Thank you, Madam Chair.
First of all, thank you to the committee for inviting me here today to give you some comments on Bill C-262.
My name is Tom Isaac. I'm a partner with Cassels, Brock & Blackwell. I'm here in my personal capacity. I practice exclusively in the area of aboriginal law across Canada.
My comments today are focused on why incorporating UNDRIP within Canada's already highly developed and world-leading legal regime. Protecting indigenous rights against unilateral and unjustified state action requires a prudent and thoughtful approach. This approach needs to be sensitive to existing Canadian law and the tremendous efforts undertaken by our courts, indigenous peoples, and some public governments over the last 25 years. Bill C-262, as currently drafted, does not reflect the necessary prudence or thoughtfulness required, in my respectful view.
UNDRIP and the embrace of the principles therein mark a critical step forward by some parts of the international community to recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples globally. This is a significant international human rights achievement. UNDRIP provides an important benchmark in a world that has too often harmed, mistreated, and exploited indigenous peoples.
You will note that I said “some parts of the international community”. Not all states with indigenous peoples are on the right path, and the process itself relating to UNDRIP has been divided. During the 2007 UN General Assembly vote regarding UNDRIP, only 42 states—that's out of 88, according to the United Nations at that time—voted in favour of UNDRIP. In fact, most of them put the same caveats on their vote in favour of UNDRIP that Canada ultimately did, in terms of its being subject to domestic law. So 42 out of 88 voted in favour of UNDRIP, while 4, including Canada at the time, took principled reasons to vote against it. As for the other 42, they either abstained, of which 100% of those abstaining that day were states with indigenous peoples, or they didn't bother to show up at the UN for the vote. Of those states, 93% had indigenous peoples.
My point here is that it's important to recognize that UNDRIP was drafted in the context of this division. By necessity, UNDRIP needed to be blunt and as easy to understand as possible, given that it was intended to apply globally to address those states that act without constraint against the rights of indigenous peoples.
This is not to suggest that UNDRIP has nothing to offer Canada. I want to be very clear that many elements of UNDRIP can be extremely relevant to Canada. In particular, I would focus on the ones relating to education, health, equality under the law, the development and maintenance of political systems and institutions, social and economic security, and gender equality. While these and other elements of UNDRIP are relevant to Canada, any effort to adopt UNDRIP must reflect the distance that Canada has travelled to date to prioritize reconciliation with indigenous peoples, the lessons we have learned over the past decades, and the significance—I would say the unique significance at law globally—of section 35, a uniquely Canadian creation.
Since the 1990 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sparrow, the court has developed a framework for protecting indigenous rights and reconciling those rights with other indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians through nearly 70 decisions. The progress made so far has been the product of substantial and purposeful efforts and dialogue between indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians. Today, after decades of effort and investment by all parties, we have a constitutional regime that, for example, recognizes and protects Tsilhqot’in aboriginal title rights to land, and identifies the degree of consultation required when reversing the flow of a pipeline.
We also have a federal government that has expressly stated that Canada's most important relationship is with its indigenous peoples. As each year passes, Canadians, indigenous and non-indigenous, gain increased certainty and confidence in how indigenous and non-indigenous peoples can respectfully and productively live together.
In introducing Bill C-262 at second reading, the bill's sponsor said that the bill promises to “at least provide the basis or framework for reconciliation in our country”, with respect, suggesting that a new approach to indigenous rights is needed, one focused on reconciliation. Again, with respect, reconciliation has been the primary goal of the Supreme Court of Canada for nearly three decades. Again, I'm not here to suggest that we're done, but reconciliation is at the core of our case law to date.
Progress in defining and advancing reconciliation has resulted in increasing clarity and has allowed us to have more meaningful discussions, better protect aboriginal and treaty rights, and promote reconciliation through practice. Bill C-262, as it is presently drafted, risks disrupting the increased clarity within Canada's legal regime for protecting indigenous rights and as a result, risks becoming an obstacle to the pursuit of reconciliation.
UNDRIP itself cannot be meaningfully incorporated into Canadian law unless it is understood in relation to the existing Canadian legal framework, importantly, including section 35. For example, UNDRIP uses such terms as “indigenous”, “the lands and territories of indigenous peoples”, and “free, prior and informed consent”, each of which will need to be interpreted within the context of Canada's existing legal regime for the protection of indigenous rights.
It is presently unclear in Canadian law who “indigenous” refers to. In Daniels, the Supreme Court stated that the term included those individuals who do not possess section 35 rights. Additional instruction is needed to clarify the intended beneficiaries of the rights set out in UNDRIP. Is it intended to apply to all indigenous peoples throughout this great country, including those who self-identify as being indigenous?
Likewise, Canada has developed a highly sophisticated understanding of indigenous interests in land, including traditional territories, aboriginal title, a right to the land itself, and treaty lands. These terms aren't used in UNDRIP, which lacks specificity, including any relation to overlapping and competing indigenous interests, which is a very live issue in Canadian law.
Finally, much has already been said about free, prior, and informed consent. I'd be delighted to talk more about this concept. It means a veto, or a duty to consult that is consistent with what already exists in Canadian law, or something different. This phrase is clear on its face upon plain reading of UNDRIP, and I think credit ought to be given to the drafters. Any attempt at redefining the phrase in a less than forthright manner, in terms of its application to Canada, risks undermining the needed and necessary transparency in the reconciliation process. I say this with respect. Say what you mean and mean what you say.
Nowhere does UNDRIP refer to reconciliation or give specific consideration to how indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians can respectfully coexist. Such considerations are irrelevant for most countries, where indigenous rights are fully subject to the acts of a government. In Canada, reconciliation and principles, like the honour of the crown, are at the core of the relationship between indigenous peoples and all Canadians and work to direct and constrain how governments interact with indigenous rights.
In the preamble of Bill C-262, it suggests that the Parliament of Canada recognizes the principles set out in UNDRIP. There are many principles enunciated in UNDRIP, which are all relating to things like democracy, the rule of law, and the charter, none of which are novel to Canada. However, section 5 of Bill C-262 refers to the objectives of UNDRIP, although UNDRIP makes no reference to its objectives, its goals, its aims, or its intentions.
With respect, the sponsor has said that Bill C-262 can advance “justice” and “reconciliation” and clarify “the existing rights of indigenous peoples” and establish “very clear rules”. As presently drafted—and again, with respect—the bill provides no clear or even vague direction on any of those matters, does not explain how it will advance justice or reconciliation, and does nothing to clarify the existing rights of indigenous peoples in Canada.
Finally, the bill is missing an element that should be essential for any legislation that proposes to alter Canada's legal regime, which would be a clear explanation of how the outcome of adopting the bill will differ from the current law existing in Canada.
Canada's legal regime relating to the protection of indigenous rights is evolving and can benefit from being examined critically against the clear, if bluntly stated, articles of UNDRIP. However, simply adopting UNDRIP, without clear direction of how it should interact with Canada's existing legal regime risks disrupting the increasing clarity that has been gained through unprecedented efforts and decades of decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada.
To conclude, to move forward, Canada requires a thoughtful and purposeful approach, consistent with the honour of the crown, and I suggest to the committee that this is what reconciliation deserves. To the extent that the bill can contribute to that dialogue, it should be revised to provide the context and substance required for promoting and enhancing reconciliation and protecting indigenous rights in Canada. As I wrote in my 2016 report as the minister’s special representative on reconciliation with Métis, “Reconciliation is more than platitudes and recognition. Reconciliation flows from the constitutionally protected rights...protected by Section 35 and...must be grounded in practical actions.”
Those are my submissions.
Thank you.