Citizenship and Immigration Committee on Oct. 4th, 2018

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Good afternoon. I'm happy to call the 124th meeting of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration to order.

We are continuing our study of migration challenges and opportunities for Canada in the 21st century. We have two one-hour sessions today. We have Idil Atak from Ryerson University, as well as Alexandra Bilak, who is coming via video conference from Geneva, Switzerland. I usually start with the video conference just in case there's a technical problem and then we can get you back if we need to.

Just by way of introduction, the committee has decided to do a significant study on what in the world is going on with respect to migration of people, both forced and voluntary migration, what Canada's policy and legislative response should be in the 21st century, whether it should be different from what it was in the 20th century. We welcome both of you to the meeting.

We'll begin with Ms. Bilak.

[Alexandra Bilak, Director, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

I'm here to talk about the phenomenon of internal displacements, its global scale, some of its underlying causes and longer-term impacts, and possible solutions to it.

I'm the director of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, an organization that monitors internal displacement across the world and documents the situation of people who are forcibly displaced or at risk of displacement inside their own countries.

Internally displaced persons, or IDPs, often fall between the cracks of broader debates on migration, even though they are in fact an integral part of the global migratory picture and are among the world's most vulnerable communities and individuals.

At IDMC, we monitor internal displacement in the context of armed conflict, generalized violence, man-made disasters, and human rights violations more broadly. We are the world's trusted and authoritative source of data and analysis on this topic. We provide global statistics on conflict-induced and violence-induced displacement in 54 countries in the world and on disaster-related displacement in over 130 countries.

In 2017, we recorded 30.6 million new internal displacements by conflict and disasters. As in every other year, the majority of conflict-related displacement happened in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, while disaster-related displacement predominantly affected South and Southeast Asia.

Some of the countries that not only host the largest numbers of IDPs but are also prone to new waves of internal displacement every year include the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia in Africa, and also, of course, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan. The Philippines, China, India, Bangladesh and many small island states in the Pacific also regularly record high levels of displacement by disasters every single year.

The communities that are most severely affected are often those living in low- or lower-income countries that are experiencing protracted conflict and crises and that typically have low capacity to cope. This is where IDPs can be forced away from their homes in very brutal circumstances and can be compelled to move repeatedly over short periods of time in search of safety. We are looking in some cases at very cyclical patterns of displacement, but also very repeated shocks that gradually erode the resilience of communities that are often already very poor and vulnerable.

Even though disaster-related displacement is often considered less severe, with higher rates of return and more straightforward processes of reconstruction and reintegration, we have also documented a significant number of people, often from poor and already vulnerable communities, who remain displaced following a disaster for long periods of time. Haiti following the 2010 earthquake or Japan after the Fukushima disaster are clear examples of this, but there are many more.

As conflicts drag on, as the global rate of urbanization increases, and as climate change is likely to exacerbate the intensity of sudden and slow-onset disasters in the future, there is no reason to believe that the rising trend of internal displacement will be reversed. While today's crises are clearly underpinned by longer-term development challenges, they can also, in turn, seriously impact the development trajectory of states. This is why we have been making a clear argument over the years that internal displacement should be seen as a humanitarian challenge with clear human rights implications, but should first and foremost be considered a development challenge.

Despite all of this, action on internal displacement has been largely absent from the international policy agenda. Since 2016, the world's attention has been firmly focused on migration and refugee flows, and on the negotiation of the two global compacts on refugees and migrants. Neither of these substantively addresses displacement within national borders, or adequately recognizes the relationship between the root causes and drivers of internal displacement and wider cross-border movements.

We do not believe there is currently an appetite among states or donors to draft new international laws or protocols on internal displacement or responsibility sharing, and the utility of creating new bodies or normative frameworks to address the issue is, for us, debatable.

However, high-level political engagement is clearly needed right now to mobilize action on internal displacement. To that end, we would recommend that Canada consider supporting the recently proposed high-level panel on internal displacement. In doing so, it should strongly support the substantive involvement of states most affected by internal displacement, states that therefore have constructive experience in addressing it.

Whenever possible, these governments must take the lead in addressing internal displacement and its root causes. In doing so, they should integrate internal displacement into long-term development plans and climate change adaptation planning and invest in disaster risk reduction efforts, and in some cases they are very willing to do so. Given the scale of internal displacement globally, we believe that failing to do this is likely to undermine these countries' progress towards achieving their sustainable development goals and other international frameworks.

Where governments are themselves the cause of displacement, the international community needs to better coordinate operational responses while at the same time working to support peace-building efforts, conflict resolution, access to justice, and of course accountability for human rights violations.

To that end, Canada could support coordinated responses to protracted displacement that address the humanitarian, development and peace-building dimensions of this phenomenon, and use its influence to ensure its UN partners do the same in their programming and their engagement with national governments. This kind of support will be critical to addressing the underlying drivers of internal displacement, refugee movements and migration flows.

Finally, we would encourage more substantive investments in coordinated and consistent data collection systems on the ground to ensure that the trajectory of people displaced inside their countries, and also across borders, can be better understood, monitored and responded to, and more importantly, to ensure that the situation of IDPs never falls off national and international agendas.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you very much.

We'll turn now to Ms. Atak.

[Idil Atak, Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, Ryerson University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair. I also would like to thank the committee for the opportunity. It's a real privilege to be here.

My remarks will touch on the changes made in Canada's refugee system by two acts, the Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act and the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, both of which entered into force almost six years ago, in December 2012.

The previous Conservative government introduced these pieces of legislation following the arrival of nearly 600 Tamil asylum seekers aboard two boats in 2009 and 2010.

Protecting the safety and security of Canadians was a major aim for these changes. The other policy goals were to make the refugee system faster and fairer, to clear the refugee backlog at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, and to deport failed refugee claimants as soon as possible.

My remarks draw on field research I and two of my colleagues conducted over the past four years in three provinces—Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec. We wanted to gauge the effectiveness of the new system. Whether it was reaching its policy goals was our primary question.

As a reminder, here are some of the measures introduced in 2012.

First was accelerated timelines. For most claimants, hearings are held no later than 60 days after the refugee claim is referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board.

Second was to have limited procedural rights and limited recourse. For example, most refugee claimants are barred from applying for a pre-removal risk assessment for one year following their final IRB decision.

Third was to create new classes of refugee claimants based on their mode of arrival and their country of origin. Those claimants faced even more reduced timelines, and rights and recourse were reduced further within the new system. Claimants from the so-called designated countries of origin—and there are currently 42 of these, including Mexico—are struggling to reverse the presumption of safety of their country of origin.

“Designated foreign nationals” are another new class of refugee claimants, those who arrive in Canada irregularly, with the help of a smuggler and in a group. Designated foreign nationals, including children aged 16 and 17, are subject to mandatory detention. They are denied basic remedies, such as the right to appeal, and they also face socio-economic deterrents.

According to our findings, these measures have failed to reach their primary goals. Our system is not faster and our system is not more efficient than before. On the contrary, these changes have created a number of negative results.

First of all, they violate the human rights of refugee claimants in Canada. Take the designated foreign national detention provisions: these provisions constitute a violation of our charter rights and also of Canada's international obligations under the 1951 convention and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, among other treaties.

Second, our refugee law has become discriminatory and punitive. It doesn't provide some groups of claimants with adequate procedural protections and adequate recourse. There is therefore a heightened risk of legitimate applications being rejected and individuals being sent back to persecution.

Third, the changes prioritize efficiency and deterrence over fairness.

Fourth, the Canadian refugee landscape is seen as a field of law in flux. The legal uncertainty affects all actors involved, including Immigration and Refugee Board members, legal counsels and service providers.

Lastly, we found a correlation between these new policies and undocumented migration, which is becoming increasingly visible, as shown by the sanctuary city movements. Some of these measures have been quashed by our courts and there is ongoing litigation, but this is a lengthy and costly process.

Parliament should be proactive and first repeal the DFN clause, the designated foreign national clause. Second, refugee claimants should be given enough time, ideally no less than three months, to prepare for the hearing at the Immigration and Refugee Board. Third, differentiated treatment of refugee claimants should be eliminated. Fourth, all procedural rights and recourses should be readily available to all claimants as a matter of the rule of law. Fifth, a better understanding of undocumented migration in Canada is needed, including how our policies sometimes create the illegality of migrants. A case-by-case regularization of undocumented migrants should be considered.

These changes would enable us to establish fairness and efficiency in the system while upholding respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms of all human beings, in accordance with the objectives of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you.

Ms. Bilak, I recognize that it is late in your time zone. Thank you. We're very appreciative that you have made yourself available.

Go ahead, Mr. Ayoub.

[Ramez Ayoub, Liberal, Thérèse-De Blainville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Your speeches were very interesting.

Let me begin with you, Ms. Atak. I would appreciate a written copy of your notes because you provided a lot of important details. At this point in our study, we are gathering testimony and also wondering whether there is indeed a migration crisis. Some politicians maintain it is a serious crisis, but according to those on the ground who have a broader overview, Canada is not really in crisis.

On the other hand, we met recently with an official responsible for immigration to Canada. He said that processing times are from two to two and a half years. Thirty thousand cases are processed every year, but there is still a backlog of 60,000 cases.

You have suggested many possible solutions, but which ones do you think we should pursue in the short term to reduce processing times and treat refugees, migrants and people with regular or irregular files equally? How can we uphold their rights while doing things properly in Canada to welcome good people and reject undesirable individuals?

[Idil Atak]

Thank you for your question. You raise some very important points.

As to whether or not there is a crisis, I will say both yes and no. While processing times for asylum seekers have improved, the election of President Trump in the United States has led to an increase in the number of irregular border crossings. This is unprecedented, in my opinion. I would also say that the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement is counterproductive because it prevents asylum seekers who want to make a regular application in Canada from doing so, forcing them first to cross the border irregularly. So the number of such crossings is increasing, and I would say this is a crisis.

What is the way out of this crisis? I would recommend revising the agreement or, ideally, getting rid of it.

[Ramez Ayoub, Liberal, Thérèse-De Blainville, QC]

What would we replace it with?

[Idil Atak]

Canada must allow asylum seekers to make an application. The budget of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the IRB, has increased recently, and that is positive. One of the solutions would be to provide more funding for all actors in Canada who are trying to resolve this crisis, and also for legal aid—

[Ramez Ayoub, Liberal, Thérèse-De Blainville, QC]

I have to interrupt you because I do not have much time. I am really interested in the concept of a “safe third country”. If we were to change that concept, how much time do you think that would take, and what steps would be needed to achieve that and establish a new concept? I do not think we can get rid of the agreement without replacing it with something better.

How much time do we have to do that? In the meantime, do you think the only solution is to increase budgets and speed up the processing of economic migrants?

[Idil Atak]

This agreement has been in effect since 2004. There were irregular border crossings before Donald Trump was elected, but they have increased considerably since he took office. This shows how counterproductive the agreement is.

There is a crisis because the government south of the border has an ideology that is clearly opposed to refugees, proving how much intolerant regimes can increase the flow of asylum seekers.

What can the agreement be replaced with? I would actually recommend that we simply get rid of it because we already have a system that combines the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada and legal aid. This system is already able to deal with the situation.

[Ramez Ayoub, Liberal, Thérèse-De Blainville, QC]

Thank you, Ms. Atak.

We have about a minute and a half left. Ms. Bilak, are you familiar with the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement? Are there any other such international agreements elsewhere the world?

Since you do not seem to be familiar with it, Ms. Bilak, I will ask Ms. Atak.

To your knowledge, Ms. Atak, are there other countries that have this kind of agreement?

[Idil Atak]

There are in fact agreements in the European Union, and all EU members have declared themselves safe countries. That is the basic principle of the Canada-U.S. agreement, but it does not work at all in the European Union.

[Ramez Ayoub, Liberal, Thérèse-De Blainville, QC]

It does not work?

[Idil Atak]

They have something called the Dublin system, which has been in effect for two decades. It does not work because it is very expensive and counterproductive.

[Ramez Ayoub, Liberal, Thérèse-De Blainville, QC]

What are they thinking of doing to improve or change it?

[Idil Atak]

There is a big debate about that.

It is difficult to compare Canada and the European Union though because I think our system is much more humanitarian and we are geographically more protected than the European Union.

[Ramez Ayoub, Liberal, Thérèse-De Blainville, QC]

Thank you very much for your answers.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Mr. Maguire is next.

[Larry Maguire, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to both of our witnesses today for your presentations to us.

Ms. Bilak, I would like to ask you a couple of questions. You both had great experiences with IDPs. Looking at the situation of internally displaced people, you've given us numbers, and of course the disasters aren't going to stop. They do continue, as you said in your testimony today as well. It's not only disasters from natural causes, but there are also genocides going on.

Could you could provide me with some opinions in a couple of areas as to what Canada's response to the Rohingya genocide should be?

[Alexandra Bilak]

It's true that some of the highest and most severe levels of internal displacement that we've recorded recently have taken place in some of the most conflict-ridden countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which re-erupted into conflict back in 2016 and into 2017, and that conflict is still continuing today. Since the beginning of this year we've also looked at a huge spike in conflict and internal displacement in Ethiopia, so it's true that these large-scale violent crises are driving some of the highest levels of displacement.

When it comes to Myanmar, the crisis in Myanmar has been predominantly a refugee crisis. We've had many difficulties in determining the extent to which people have been and are still trapped internally, as opposed to the extent to which they were displaced first, and for how long, before they were then compelled to leave the country.

Most of the reports we received from Myanmar established relatively clearly that the movement was very soon a cross-border movement and became very quickly a refugee crisis. A number of IDPs have been living in very protracted situations, in some cases for decades, in pockets of insecurity that remain across Myanmar, but a large part of the crisis there has been mostly a refugee crisis.

The situation there has been very different from the situation in Syria, which for the first few years of the civil war was clearly an internal displacement crisis and then tipped into a cross-border movement and a refugee movement only in 2015. You really had both in Syria, and it's still very much the case today. You have a huge caseload of Syrian refugees, but you have an equally large, if not larger, IDP caseload in Syria. I would qualify Myanmar as a very different case.

[Larry Maguire, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

With your experience, do you think we should be reconsidering our settlement criteria to include IDPs where possible?

[Alexandra Bilak]

Well, because they don't leave their country, IDPs require a very different type of response. They need to be protected and assisted inside the borders of their country. A lot of the countries I'm talking about are in many cases failed states, or in other cases just fragile, low-income countries that have very low capacity. They, of course, then require adequate assistance.

In many cases, we are mainly looking at budgetary needs and capacity needs. In countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia there is political willingness to address the issue of IDPs and to respond adequately to this phenomenon, but there are simply insufficient financial and human resources to do so.

In that context, for those countries where there is political will, I would strongly encourage Canada to invest in longer-term dialogue with these countries, and also longer-term development, because that is ultimately what is driving these high levels of displacement.

[Larry Maguire, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

While they're doing some of that, do you think it would be appropriate to use the Magnitsky act to sanction some of these individuals in Myanmar who are responsible for some of these crimes?

[Alexandra Bilak]

I'm not familiar with that and I wouldn't really wish to comment too much on the political situation in Myanmar and what is required in terms of diplomatic efforts or sanctions to be levelled against the government there.