Evidence of meeting #106 for Citizenship and Immigration in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was subamendment.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
I call the meeting back to order.
Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe, do you want to say something before I say something?
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
Yes, Mr. Chair.
Something unfortunate just happened, but I don’t think my colleague, Ms. Kayabaga, did it in bad faith. It may have just been a mistake on her part. Nevertheless, it’s a violation of privilege. I could table a motion referring the matter to the House. However, I don’t want our parliamentary session to end on that note, nor do I want to embarrass my colleague.
That said, I have a request for you, Mr. Chair. Since a matter that should have remained confidential was disclosed, I ask the committee to decide unanimously in favour of withdrawing it from the official record. I also request editing of the meeting’s video to remove the part where we heard information that should have remained confidential. Finally, I would like my colleague to apologize, of course. If those three conditions are met, I could move on, Mr. Chair.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Thank you very much, Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe.
As always, I appreciate what you are doing.
As the chair, my job is to make sure that everything is done according to the rules.
Madam Kayabaga, please go ahead.
Liberal
Arielle Kayabaga Liberal London West, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to say that I want to apologize. I did not mean to say anything that is out of bounds. My intention was to allow my colleague to make the comments that he was making, so I do want to take that back. I believe that we've given a wide latitude of topics for debate—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Madam Kayabaga, please keep it concise, because I don't want further trouble for you.
Liberal
Arielle Kayabaga Liberal London West, ON
I'm trying to be really concise but I want my colleague to understand that I was not trying to go out of bounds.
Sometimes we forget the meetings that we have in camera and the ones that we don't have in camera. My intention was not to go out of bounds and to offend my colleague, and I do apologize for that. I just want to make sure that we can continue to give the same wide latitude that we're giving to others to make comments and not to interrupt our colleagues as they're making comments.
Bloc
Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe Bloc Lac-Saint-Jean, QC
I could not be any nicer than that, Mr. Chair.
I did not want an explanation. The fact that confidential information was revealed in public constitutes a breach of privilege. I certainly can bring this before the House, and my colleague could be reprimanded. What I’m asking for is an apology, not an explanation of the context. A breach of privilege occurred, and I am asking for an apology. I also want the committee’s unanimous consent to remove the comment from the official record. Finally, I want the video changed accordingly.
I will give Ms. Kayabaga one last chance to officially apologize. That is exactly what I want. I do not want her to give me an explanation of the context. If I do not get a satisfactory apology, I will have to go further, unfortunately.
That is what I am asking for, Mr. Chair. I think I’m playing very fair right now.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Thank you, Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe.
You are very fair. In fact, you are a gentleman, and I do commend that.
Madam Kayabaga, would you please respond if you apologize and take the comment back? Then I'll go to the general consent from the committee.
Liberal
Arielle Kayabaga Liberal London West, ON
Yes, Mr. Chair.
As I said earlier, I do apologize to my colleague as his privilege was breached. I do take it back. I'll leave the rest of the actions to the rest of the committee as I cannot make that decision on behalf of the committee.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Thank you kindly. I appreciate that.
Is there unanimous consent from committee to do that, to take the comment back?
Mr. Kmiec.
Conservative
Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB
Mr. Chair, I would like to understand something.
Is there a precedent for this? In the past, has a parliamentary committee ever unanimously decided to change what appeared in the official record of a public meeting and change the video? I just want to understand what might be the effects of Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe’s request. Have other committees already done that?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
I cannot say that, but I certainly would love to see it, because in the way he has acted we all know that he has shown the highest standards someone can show towards their colleagues.
Madam Kayabaga has apologized and has accepted to take it out of the blues of the committee. It's up to the members now. If you can give unanimous consent, I will make sure that the clerk does the necessary work that has to be done.
Conservative
Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB
Mr. Chair, I see the clerk frantically typing on his keyboard to find examples of precedents. We may have to ask procedural clerks if this was done in other committees.
For my part, of course, I will give my consent, because it is a breach of privilege. Ms. Kayabaga admitted she breached Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe’s privilege by revealing what was said in camera. So, I agree.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Is there unanimous consent among the committee—
Go ahead, Madam Kwan.
NDP
Jenny Kwan NDP Vancouver East, BC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Right off the top, when I raised the point of order and noted that there had been a violation, I texted Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe and inquired about his point of view and indicated that I would defer to him with respect to how he wished to proceed seeing as it was his privilege that had been violated.
From that perspective, I will support what Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe wishes.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Thank you, Madam Kwan.
I see there is unanimous consent to go with Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe's suggestion.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
That is carried. Thank you very much, Mr. Brunelle-Duceppe. I do appreciate it.
Thank you, Madam Kayabaga, for being a professional member of the committee and doing what needed to be done to calm things down and to carry on with the agenda.
Mr. Chiang, the floor is yours.
Before Mr. Chiang starts speaking, I again request, members, that you be careful not to talk about anything that we talked about in camera because doing so will put us into a very difficult situation, and I don't think any of us wants to see one of our colleagues get into this situation.
With that, I also want to thank committee members for their unanimous consent on this issue. I appreciate that. That makes my life as the chair much easier as well and I do enjoy, in fact, working with both sides of the aisle here.
Mr. Chiang, please go ahead.
Liberal
Paul Chiang Liberal Markham—Unionville, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all of our members for correcting what happened earlier.
...left behind were people who had tried—with the coalition's encouragement—to advance security, freedom, opportunity and dignity in their country. Within Afghanistan, there is now a tableau of vulnerability; millions of people trying to avoid hunger, destitution, or retaliation.
Afghanistan is not only one of the many crises in distant parts of the world; Canada has a legacy there. Consequently, the Taliban's takeover has deep emotional significance for Canadians, as well as implications for Canadian public policy. At the peak of Canada's mission in Afghanistan, “approximately 2,950 Canadian soldiers and over 120 civilian personnel were deployed to Afghanistan.” Cumulatively, more than 40,000 members of the Canadian Armed Forces...served in Afghanistan between December 2001 and March 2014, as part of the operations—at different times and with different mandates—in Kabul and Kandahar. Taken together, the counterterrorism, stabilization, combat, support, and training missions undertaken by Canada were its largest military deployment since the Second World War, with 158 members of the CAF and one Canadian diplomat losing their lives in service [to Canada]. Furthermore, Canada has provided $3.8 billion in international assistance to Afghanistan since 2001.
Over almost 20 years of international partnership with Afghanistan, many Afghans experienced improved access to healthcare and education. They were also able to participate in efforts—however flawed and incomplete—to build a democracy that was connected to the world. It is these gains that are now at risk.
To learn lessons from what transpired and to determine how Canada can help Afghan people who worked alongside the thousands of Canadian Armed Forces, diplomatic and development personnel who served in the country, the House of Commons created a Special Committee on Afghanistan (the Special Committee). It was mandated,
...to conduct hearings to examine and review the events related to the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, including, but not limited to, the government's contingency planning for that event and the subsequent efforts to evacuate, or otherwise authorize entry to Canada of, Canadian citizens, and interpreters, contractors and other Afghans who had assisted the Canadian Armed Forces or other Canadian organizations, and that the special committee conduct its work with the primary objective of assessing the humanitarian assistance to be put in place by Canada to assist the Afghan people [...].
The Special Committee was instructed to present a final report within six months of its creation on 8 December 2021.
To accomplish this task, the Special Committee has received testimony and briefs from a range of individuals and organizations, including those that are trying to meet humanitarian needs in Afghanistan. It has heard moving stories and appeals from people with family and colleagues who have been unable to leave Afghanistan or are in precarious situations in neighbouring countries, and those who are trying to help them. The Special Committee was also briefed on the government's response by Global Affairs Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces.
The report that follows is structured in two parts. The first is retrospective, examining the August 2021 evacuation from Kabul and the events that led up to it, including the assessments and decisions that were made. The second part is forward-looking. It details the humanitarian situation inside Afghanistan, and the efforts to bring Afghan nationals who are at risk to safety, as well as the impediments that are being encountered. The dedicated focus on this one country, at a time of great instability in the world, reflects the obligations that stem from Canada’s years of military, development and diplomatic involvement in Afghanistan and the enormity of needs and vulnerabilities that exist.
Part I: Looking Back.
The Fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban
On 14 April 2021, President Joe Biden announced that the United States (U.S.) would begin the final withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan on 1 May 2021, in keeping with the 29 February 2020 agreement his country–under the administration of President Donald Trump–had reached with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar. The rationale for intervening in Afghanistan in October 2001 had been “to ensure Afghanistan would not be used as a base from which to attack [the U.S.] homeland again,” an objective that President Biden said had been “accomplished.” The United States could not, he remarked, “continue the cycle of extending or expanding our military presence in Afghanistan, hoping to create ideal conditions for the withdrawal, and expecting a different result.” Following consultations within his administration and with allies and partners, President Biden concluded that it was “time to end America’s longest war.”
After declaring that “there is no military solution to the challenges Afghanistan faces,” the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies announced on the same day that they too would begin the withdrawal of Resolute Support Mission forces—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Mr. Chiang, can I interrupt you for one second?
Madam Kayabaga, you have your hand up. It's not a point of order, is it?
Liberal
Arielle Kayabaga Liberal London West, ON
No, Mr. Chair. If it was a point of order, I would call one. I just want to get on the speaking list.
Liberal
Paul Chiang Liberal Markham—Unionville, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It continues:
—by 1 May 2021. The NATO withdrawal was to be completed “within a few months.”
Even though the involvement of foreign troops was coming to an end, the hope was that an intra-Afghan peace process would result in a settlement. The Taliban had committed, through the Doha Agreement, to start such negotiations, which had been intended to see discussion of a ceasefire, as well as a political roadmap for the country. Nevertheless, negotiations between representatives of the Afghan republic and the Taliban—which commenced in September 2020—did not result in meaningful progress.
In May 2021, the Taliban intensified its military offensive against the Afghan government and began to increase the territory under its control. By mid‑July 2021, the Taliban reportedly “controlled about half the districts in Afghanistan, at least six international border crossings with their revenue-generating customs posts, and long stretches of highways throughout the country.”
The first provincial capital to fall to the Taliban, on 6 August 2021, was Zaranj in Nimroz province, on Afghanistan’s western border with Iran. The next day, the Taliban captured its first capital in northern Afghanistan, the capital of Jowzjan province. By 12–13 August 2021, the country’s second- and third-largest cities—Kandahar and Herat—fell under Taliban control, along with Lashkar Gah in Helmand province. Then, with the capture of Mazar-e Sharif, the Taliban completed their takeover of northern Afghanistan. On 15 August 2021, Afghanistan’s President, Ashraf Ghani, fled by helicopter to Uzbekistan, before relocating to the United Arab Emirates. Taliban forces entered Kabul, assuming control of government buildings and the presidential palace. In all, therefore, the Taliban captured 33 of 34 provincial capitals within 10 days.
President Biden maintained the 31 August 2021 deadline for ending the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, which he had announced on 8 July 2021, saying that he was not prepared to extend “a forever exit.” The decision to end the military airlift operation by that deadline, the president indicated, reflected a “unanimous recommendation” of his civilian and military advisors. On 26 August 2021, a member of the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a terrorist group that competes with the Taliban for power and influence in Afghanistan, had detonated a suicide vest at one of the entrances to the Hamid Karzai International Airport (the Kabul airport), killing 13 U.S. troops and an estimated 150 Afghan civilians. It was understood that the Taliban’s tacit cooperation with coalition forces around the security perimeter of the airport would end on 1 September 2021. In all, during the 18‑day period of the multinational “air bridge” it facilitated and defended, the United States flew 387 military sorties and enabled 391 non-U.S. military sorties to evacuate 124,334 people.
Canada’s Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
When the need for an evacuation became clear, Canada was in a different position than some of its allies because there had been no Canadian military mission in Afghanistan since 2014. Canada did not, therefore, have military assets on the ground. The CAF was approved to support the evacuation on 30 July 2021. In essence, this complex mission involved, in the words of General Wayne D. Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff, projecting combat power “from Canada into a contested environment on the other side of the world where we had not had a military presence for seven years.” Canada was able to do so because of its strategic airlift and communication capabilities, as well as its network of partners and allies and embedded staff around the world. The people the CAF were tasked with evacuating included Canadians and Canadian-entitled persons, as well as interpreters who had worked with the Canadian Armed Forces and Afghans who had worked for the Canadian embassy over the years. Military and civilian chartered flights began on 4 August 2021 but were subsequently disrupted when Kabul fell to the Taliban.
On 15 August 15 2021, the Government of Canada announced the decision to “temporarily suspend” Canada's diplomatic operations in Kabul. The rapidly evolving situation was posing “serious challenges” to Canada's ability to ensure the safety and security of its diplomatic mission. Canadians still in Afghanistan were instructed to “leave immediately while commercial flights [were] available.”
CAF flights resumed from the Kabul airport on 19 August 2021 as part of the U.S.-led “air bridge,” with the last flight departing on 26 August 2021. Canada and other allies needed to repatriate their personnel and aircraft first so that the United States could complete its own withdrawal and, finally, cease defending the airport. The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence, told the Special Committee that Canadian personnel “stayed as long as possible at great personal risk.” The conditions in Kabul were described by the CAF as having been “tenuous, chaotic and desperate.” In all, Canada transported and facilitated the transport of approximately 3,700 evacuees. Those evacuees “include Canadian citizens and permanent residents, their family members, citizens of allied countries, persons with a lasting connection to Canada and [A]fghan nationals at risk accepted for resettlement in Canada or by [Canada's] allies.”
The Government of Canada's travel advisory for Afghanistan now indicates that travelling throughout Afghanistan “is extremely dangerous, including in Kabul.” There are, according to the advisory, “checkpoints on all roads and throughout cities.” What is more, “[s]ome borders are closed or may close without notice. Border crossing is risky.”
Contingency Planning and Signs of Collapse
The Special Committee received conflicting information regarding whether the fall of Kabul—and thus, Afghanistan—to the Taliban was a culmination of a political and security situation that was clearly unravelling, or a surprise.
Reid Sirrs, former Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan, told the Special Committee that the “complete collapse of the Afghan forces and the Taliban's rapid takeover of Afghanistan came as a surprise to everyone.” Jennifer Loten, Director General of International Crime and Terrorism at Global Affairs Canada (GAC), similarly conveyed that the speed at which the U.S. departure from Afghanistan converted into the Taliban's control of the country surprised the world. She said: “I don't think any of us would have predicted an August [2021] fall of Kabul.”
Owing to Canada’s limited presence on the ground in Afghanistan, Canada relied on allies for “a lot” of its intelligence, according to the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Eyre. There was a deterioration in the country, he said, from the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal. In the words of General Eyre, as of 1 April 2021, “our intelligence assessed that the Afghan government was facing a likely defeat, and as time progressed, the timeline for that defeat reduced as well.” In subsequent remarks, General Eyre expanded on the nature of the expected defeat, namely that, “should western forces withdraw, the Taliban would likely decisively defeat the [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces], capture most major urban areas and re-establish Taliban control over most of Afghanistan.” By 8 July 2021, the CAF assessed that a “maximum” of six months remained before that eventuality. At the same time, General Eyre stressed that intelligence assessments reflect probabilities and not absolute certainties.
The Special Committee was given a general sense of how the government’s contingency planning evolved. The Honourable Harjit Sajjan, speaking about his former role as Minister of National Defence (2015–2021), indicated that Global Affairs Canada had submitted a request for assistance from the CAF to ensure the security of embassy personnel in Afghanistan. That request, which was necessary for any troops to be deployed, was “authorized in early April [2021].” The CAF’s strategic advisory team was in place as of 24 April 2021 with instructions to provide warning and advice—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Sukh Dhaliwal
Mr. Chiang, I'm sorry. I have to interrupt. I think there are bells ringing. If there is no unanimous consent to adjourn, then I have to suspend the meeting.
Is there consent to continue through the bells?