Thank you very much.
I'd like to thank the members of the committee for inviting me to appear today.
I know that some of my colleagues are going to talk about the consultation issue. While I believe that's very important, I will focus on other matters, because I know that at least there's going to be some discussion of that by others.
I was a member of the La Forest committee, the Canadian Human Rights Act review panel. My main purpose today will be to talk to you about the thinking of the panel and how we reached the recommendations we did.
I'd like to start by talking about the goals that we thought should be achieved. In other words, what are we trying to accomplish here before we move on to “how do we accomplish it”? I think in the view of the panel there were five goals.
The most obvious one is to provide a remedy to those who experience discrimination related to the Indian Act, which of course is now precluded by section 67.
The second one, however, which is equally important, is to do so in a way that balances the individual rights in the Canadian Human Rights Act with the collective rights of aboriginal peoples.
The third, in our view, was to ensure that the Canadian Human Rights Act doesn't become a tool for non-aboriginal people to challenge programs and activities designed to benefit aboriginal people and to deal with historical inequalities.
The fourth, which is related to the third, is to ensure that the Canadian Human Rights Act doesn't become a way of piecemeal dismantling the Indian Act. While the Indian Act certainly is far from perfect, we think if it's going to be changed it should be done so in a more cohesive way.
The fifth is to ensure that the Canadian Human Rights Act applies in an even-handed way to bands and other aboriginal governments and doesn't create arbitrary results. In the view of the panel, section 67 does sometimes lead to arbitrary results.
Let me give you two examples. Sometimes two different bands could make exactly the same decision, and one could do so by using its powers under bylaws under the Indian Act, and another might do so by a more informal internal process. But let's assume they are passing exactly the same regulations. The first one would be exempted from any challenge under section 67, because of section 67, so that you couldn't bring a human rights complaint against that. The second would not come within the exemption of section 67, even though it did exactly the same thing.
A second example is that some aboriginal governments get their powers and use their powers under the Indian Act, and others, for example, do so under self-government agreements. Since section 67 only applies to things done under the Indian Act, the first group is covered by the exemption and the second is not. We thought a more integrated way of looking at things would be appropriate.
So just to remind the committee—I know you know this—about what we did recommend, our longer-run recommendation was to create a human rights system controlled by aboriginal governments, locally, regionally, or nationally.
Our more immediate goal, however, was to repeal section 67 but to add an interpretive clause that said in essence that the Human Rights Act should be interpreted in a way that takes account of aboriginal community needs and aspirations.
I'd like to discuss for a moment or two why we thought an interpretive clause was needed. First, we thought it was needed to achieve that goal of balancing individual and collective rights. If section 67 was repealed and there was no such provision, there is a danger that the largely individual rights in the Canadian Human Rights Act would predominate over the collective rights of aboriginal people.
The second is to ensure that the Canadian Human Rights Act doesn't become a tool for non-aboriginal people to attack the provisions and benefits granted to aboriginal people and perhaps dismantle the Indian Act piecemeal. For example, non-aboriginal people might challenge health and education benefits provided to aboriginal people alone.
Third is to try to ensure that the procedures and remedies used by the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal are appropriate to aboriginal communities. That is, require the tribunal to consider what's appropriate, for example, in terms of remedy, which might be different from an appropriate remedy against, say, Bell Canada or Canada Post.
Now there are some general provisions in the Canadian Human Rights Act, as you know, particularly the bona fide justification provisions, that sometimes work to achieve some balancing. But they are not tailored to the needs and interests that arise in this context, and therefore the panel was of the opinion that they aren't enough alone.
I know there's been some discussion of other possible measures that might be used for balancing, and I thought I might explain for a moment why the panel was of the view that an interpretive provision was necessary and why other provisions weren't appropriate or adequate by themselves.
One, of course, which I know you've talked about, is section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The difficulty there is that while section 35 protects certain historical rights and treaty rights of aboriginal people, it doesn't protect all the matters that are of crucial interest to aboriginal people. For example, it doesn't protect fishing and trading traditions that aren't part of a treaty and that developed after European contact. Also, it doesn't protect government entitlements, such as the programs designed for the benefit of aboriginal people under the Indian Act. So it goes partway there, but in our view, it isn't sufficient in itself.
Section 25 of the charter says the charter shall be interpreted in a way that does not affect the rights of aboriginal people, but it doesn't say that the Canadian Human Rights Act shall be. It doesn't apply to the Canadian Human Rights Act. So, in my view, it doesn't have a great deal of effect in this context.
Section 15 of the charter, the equality provisions, really require the same consideration as the Canadian Human Rights Act. They are primarily individual rights provisions, and therefore, in our view, they don't allow for the kind of balancing we thought was appropriate.
I'd like to talk for just a moment about the form we thought the interpretive provisions should take. I certainly don't have statutory language to propose to the committee, but I did want to talk about a couple of things the panel thought were crucial and then present one option for your consideration, without necessarily saying whether I'm recommending it.
The two characteristics we thought were crucial were, number one, that it should be in some binding form. It should require that the act be interpreted in a manner consistent with the needs and aspirations of aboriginal people; it shouldn't just be a statement of principle or purpose. Second, we thought it should be included in the statute, though perhaps supplemented by other provisions in regulations or bylaws.
The option I'd like to present to you is that there could be a fairly general provision in the act itself, talking in relatively general terms, leaving them the possibility or the hope that more specific bylaws or regulations could be enacted to deal more specifically with particular situations after consultation with aboriginal people. If those consultations weren't as productive as we would hope they would be, at least there would be this general provision in the act.
There is some precedent for an interpretive provision in the charter itself. Section 27 of the charter says, “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”.
It protects multicultural rights. I think our panel felt that something along the lines of what was in the Canadian Human Rights Act was necessary to equally protect the rights of aboriginal people.
Thank you very much.
