Okay.
I would answer the first one on migration.
The primary change we have seen is the Venezuelan migration crisis, the likes of which are unprecedented in the post-Second World War period in Latin America, and the dimensions of which were not expected at all. I was at the border between Colombia and Venezuela over the weekend. There was a very substantial flow of people coming in, legally, over the four main border crossings between the countries. They're probably in the region—it varies per day—of 2,000 to 3,000 people coming from Venezuela every day. As we know from the latest UN figures, we're talking about a population of Venezuelans abroad, primarily in Latin America, of three million now. Most of them have left since 2015 but this has particularly accelerated since late 2016, as the economic crisis in Venezuela was aggravated. That would be the main difference in migration flows.
Obviously, I could also talk about the change in the nature of migrant flows in central America. The role of Central America is dominating the migrant flow through Mexico to the United States, replacing the Mexicans on that route. They're turning the flow much more into a flow of refugees because these people, of course, are fleeing in part from high levels of insecurity. That process, that change, predates 2016 when that was clearly witnessed in the crisis of unaccompanied children in 2014.
As for the second part of your question about the broader change in Latin America, I think we now have to acknowledge that the region is entering a period of profound political polarization, which is not just characteristic within countries but is also characteristic across the entire region. In fact, if we look at a political map of the region nowadays, we see authoritarian left-wing governments in Venezuela and Nicaragua. What I would characterize as an imminent, authoritarian, right-wing government, will be taking power in Brazil, with many shades of left, right and centre in between.
In my personal experience of working in Latin America since 1996, in all of Latin America's history since independence I don't think there has ever been this level of political diversity in the region, which poses very great problems for regional coordination and regional responses to crises, including migration. To a large extent, it's also an expression of vitality in democracy and a diversity of democratic expression, which we see very much within countries. It could be the evangelical churches, which play an important role in the rise of conservative right-wing candidates in Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia or the other grassroots indigenous Afro movements such as the Afro-Colombian movement, which is responsible for the rise of new left-wing movements, particularly in Colombia and other parts of Central America.
That would be my general diagnosis. My concern, particularly at the moment, is that this political dynamic is great for diversity. As I said, it's undermining the capacity of regional institutions that respond to crisis in a moment where we are seeing ongoing problems with criminal violence, uneven economic development and of course, instability and unrest in particular contexts such as in Nicaragua, Venezuela and Honduras.
In this light there is a grave concern that we will see greater levels of instability as the regional institutions prove unable to respond satisfactorily to these crises.