Thank you, Mr. Chair, and welcome back.
Thank you to all members who are here. I hope you all had a good summer.
Personally, it was a fantastic summer for me. I'm happy to be back to work for the citizens of Markham—Unionville, who elected me to be here to do the good work of government.
On saying that, I want to get back to the Afghan letter, which we stopped on June 17 when I last spoke about it. Last time when I was speaking on it, I was speaking about the following letter:
Ambassador Sirrs provided further details about the government's contingency planning and the core assessments that were informing decision-making at the time. He said:
“Up until a few days before the decision to temporarily suspend embassy operations, Canada and the international community were expecting difficult times in August and September, but not a complete takeover of the capital. In fact, we expected the Afghan military to defend the city until the onset of winter, allowing time for negotiations to continue.
“With this in mind, we were considering options to maintain a skeletal presence throughout the fall so we could continue essential programming as well as support possible evacuation efforts. With the support of a special advisory team from the Canadian Armed Forces we were able to continually update our concepts of operation for maintaining a presence in the country to a temporary suspension of operations and implementation of a non-combatant evacuation operation. This team was also instrumental in securing space in the air bridge that became an essential bridge for getting so many people out of the capital.”
Commenting on the extent and pace of evacuation efforts that Canada had carried out prior to the collapse of the Afghan republic, Ambassador Sirrs indicated that planning for a special immigration measures policy “went back into March [2021].” He also commented that the republic's authorities had “started barring people who did not have passports or the Afghan tazkiras—national identity cards—on the planes.” Those constraints reflected a larger political context, according to Ambassador Sirrs, wherein the president of the Afghan republic “did not want Afghans leaving because he felt that there would be a brain drain, and we retorted that we needed to have part of the brain come with us so that they could come back and build the country later on.” Minister Anand echoed this point, noting that the “former Afghan government was concerned that a mass exodus of people would signal a lack of confidence among its citizens.”
Looking back on these events, testimony and information provided by other witnesses suggested that signs may have been missed and time to evacuate people, when more options were available, may have been lost.
The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) was asked about the contingency planning it was doing for Afghanistan and the region, which was completed in December 2020 and shared with governments—including the Government of Canada—in early 2021. The document noted that the situation in Afghanistan, “including a complex peace process and the withdrawal of international forces and a volatile security environment has given rise to an unpredictable trajectory.” The UNHCR was preparing for two possible scenarios. The first was increased internal displacement caused by escalating conflict, political instability, and a stalled peace process. The second scenario was heightened conflict and a breakdown of the peace process, which would saturate the absorption capacity of communities, “resulting in exponential internal displacement and outflows of Afghans seeking international protection in neighbouring countries.”
When asked whether action should have been taken earlier, Stephen Peddle—who retired from the Canadian Armed Forces as a senior intelligence officer with the rank of major—replied:
“The moment that President Donald Trump announced to the world that America was leaving Afghanistan, I think anyone who was in Afghanistan knew the writing was on the wall as to what was going to happen. The question was when, and then President Biden gave a date.
“There were lots of opportunities long before July or August 2021 to bring all the Afghans who helped us, who we had records of, over to Canada. There is no excuse whatsoever for us to have waited until August 2021, when we knew that Afghanistan was folding. There's no excuse whatsoever for waiting [so] long.”
Wazhma Frogh, founder of the Women & Peace Studies Organization—Afghanistan, told the Special Committee that the collapse of the Afghan republic and the fall of Kabul to the Taliban “didn't just happen overnight.” In her view, the 2020 agreement between the United States and the Taliban, and not 15 August 2021, was “the start of Afghanistan's political surrender.” With the Doha agreement, she said, legitimacy was given to the Taliban, while representatives from the Afghan republic were not included as signatories. That was, she said, “when things started getting much worse in local communities.”
Major-General (retired) David Fraser referenced a letter that he and others sent in early July 2021 “to the implicated ministers asking them to create a pipeline to evacuate vulnerable Afghans.” In his view, “[i]f three retired generals without access to intelligence saw this coming in July, there could have been a lot more people evacuated out of Afghanistan before Kandahar fell and before Kabul fell.”
That was not the only letter that was sent or appeal that was made. Wendy Long, Director of Afghan-Canadian Interpreters, had started writing letters in November 2018 to Canada's then Minister of Immigration, Ahmed Hussen. She told the Special Committee:
“As the Doha peace talks progressed, the pleas for an immigration process mounted and concerns started coming in from veterans worried about those left behind. Some veterans had spent thousands of dollars in attempts to get interpreters here, without results, adding to their mental anguish.”
After compiling files on Afghans who had been part of the Canadian mission, Wendy Long's organization and 15 other international advocacy groups sent an open letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on 1 June 2021, as well as to then Minister of Immigration Marco Mendicino, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau, then Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan, and other NATO leaders. The letter warned that time was “running out to protect NATO's local Afghan allies.” Furthermore, the signatories suggested that....
In addition to the people who had played a direct role supporting military and diplomatic missions, there was also growing concern for people who were associated with the larger project of building democracy and advancing women's rights in Afghanistan. These concerns were reflected in a letter that was written to Minister Mendicino on behalf of the Afghan Women's Organization Refugee & Immigrant Services. Asma Faizi, the organization's president, explained that they had been approached “by women parliamentarians and activists from inside Afghanistan” concerning “the dire situation they were in.” Dated 26 July 2021, the letter urged the Canadian government to “take immediate action to protect Afghan women and girls” since the situation had taken “a dark turn with the withdrawal of US and NATO military forces.” Furthermore, the letter communicated the organization's understanding that the Taliban had “reoccupied more than half of Afghanistan and the gains that have been made in the past 20 years, particularly by women, are now at dire risk.”
Mr. Chair, I move to adjourn debate.