Indigenous and Northern Affairs Committee on Oct. 27th, 2011

[The Chair, Conservative, Chris Warkentin]

Committee members, I'm going to call this ninth meeting of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development to order.

We are obviously going to be short on time. Our schedule is going to be a little truncated, but we do want to give maximum opportunity for having committee members hear testimony from the department today, as well as including the questions that will follow.

I'm going to leave the introductions to you folks. We'll turn it over to you immediately and then go as quickly as we possibly can into questions. Thanks so much for coming.

[Patrick Borbey, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Treaties and Aboriginal Government, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development]

Thank you.

I am accompanied here today by my colleagues. Jim Barkwell is associate director general for negotiations in western Canada and is based in B.C. Perry Billingsley, from Gatineau, is the director general of policy development and coordination here in Ottawa. Stephen Gagnon is director general of implementation.

I'll try to go as quickly as I can through my notes. You do have copies, so if I'm going too quickly, I'm sure you'll be able to catch up.

I'd like to thank the committee for this opportunity to speak about our work, particularly as it relates to treaties and treaty negotiations. Treaties are an important part of the department's mandate. A great deal of work has been done and continues to be done in our efforts to conclude and implement treaties across the country.

As we will discuss, treaty-making is difficult and complex but very gratifying work. We are committed to producing positive and beneficial results for all Canadians as a result of our treaty work.

Aboriginal people in Canada claim rights to lands and resources and to be self-governing. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes existing aboriginal and treaty rights but does not define those rights. The uncertainty that accompanies unresolved claims to aboriginal rights and title often presents challenges to economic development opportunities. Tapping into these opportunities benefits both aboriginal people and the broader Canadian community.

Fundamentally, there are three ways for the Crown to deal with unresolved aboriginal rights claims.

First, we have treaties, which provide a permanent and comprehensive resolution of aboriginal claims by negotiating constitutionally protected agreements. Canada's preference is to negotiate resolution to unresolved aboriginal rights claims.

Second, litigation, where the scope and substance of aboriginal rights are determined by the courts.

Third, other agreements, such as contractual-type arrangements which do not provide for a final resolution of all claims.

My sector is responsible for addressing comprehensive, specific and special claims, including assessment and negotiation of those claims, managing the implementation of negotiated agreements, and managing historic treaty matters and commissions.

For today, we focus primarily on the Comprehensive Claims Policy, the work of the British Columbia Treaty Commission and Canada's policy for the implementation of self-government.

From the federal perspective, the key objectives of the comprehensive claims policy are twofold: achieving certainty of rights for all parties and finality of claims respecting lands and resources through a one-time settlement.

Comprehensive land claims agreements are negotiated in areas of the country where aboriginal rights and title have not been addressed by treaties or other legal means. These agreements are modern-day treaties among aboriginal claimant groups, Canada, and the relevant province or territory. While each one is unique, these agreements usually include such things as land ownership, money, wildlife harvesting rights, participation in land, resource, water, wildlife, and environmental management, and measures to promote economic development and protect aboriginal culture.

Through the policy, the negotiating parties seek settlement of aboriginal claims to lands and resources. The final agreements are constitutionally protected land claims. In exchange for the release of an aboriginal group's claims, the crown may transfer title to land provide a financial component, and establish arrangements for the use, benefit, and co-management of lands and resources. Settling claims is one step toward establishing a new, productive government-to-government relationship with aboriginal groups.

At present, the majority of comprehensive claims negotiations are in British Columbia. The British Columbia treaty process is a made-in-B.C. approach to negotiations. In 1992, an agreement was struck between Canada, the province, and the B.C. First Nations Summit to establish the British Columbia Treaty Commission. All First Nations in B.C. may participate in treaty negotiations once their statements of intent to participate are accepted by the commission.

As of September 2011, there are three treaties in effect in British Columbia: the Nisga'a Final Agreement (2000), the Tsawwassen Final Agreement (2009) and the Mah-nulth Final Agreement (2011).

There are 57 additional claimant groups (representing 108 of the 197 eligible First Nations in B.C., or approximately 75,000 of an estimated 120,000 members) who have submitted statements of intent to the BCTC indicating their intent to negotiate a treaty. The 57 claimant groups have organized themselves into 47 negotiation tables. Seven of the 57 are still in the early stages of negotiations, 43 are at the agreement-in-principle negotiation stage and five are at the final negotiation stage.

In addition, McLeod Lake First Nation, a recent adherent to Treaty 8, has submitted a statement of intent to negotiate a stand-alone self-government agreement within the B.C. treaty process.

To date, 23 comprehensive land claim agreements and two self-government agreements have been ratified and brought into effect since the inception of these policies and processes. These agreements cover approximately 40% of Canada's land mass and impact 96 aboriginal communities and more than 100,000 first nation and Inuit members.

Canada has recognized that the right to self-government is an aboriginal right within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Canada's approach to self-government sets aside attempts to define these rights in favour of negotiating practical arrangements for aboriginal communities to exercise self-government.

Self-government agreements can form part of a land claim agreement or they can be stand-alone agreements. As stand-alone agreements, they can be either constitutionally or non-constitutionally protected and either be comprehensive—in other words, involving core governance and other jurisdictions—or cover only sectoral jurisdictions. An example is education.

For self-government agreements to be workable, they need to address a number of practical issues of public administration, the kind that are faced by all governments in Canada. These include the structure of the new government and its relationship with other governments, new fiscal arrangements, the relationship of laws between jurisdictions, program and service delivery, and implementation planning, to name a few.

I'm sure you can appreciate that while these are practical matters, negotiating them could be quite complex and time consuming. A key part of Canada's approach is that these arrangements be appropriate for the group in question, but in a 21st century context.

Emerging evidence suggests that aboriginal groups with self-government agreements enjoy improved outcomes compared to those remaining under the Indian Act.

In 2003, and again in 2011, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development completed an impact assessment of aboriginal self-government or community well-being. Using both quantitative and qualitative data, the assessment suggests that, as a group, self-governing First Nations have better education, employment and labour force outcomes in comparison to all registered Indians on reserve.

Further, the analysis shows that, not only have self-governing aboriginal communities focused on establishing the foundations of governance, they have a renewed sense of pride in their governments and have established new relationships to foster socio-economic growth and progress in their communities.

From this we can see that, although these negotiations are often challenging and lengthy, the outcomes certainly meet Canada's objectives of strong, healthy communities.

Currently, there are 18 self-government agreements in Canada involving 32 aboriginal communities. There is one education sectoral agreement involving 11 first nations: the Mi'kmaq Education Act. Sixteen of these self-government agreements are integrated within a land claim agreement involving 30 communities.

I know I'm throwing a lot of numbers at you, but they're on the map that we've provided for ease of understanding.

Two agreements are stand-alone self-government agreements involving two communities. In addition, there are 91 self-government negotiation tables, of which 67 are involved in comprehensive land claims and 24 are in stand-alone self-government negotiations.

Canada is also participating in four sectoral self-government negotiations: with the Blood Tribe on governance and child and family services; with the Nishnawbe Aski Nation--NAN--and the Union of Ontario Indians on governance and education; and with the First Nations Education Steering Committee in B.C. on education jurisdiction for 13 communities.

The Government of Canada remains committed to existing negotiating processes. We continue to build on our successes and learn from our experiences to improve our performance. While the complexity of the issues often leads to extensive negotiation time and expense, we continue to look for ways to improve these processes and to expedite the conclusion of agreements, both to further the process of reconciliation with aboriginal people and to achieve beneficial results for all Canadians.

I thank you very much for this time to present our work. I welcome the opportunity to respond to any questions you may have.

Thank you. I welcome your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Chris Warkentin]

Thank you.

We're going to start with Ms. Duncan.

[Linda Duncan, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for attending. I really appreciate the briefing. I asked for it. It's helpful to hear from the government on their perspective.

There is a lot to cover. I'm going to pick up right away on your statement on page 10 that “Emerging evidence suggests...”, and so on and so forth. A finalized treaty and self-government enable economic development, well-being, and so on and so forth: we're hearing that over and over again.

Having heard from the BC Treaty Commission, having looked at papers, and having talked to some of the first nations, the impression that arises over and over again is that the federal government is dragging its feet, particularly between agreement in principle and the final agreement. So the obvious question is, if the Government of Canada firmly believes this is the way to move forward and achieve well-being and economic benefits for first nations, where's the barrier? Why aren't we moving forward more expeditiously in resolving the treaties?

Next, we have two scenarios. In certain parts of Canada, we have these so-called modern treaties. In other parts of Canada, in a huge swath, in the Prairies and parts of eastern Canada, we have the original treaties. Many people who exist under the original treaties are feeling that they're getting short shrift on the traditional lands, that it's not enough to look at better ways to manage their reserve lands, and that they're missing out on the benefits they deserve in both their traditional harvests and in their underground resource extractions.

I would appreciate your responses.

[Patrick Borbey]

Certainly, we agree that it does take a long time and that it's probably frustrating to all parties. You need to have three parties in alignment to be able to reach an agreement in this case, not just the federal government and the first nations, but also the provinces and the territories. We certainly want to be able to improve on that track record, and we have some ideas about how we could do that.

I think Sophie Pierre has pointed out some particular issues in her report, which we want to work with. We want to continue working with her. The minister has appointed Jim Lornie to be a special representative to look at the B.C. treaty process and make some suggestions in terms of improvements.

We also feel that, given the fact that we have about 100 tables negotiating at any given time, that each one of them is at a different state of development, and that events such as elections or changes in government may, at the end of the day, have an impact on the negotiating table, we have to keep monitoring the progress there on a regular basis and ensure that progress is being made. So it's not easy. We can look at some potential solutions and, certainly, the effort will be made to make improvements.

On the historic treaties, yes, the country is divided roughly into historic treaties versus modern treaties or areas that are not yet covered by treaties. In historic treaties, you have the friendship treaties that covered Atlantic Canada, parts of Quebec, and some parts of Ontario. Then you have the numbered treaties that went from Ontario out west. Our position is that the rights have been settled through the numbered treaties.

We are in negotiations with some first nations that are associated with friendship treaties. Those rights are seen as not having been dealt with through those treaties, the lands and resource rights.

Also, of course, the rest of the country is not covered by historic treaties, so we are actively pursuing modern treaties.

The first nations in historic treaty areas that are not in negotiations can use consultation and accommodation mechanisms. If there are development projects in their area that are going to impact their rights, then they have the option of working with proponents and with governments from that perspective. We are increasingly seeing agreements that are reached that way--outside the treaty process.

[Linda Duncan, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Maybe I can just give the committee an example that will make it easier to see what I'm getting at.

There was an historic precedent-setting ruling by the Federal Court this past summer. Three Alberta first nations sued the Ministry of the Environment for failure to consider their interests in the recovery plan for the caribou. The court was very definitive that the minister erred in not considering aboriginal treaty rights in his decision-making.

So I'm curious to know.... Related to that case, I know that you're being sued by a number of entities who have final agreements, including Nunavut. Why are the first nations having to go to court? It's the federal government's responsibility to do the consultation, to consider and accommodate, not industry's, so I'm a little troubled by your saying they can talk to industry.

[Patrick Borbey]

If you're talking about a provincial jurisdictional matter, then it's the crown in this case--

[Linda Duncan, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

No, I'm talking about federal jurisdiction.

[Patrick Borbey]

Okay. I'm not aware of this case and whether a federal decision is involved or not, yes, on consultation and accommodation, the onus is on the crown to maintain the honour of the crown and consult with first nations before a project goes ahead.

So I agree with you: we have to continue to move forward in that area.

But on the other part of your question, sorry. On the Alberta case, we would have to look into it.

[Linda Duncan, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

The Alberta case is only one of many. The Mikisew Cree, of course, brought the precedent-setting Supreme Court case, the decision saying that the federal government is obligated to provide advance consultation, consideration, and accommodation. I understand that the Athabasca Chipewyan are now bringing the same case because they're saying the government is not living up to that duty to consult.

So there's the issue of expediting the new treaties, and then there's the issue of delivering on the existing treaties. Where is the problem? Do we not have enough moneys budgeted for either of those processes? Is there not the political will to deliver on those responsibilities?

[Patrick Borbey]

Part of the answer, as well, is the work we've been doing on specific claims, and again, first nations, aboriginal groups, who feel we have not honoured the terms of the treaty have that option and haven't been exercising that option. That has been funded by the federal government. Two and a half billion dollars have been set aside to resolve specific claims. That's another option first nations have, and access to the tribunal that has been set up is now up and running.

[The Chair, Conservative, Chris Warkentin]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Clarke, for seven minutes.

[Rob Clarke, Conservative, Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill River, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for coming in.

I'm looking over your map of the Akaitcho and the Athabasca Dene in northern Saskatchewan and at just how the negotiation process takes place.

One of the things that's very interesting, and which I'm glad my colleague mentioned, is the strategy for saving the woodland caribou. We're talking about economic development, and we'd like to go further with the study, but with the court case—and I don't think my colleague is fully briefed on this—any projected development, especially in northern Saskatchewan, will not happen because of the woodland caribou strategy. Because 65% of the area has to be pristine for the caribou, for any development to take place in northern Saskatchewan.... It means no roads for first nations in northern Saskatchewan, no mines, no dams, no nuclear storage.

I'm very passionate about this issue. I'd be glad to debate it anytime, anywhere. I looked at the NDP platform in the provincial election, where they're going to do revenue sharing.... But there's not going to be any revenue in the province of Saskatchewan for first nations. They talk the story here and I get really frustrated about this, because as for what the strategy does with the first nations in northern Saskatchewan, the Alberta first nations took on the court case without consulting with northern Saskatchewan, and now they're going to be losing out on any type of economic development to help better themselves.

The Athabasca Dene in northern Saskatchewan are undergoing a negotiation process with the federal government and Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Manitoba, which is in out-of-court negotiations right now. I'd like to have further clarification on why some of these negotiation processes take so long.

Maybe we can start with the chief negotiator. Please explain the process, if you don't mind.

[Patrick Borbey]

This is a special case because it's resolving a transboundary claim, so it's a little bit outside of our normal processes, but yes, the minister would name a negotiator and that negotiator would receive a mandate from cabinet. That mandate can only go so far in terms of what can be offered as a resolution.

Also, of course it involves the court cases: that those be in abeyance while we negotiate. In this case, there are two claims, one in Manitoba and, as you say, one in northern Saskatchewan. So, it's collaboration with the first nations to put those cases in abeyance, which is the situation right now, and then we have to work basically with the first nation and with the territorial government. In this case, that would be both with the Nunavut government and with the GNWT, but we also have to take into consideration the rights and claims of other first nations or aboriginal groups in the area. In Nunavut, it's obviously the Inuit of that region, and in GNWT, you have the Akaitcho, and the Métis to a certain extent.

We have to find the right balance among all those interests before we can come to an appropriate resolution. Right now we are in the midst of negotiations, and we hope that we'll be able to conclude successfully, but there's always the possibility that the litigation could be reactivated.

That's the environment we're working in. Also, of course, a new government has just been selected in the GNWT, so out of respect we need to give them a chance as well to develop their approach, their policy, towards the resolution of this claim.

[Rob Clarke, Conservative, Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill River, SK]

Okay.

In regard to the annual report of the BC Treaty Commission, we heard testimony earlier this week from Sophie Pierre. She was very critical about the lack of progress in the B.C. treaty process. I'm just wondering what your perspective is on that criticism.

[Patrick Borbey]

Yes, everybody had envisaged that we would be further along in the B.C. treaty process than where we are right now with two agreements, plus Nisga'a, which was reached before under different terms.

However, we have a fair number of agreements that are well advanced. There are about five at the final agreement stage. There are good prospects for further treaties to move forward. The minister just signed the Sliammon final agreement last week, and we have made a lot of progress towards the Yale first nation treaty, which we hope we'll be able to put before you at some point. The government will decide what the timing is in terms of bringing that forward.

The vast majority of the other negotiations are at the agreement-in-principle stage, and some of them are at the very advanced agreement-in-principle stage. So we think there's kind of a wave making its way through the system, and we're hopeful that we'll be able to have a lot of progress over the next two years.

We're also hopeful that Mr. Lornie will be able to report based on his consultations with all first nations--“common table” first nations, first nations that are in treaty, first nations that are not in treaty--and he'll be able to give advice to the minister and to the government on ways we could further improve and further accelerate the process.

[Rob Clarke, Conservative, Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill River, SK]

Could I get further clarification? Overall, why do treaties take so long?

[Patrick Borbey]

Well, they are pretty fundamental changes in status for the first nation. They're fundamental for Canada, they're fundamental for the province, and they also are extremely important for the first nation. Basically, there's a huge amount of work that needs to be done by all parties to achieve success on a treaty.

There are some capacity challenges that have to be met. A lot of the first nations in B.C. that we're negotiating with are fairly small. That's the way the structure is in B.C. We also have to be realistic as to what can be achieved within those communities.

Those of you who've heard or met Chief Kim Baird from Tsawwassen First Nation would be very impressed with the work they've taken on over the last few years to make that treaty a reality. This is a community of 400 people, and it's a huge amount for them to take on.

It does take time. I've heard first nations or aboriginal groups say that it takes too long and that we should move more quickly. I've heard others say that we shouldn't go so quickly, because this is a fundamental shift for them and they want to be able to work in step with us and be ready to take on all this new responsibility.

That's a bit of an answer, I guess.

[The Chair, Conservative, Chris Warkentin]

Thank you so much.

We'll go to Ms. Bennett, for seven minutes.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Thank you very much.

Thanks to all of you for coming today. You have to bear with us: it's a steep learning curve for some of us. I may know a little bit more about the social determinants of health, but this is new.

However, I was very impressed with the briefing on the EU marine region, mainly because of the agreement on the shared territory in terms of traditional hunting and fishing and the fact that it was actually carved out and designated as such with a co-management plan, and it seems to be a pretty straightforward agreement.

Therefore, I was concerned about the Yale treaty. It is sort of what you were saying at the end, Patrick, in terms of the Goldilocks of your job: too hot, too cold, too fast, too slow. It is rarely just right for people on all sides. I was concerned to hear that the Stó:lo people are feeling that their traditional hunting and fishing rights have not been honoured, that there hasn't been a carve-out, and that they're worried they would need to have permits from one band to carry out what they've been doing for 10,000 years.

I would like to know the process for these areas that are contentious. What does it take for you to green-light a treaty when there's such objection? It sounds as if there are probably one or two or three amendments to the Yale agreement that could make it work. It's not about stopping it; it's a matter of actually finding those accommodations.

[Patrick Borbey]

Thanks.

It's an excellent question, because I think the overlaps create a lot of issues as we move forward in treaties. I don't think we'll ever find a situation in which every single person will be in agreement that all of the rights have been properly dealt with. That's the nature of traditional occupancy of the land, especially in British Columbia: if you've seen it, it's not even a puzzle picture, because all of the pieces are overlapping.

It's a huge endeavour. We do have some approaches and mechanisms. Some of them are legalistic in terms of how the agreement is structured. There is a non-derogation clause to ensure that the future rights that may be asserted by neighbouring first nations are not forgotten. There are some ways of dealing with it within the agreement. In coming together, in terms of the agreement, we've had a number of initiatives to deal with the Stó:lo claims and others.

I would like to ask Mr. Barkwell to explain, very briefly, what we've done in the case of Yale.

[Jim Barkwell, Associate Director General, Negotiations - West, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development]

Thank you. I will try to be brief, but there was a very extensive consultation process and three years of work to address the question the member raises.

We started in 2008 and involved over 60 first nations that are in the Yale area. We mailed out information to them and offered them an opportunity to meet with us and provide their views. A year later, we provided the final agreement to them so they would have that as detailed information, and we did the same thing.

As a result of that process, which was a joint one between me—I'm the senior federal representative on this particular file—and the provincial senior representative, we offered to have consultation meetings with those who were interested in providing detailed input to us.

We had 11 such meetings. As a result of that, we made several adjustments to the actual Yale treaty agreement, in addition to the things that are already built into our treaty model to protect the interests of other first nations, such as the non-derogation clause that Mr. Borbey references.

We are very careful in terms of land selection. We chose lands that we added to the Yale Indian reserves that were near the reserves and, as much as possible, away from areas where other first nations have interests. We specifically excluded one area known as the Yale beach, which is a public access area that allows fishermen to enter onto the water to exercise their fishing rights. We did that early on.

As a result of the consultation process and the input we received from Chief Joe Hall, whom you may have met, and other Stó:lo representatives, we made several other adjustments. We reduced the harvesting area—that's where they can hunt, fish, gather plants, and so on—to exclude Harrison Lake, because one first nation indicated an interest in that area. Chief Hope of the Yale agreed with that. We designated one area of new treaty settlement land known as Frozen Lakes as public. In the treaty, that's identified for public access so that other first nations and the public are able to go onto those lands. Some of those lands are culturally significant to first nations.

The third measure we undertook as a result of the consultation is an access protocol, which is an actual treaty provision we put in to indicate that access may be requested by any individual and that Yale may not unreasonably refuse to grant that access. This was done—and it applies to all people—particularly bearing in mind the interests of the Stó:lo representatives who had given us input. The standard backstop we have is the non-derogation language, which essentially asserts that no impact on other first nations is intended as a result of the treaty provisions. Essentially, if in the future a court determines there has been an adverse effect on a treaty provision, that provision will operate, or will be amended, so that it does not adversely affect that right.

I will just mention a couple of other things very quickly. The dispute or issue between Yale and some of the Stó:lo groups exists today. It isn't just a treaty-related issue, because it pertains to the Indian reserves themselves and a different view that the Stó:lo have in terms of how those reserves should be handled, even though they are currently held by the crown on behalf of Yale.

There is a reasonable point to be made that, through this treaty provision that I mentioned, the access protocol provision, the Stó:lo in a post-treaty world will have a higher level of access to some of the lands that are in contention than they do currently under the Indian Act.

Secondly, Chief Hope has made some public comments. He has indicated that--and I will tell you how he was quoted in some newspaper articles--the process of permitting, which is not currently accepted by the Stó:lo groups, may not “be imposed right away, if at all”. He said, “It may be better to put that aside”. Essentially he is saying that another option would be to have direct talks with families who have traditional fishing sites in the canyon. He is quoted as saying, “I'm hoping between then and now to sit down with [Chief] Joe Hall and others to talk in a reasonable manner and plan things out for Stó:lo people to come up to Yale.” Those are the chief's own remarks about how he is open to having an outside protocol or some other arrangement that would be suitable.

In that regard, the last point I will make is that we do have funding available through a process called treaty-related measures. We are providing funding to Yale in order to develop some work on the fisheries protocol.

[The Chair, Conservative, Chris Warkentin]

Thank you very much. I extended the time a little bit because it's an issue that I think many of us around the table are quite interested in.

Mr. Ray Boughen for seven minutes, please.

[Ray Boughen, Conservative, Palliser, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me add my voice to my colleagues' in welcoming you here and thanking you for taking time to spend part of your day with us.

When we look over what happens with some of the treaties, and how they are devised and put together, some of the questions that come to mind are things like how much debt the first nations will accumulate through the B.C. treaty process, the loan-handling process. We know there are costs involved here. What are those costs like? Can you share with us what the costs are and how the money is spent?

[Patrick Borbey]

Thank you.

Yes, through the special circumstances in the B.C. treaty process, the BC Treaty Commission makes the decisions, on an annual basis, on the amount of loans that are to be issued to each of the first nations. The federal government is responsible for those loans, but the BCTC is delegated or empowered to do that.

So it is an issue that's of concern in terms of the growth and size of the loans, and whether this information is always as transparent as it should be for first nation members who may not realize what kind of obligations they may be accumulating for future years.

The loans, as you probably know, are paid off at the signing of a treaty against the capital transfer. We're quite concerned when the capital transfer-to-loan ratio starts getting a little bit high to make sure that, at the end of the day, there is going to be some significant net benefit--funds out of the treaty that can be invested by the first nation in economic development, for example. In some cases, I think we're reaching a fairly high level, and we're monitoring that very closely. In a lot of cases, it's fairly low. It's still manageable, although that doesn't mean that it's not a concern.

One of the things the federal government has done is suspend the accumulation of interest for the loans up until 2014, so that there's not an added burden on the first nations while we continue negotiations. We've taken some measures there and the department is absorbing the loss in terms of the forgone interest.

In regard to the implications of the impacts, it's an issue that we're going to need to look at very closely. We are also going to need to renew our authorities in this area within the next couple of years. So we'll be coming to the government with advice on how this should be handled in the future. That's certainly a big issue and, if there are some specific questions related to the B.C. process, I can ask Mr. Barkwell to add to that, if you need more.