or not the defence of provocation ultimately is put before a jury depends on there being an air of reality to that defence. That's something that the courts carefully scrutinize.
Minister Alexander told you that anyone charged with murder could raise the defence of provocation in seeking to reduce to the lesser charge of manslaughter. That's misleading and simply untrue. There must be an air of reality to the argument before it can be placed in front of a jury.
The government has maintained that changes in Bill S-7 are necessary. Quite simply, they're wrong. The minister used the Shafia case as a justification for changes in provocation. Of course, as you know, the facts of that case are well known, and it's also known that provocation wasn't raised by the defence in Shafia. Shafia was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder.
So what do our courts say about honour-based provocation? Well, let's take a look at the case the minister didn't discuss with you, the 2006 case from the Ontario Court of Appeal of Humaid. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a conviction for first-degree murder, denouncing honour killing in language that even an immigration specialist should be able to understand.
The court said that assuming the accused's religion and cultural beliefs, in that case, were antithetical to the fundamental Canadian values, such as equality of men and women, they could never play a role in the ordinary-person provocation inquiry. The Court of Appeal went one step further and categorized these types of rationales not as provocation, but as motive.
The evidence that you heard is that there have been three unsuccessful cultural provocation defences. The minister told you that this provocation defence has been raised in several so-called honour killings across Canada. I hope he was not trying to insinuate that the application of provocation is common. That would be a reckless mischaracterization. We are talking about three cases.
This bill does more than just limit provocation to honour killings. If that was the intent of the legislation, perhaps it should have been drafted more specifically.
We just had the Supreme Court release the case of Nur, striking down some mandatory minimums. The rationale given by the minister was that they were targeted at a specific fact situation, and the court found their application was overly broad. That could be the case here, because Bill S-7 applies to much more than just honour-based provocation. It also prevents provocation from applying to a range of other cases that have historically been put before the jury. Racial slurs, hate speech, mistake of fact—all these situations will be limited in the ability to raise provocation.
One can imagine a variety of situations where it may be appropriate to leave provocation with a jury—not to tell the jury to accept it, but to leave provocation with the jury.
Imagine the father of a young girl who has committed suicide due to cyberbullying, who was sexually assaulted and harassed online. Imagine that father standing by his daughter's grave when he is confronted by the friend of the offender, who says some of the most despicable things that would never be repeated in a forum such as this, inhumane things, and spits on the daughter's grave. Under this law, if the father reacted violently, he would be unable to raise provocation, even if he acted in the heat of the moment when his passions were inflamed.
Even if we combine behaviour like that with offences such as corrupting morals, making sexually explicit content available, corrupting children, indecent acts, exposing genitalia to a person under 16, violence to the clergy, disrupting religious worship or a funeral, recording and distributing information, failure to provide the necessities of life, administering a noxious substance, threats to kill animals, inciting or promoting hatred, theft, fraud, and mischief, this bill would be an absolute bar to provocation in those cases.
Perhaps it speaks to the government's unwillingness to read the case law or inability to understand that life can be complex. This bill simply goes too far and is too broad with respect to provocation.
Now, in my brief few moments, I would like to talk about peace bonds. Peace bonds already exist. Section 810 covers arguably what is included in this bill.
Even if it is not undesirable to add a new section to the Criminal Code to target specifically what this bill targets—and that is a consideration that should be taken carefully because the bigger the Criminal Code gets, the harder it is to understand, and we are presumed to know what's in here—one has to look carefully at what it is actually going to do.
This government is suggesting that a 14-year-old girl takes it upon herself to lay a peace bond against her family. That's ridiculous. I suppose an outside agency like the CAS, the Children's Aid Society, could intervene to lay the peace bond on the child's behalf, but they can already do that. They can already apprehend the child. They can already go to the police.
Regardless of the mechanism of laying a peace bond, the matter doesn't end when a peace bond is laid. When a person goes to court to swear a peace bond, that starts the process. The person they are complaining against is served and summoned to court. The peace bond is not automatically imposed. We still have something called due process in this country.
Then, the peace bond would be set for a hearing in our underfunded courts—