Indigenous and Northern Affairs Committee on Oct. 19th, 2017

[The Chair, Liberal, MaryAnn Mihychuk]

Good morning, everyone.

I want to welcome everyone to this hearing of the Indigenous and Northern Affairs standing committee of Canada. We are here today on the unceded territory of the Algonquin people in a process that's not just superficial but recognizes that Canada has finally recognized that it's important to understand the truth and to begin a process of reconciliation with the indigenous people of Canada.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee is looking into issues related to specific claims and comprehensive land claims agreements. We will begin the procedure.

Today we have with us the Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council, with Morgan Chapman. Committee members will remember that we met her in B.C.

We're glad to have you back; you have many faces.

We also welcome the representatives from Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. They will also be speaking for the Land Claims Agreement Coalition.

Welcome.

Both groups have 10 minutes to present, and then there will be a question period.

MPs, I'd ask you to direct your questions to whichever group, or to both, if that's your choice.

Witnesses, have you decided who's going to start?

All right, Morgan, you win. You have 10 minutes. Begin your presentation, please.

[Morgan Chapman, Research Associate, Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council, Treaty Aboriginal Rights Research Program]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Once again, my name is Morgan Chapman. I'm here for the second time, this time representing one of our client groups, the Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council treaty and aboriginal rights research program.

Today I want to speak to you about reconciliation and the fact that the process, as it stands today, cannot take place under the framework of the current specific claims process. I would also like to acknowledge that we are on the unceded Algonquin territory.

To start, first nations receiving specific claims research services from the Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council treaty and aboriginal rights research program are all signatories to Treaty No. 8. Despite the recognition and affirmation of this treaty in the Canadian Constitution, central provisions, such as the protection of the traditional aboriginal mode of life, are ineligible for submission as a specific claim. The Specific Claims Tribunal Act, in paragraph 15(1)(g), states, “A First Nation may not file with the Tribunal a claim that...is based on treaty rights related to activities of an ongoing and variable nature, such as harvesting rights.”

We respectfully ask that the Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs help resolve this serious inconsistency in order to achieve Canada's reconciliation goals.

As a point of departure, it's important to note the critical distinction between specific and comprehensive claims. Canada defines a “specific claim” as addressing

past grievances of First Nations related to Canada's obligations under historic treaties or the way it managed First Nations' funds or other assets. To honour its obligations, Canada negotiates settlements with the First Nation and (where applicable) provincial and/or territorial governments.

In other words, specific claims are those that identify outstanding breaches of Canada's specific lawful obligations to first nations. By contrast, comprehensive claims, also known as modern-day treaties, address general claims to aboriginal title not previously settled by treaty.

In order to understand the relevance of the issues at hand, one must understand the context under which Treaty No. 8 was agreed with by our member nations.

The crown intended to acquire land in British-occupied territories in North America, but the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which recognized aboriginal title, obligated it to negotiate treaties with indigenous peoples in order to open the land for settlement. Consequently, the government negotiated a series of treaties with various first nations as settlement advanced westward.

Treaty No. 8, as its sequence among the numbered treaties indicates, came near the end of this process, because the northern territory it encompassed was initially not considered as valuable as those covered by the preceding prairie treaties. However, the government's understanding of the territories' value changed abruptly in 1896 with geological surveys and the discovery of gold in the Yukon Territory, resulting in a growing recognition of the need for a treaty.

In the summer of 1898, while Ottawa developed plans to hold treaty negotiations the following spring, the first nations of the region became increasingly angry over the influx of miners. As the Ottawa Citizen reported:

There are 500 Indians camped at Fort St. John who refuse to let police and miners go further north until a treaty has been signed with them. They claim that some of their horses have been taken by the miners and are also afraid that the advent of so many men into their country will drive away the fur; hence their desire to stop the travel north.

As Indian Commissioner Forget noted at the time: “no time should be lost in notifying the Indians of the intention of the Government to treat with them next Spring”. Consequently, a treaty commission was sent to negotiate Treaty No. 8, which was signed on June 21, 1899.

The commissioners, in their report following negotiations on Treaty No. 8, recounted the importance of assuring the nations that their traditional modes of life would be respected:

Our chief difficulty was the apprehension that the hunting and fishing privileges were to be curtailed. The provision in the treaty under which ammunition and twine is to be furnished went far in the direction of quieting the fears of the Indians, for they admitted that it would be unreasonable to furnish the means of hunting and fishing if laws were to be enacted which would make hunting and fishing so restricted as to render it impossible to make a livelihood by such pursuits. But over and above the provision, we had to solemnly assure them that only such laws as to hunting and fishing as were in the interest of the Indians and were found necessary in order to protect the fish and fur-bearing animals would be made, and that they would be as free to hunt and fish after the treaty as they would be if they [had] never entered into it ... the Indians were generally averse to being placed on reserves. It would have been impossible to have made a treaty if we had not assured them that there was no intention of confining them to reserves. We had to very clearly explain to them that the provisions for reserves and allotments of land were made for their protection, and to secure to them in perpetuity a fair portion of the land ceded, in the event of settlement advancing.

Further assurances, such as those made by Father Lacombe, special adviser to the commission in 1899, were used to entice first nations into signing the treaty: “Your forest and river life will not be changed by the Treaty, and you will have your annuities, as well, year by year, as long as the sun shines and the earth remains. Therefore I finish my speaking by saying, Accept!”

These promises were also recounted in an affidavit signed by a witness to the negotiations, known locally as Peace River Jim, describing the promises and assurances that were given:

It was only after the Royal Commission had recognized that the demands of the Indians were legitimate, and had solemnly promised that such demands would be granted by the Crown, also, after the Hudson's Bay Company Officials and Free Traders, and the Missionaries, with their Bishops, who had the full confidence of the Indians, had given their word that they could rely fully on the promises made in the name of QUEEN VICTORIA, that the Indians accepted and signed the Treaty, which was to last as long as the grass grew, the river ran, and the sun shone—to an Indian this means FOREVER.

Despite the assurances of the crown's representatives that their traditional economy and mode of life would be protected, almost immediately after the signing of the treaty laws began to be passed restricting the signatory nations' rights to hunt, fish, and trap. Thus, the main intentions driving the first nations' decision to sign Treaty No. 8, and consequently the main solemn promises of the crown, were violated.

First nation signatories recognized and understood the rights provided for within Treaty No. 8. In April 1900, Chief Kinosayoo and his councillors, who represented five of our seven member nations, formally asked Canada to uphold its provisions. Specifically, they requested the surveying of reserves, provision of agricultural implements and ammunition and twine, and other promises, such as education of their membership, and 117 years later, in the fall of 2017, Canada finalized negotiated specific claim settlements with a number of Treaty No. 8 first nations regarding provision of those agricultural benefits.

It should be noted that while this one provision has been settled, the specific claims process has not even begun to address the real issue at the heart of Treaty No. 8, which is the signatories' right to their traditional mode of life. This is because, again, under the Specific Claims Tribunal Act, these rights have been deemed ineligible for submission as a specific claim.

This was not always the case. In 1982's “Outstanding Business: A Native Claims Policy”, under “Specific Claims”, such breaches were eligible for research, submission, negotiation, and resolution. Despite “Outstanding Business” providing more opportunities for first nations to address outstanding legal obligations against the crown, the process was deeply flawed, and a 2006 Senate report entitled “Negotiation or Confrontation: It's Canada's Choice” called once again for an independent tribunal process. This eventually led to the Specific Claims Tribunal Act in 2008.

The act was a step forward in terms of providing an independent adjudication process through the tribunal, but a step backward in eliminating the ability of first nations to deal with the historical breach by the crown of its most important lawful obligation under their treaty.

As a direct result, the federal government's recent stated objectives regarding reconciliation through the specific claims process cannot be fully achieved. The courts have recognized that the treaties represent a solemn and sacred promise between Canada and the signatory nations, and until our nations have a mechanism to address and resolve Canada's outstanding legal obligations, reconciliation, in the complete sense of the word, is simply unattainable.

We respectfully request that the Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs evaluate the act and make recommendations to amend it to address the elimination of paragraph 15(1)(g). To achieve reconciliation and preserve the honour of the crown, treaty first nations must be able to seek redress for outstanding legal obligations of the crown by addressing all solemn and sacred promises made under the treaty, not just some of them.

We obviously welcome questions today. I have provided our contact information in the brief, which we are hoping to submit by end of day tomorrow. It will also include our director's contact information, in case there is anything we can't address today.

[The Chair, Liberal, MaryAnn Mihychuk]

Thank you so much. That was very well presented.

We are now moving to our second group.

Whenever you're ready to start, please go ahead.

[Aluki Kotierk, President, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.]

[Witness speaks in Inuktitut]

My name is Aluki Kotierk. I'm the president of Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. I want to thank you for the invitation to come and make a presentation to you today, and I want to offer some praise. When I walked into the Parliament building this morning, the security officer who was checking me in and making sure my bags were safe said “nakurmiik” as I left, and I thought, wow, that's a great indication that it's becoming a common practice that Inuit come to the Parliament building more frequently.

I'm here as the president of Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., but I'm also here as the co-chair of the Land Claims Agreements Coalition.

In 2003, the modern treaty signatories held a national conference and set up the coalition. We found that many of us had implementation problems with our agreements. We formed the coalition to bring about changes in government policies and practices so that our agreements could be fully implemented.

Of course, each treaty has its own character, and each indigenous party speaks for its own treaty. The coalition does not change that. We are not a formal legal body. We are modern treaty signatories who are working together. We include first nations, Métis, and Inuit modern treaty signatories. Our Inuit members are also members of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, and our first nations members are also members of the Assembly of First Nations.

We have 29 modern treaties extending from Nunatsiavut through Nunavik and James Bay, across Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and down into British Columbia. They cover almost half the land mass of Canada. Some of our members have signed more than one modern treaty. We have 26 members in our coalition. We have two chairs chosen by the members. One represents the first nations, and this has been the Nisga'a, and the other represents Inuit, and that's NTI.

We formed the coalition to pursue changes in the government's approach to implementation. These are both policy changes and organizational changes. Before I get into that, I want to speak a little more specifically about our agreement, the Nunavut agreement, and the challenges we faced in implementation.

After almost two decades of research and negotiation, Inuit signed the Nunavut agreement in 1993, 24 years ago. Ours is the largest land claims agreement in Canada. We have 31,000 Nunavut Inuit. Our agreement redefined our relationship with the Government of Canada. It represented our quest for self-determination and for decolonization.

NTI's mission is Inuit economic, social, and cultural well-being through the implementation of the Nunavut agreement. I would like to speak for a moment on the subject of self-government. I understand that is part of your mandate.

In 1993, when we signed our agreement, federal policy was not to negotiate self-government through a land claims agreement. In fact, self-government, as usually understood in a first nations context, was not our goal. Our goal was to create a new territory with its own public government.

After a long, hard battle, we achieved that, and the federal government agreed to put article 4 in our Nunavut agreement. Nunavut was established six years later. This was not in the federal land claims mandate, and I must give credit to Minister Siddon at that time for being prepared not only to think outside the box but to act outside the box.

Our agreement is made up of 42 articles, and it redefined our relationship with the crown. We don't have time to go through all the articles, but I want to highlight some of the challenges and shortfalls in Canada's performance we've had in the implementation of our agreement.

Our agreement provided for arbitration to resolve disputes as an alternative to going to court, but the two parties, government and NTI, had to agree before arbitration went forward. Anyone who fears a contrary arbitration decision will find it in their own interest to refuse arbitration, if they have that option. Over the years, every time NTI tried to refer a matter to arbitration, the federal government would refuse.

In 2006, frustrated by the federal government's inaction on important points in parts of our agreement, NTI went to court. We started an action for breach of contract, failure to meet fiduciary obligations, and failure to act in a way consistent with the honour of the crown.

In May 2015, we signed an out-of-court settlement agreement. As part of that settlement, the arbitration provisions of our agreement have been changed. Now either we or the crown can refer a matter to arbitration. We have not used the new process, and hopefully we will not have to, but we now have it if we need it.

It would be appropriate for all modern treaty signatories to have effective access to binding arbitration when needed. This is an aspect that this committee could examine further.

A key element of the Government of Canada's responsibilities relates to appropriate consultations with indigenous peoples. This was reconfirmed by the Supreme Court in the recent Clyde River case. I'm sure you're well aware of the details, but I want to highlight a number of things.

The Supreme Court recognized that it is the government's responsibility to ensure that consultation by an administrative tribunal such as the National Energy Board is adequate. In this case, the court decided that there was not adequate consultation with the Clyde River community. No meaningful avenues of participation were provided to the Inuit of Clyde River, for a number of reasons. These include that Inuit had not received participant funding to assist in their preparation and participation in the process. More often than not in Nunavut, we lack access to information and technical means to fully address development proposals. Some form of participant or intervenor funding is critical to our ability to participate meaningfully in such processes.

The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the National Energy Board all have their own participant funding programs. In Nunavut, development proposals are reviewed by the Nunavut Impact Review Board under the Nunavut agreement. It is funded by the federal government and does not have a participant funding program. As a result, we cannot be confident of having the means to participate effectively in assessing important projects affecting the wildlife in our areas.

The federal Nunavut Planning and Project Assessment Act was adopted to implement the Nunavut agreement. Subsection 228(1) states that the Governor in Council may establish such a funding program for Nunavut. So far, this has not been done. NTI has requested that the federal government establish a participant funding program in Nunavut. We are waiting for a response to our proposal.

I want to touch on article 23 of our Nunavut agreement, which deals with Inuit employment in both the federal and the territorial public service. The objective is a representative workforce, which in Nunavut means 85% Inuit employment, yet today Inuit make up only 18% of the senior management level and 27% of the middle management level, with an overall 50% Inuit employment percentage across our public service.

It is now over 21 years since a full set of departmental Inuit employment plans and pre-employment training plans, with hard targets and timelines and all the necessary detail to meet those targets and timelines, were supposed to have been completed. Recently we commissioned a report by PricewaterhouseCoopers on the economic loss that Inuit face from the failure to implement article 23. The study reveals that, at this rate, $1.2 billion in employment income will be lost by Inuit over the next six years, and government costs will be $500 million more than necessary.

I have a copy of this report, which I will provide to the clerk for your reference.

In my view, this file really requires political will and the injection of direct and forceful ministerial intervention. In terms of achieving a representative workforce, not only would that have an economic impact on the lives of Inuit when we have a territory where seven out of 10 children go hungry every night, but it would have an impact on the way in which programs and policies are developed and programs and services are delivered. If we have more Inuit employees, the policies will reflect Inuit ways of understanding and being, and the programs and services will be delivered in Inuktitut—and the probability for that will be much higher.

I understand that I don't have much time, so I'm just going to give a brief listing of some of the other implementation challenges we have.

The federal government has yet to develop a procurement program, which is required under article 24. Also, Inuit impact and benefit agreement negotiations for the heritage rivers have been outstanding for many years. As well, we've been excluded from the aboriginal fisheries strategy, despite our entitlement to benefit from government programs, and Fisheries and Oceans has yet to harmonize the fishing regulations to correspond with the Nunavut agreement.

To go back to the Land Claims Agreements Coalition, I want to state that we have a four-ten declaration, which our members approved in 2006. I'll leave a copy of that for your clerk as well. The key points are that our modern treaties are with the crown, not with Indian Affairs; we need a federal commitment to meet the broad objectives of our agreements, which must not be interpreted narrowly; implementation must be handled by senior officials; and, an independent review body should review implementation.

We would like to see an independent agency. That has not been addressed by the government. We will be emphasizing this more in the future. The Auditor General has assessed implementation of four modern treaties over the last 12 years, and that work has been very much appreciated, but we need to do more of that.

In conclusion, I draw your attention to article 37 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which speaks to the rights of indigenous peoples and the role of states.

Qujannamiik.

[The Chair, Liberal, MaryAnn Mihychuk]

Thank you.

We're going to start a series of questions. First we will go to MP Amos.

[William Amos, Liberal, Pontiac, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses. You both have very strong presentations, which are very much appreciated.

I'd also like to note the presence of what look to be several up-and-coming leaders from Inuit communities. That is very satisfying to see.

Welcome.

I'm going to address my questions to you, Ms. Kotierk, primarily in terms of your role as president of NTI.

The story of non-implementation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement over that period of litigation and prior is disturbing. I'd like to give you the opportunity to describe more about what actually happened.

I want to get into the specifics around how the crown was acting or not acting, and how you think that reflects not just legal posturing but also a lack of respect in terms of the agreement that was signed, the commitments that were made, and the lack of follow-through. I mean, when you get to a point where in excess of $200 million is being agreed upon as a settlement, it's clear that the federal government knew it was in the wrong, but I'm just not sure. I think the ask early on in the litigation was in excess of $1 billion. I'm curious as to how you got to that point. What was the behaviour of the crown's representatives during that process that made it so frustrating?

[Aluki Kotierk]

Qujannamiik.

In terms of the agreement, the Nunavut Agreement was signed in 1993, and on April 30, 1990, the agreement in principle was signed in the community I'm from. I was a 15-year-old girl watching Minister Tom Siddon and the president of NTI, Paul Quassa, signing that agreement in principle.

I can tell you that there was a lot of excitement and hope that it would mean that we would be able to live our lives on our own terms, and whether we made mistakes or not, that at least we would be making our own mistakes. We were going to do it in our own language and in ways that understood who we were. That was the vision of Nunavut. I think that's still the vision of Nunavut, but we have yet to achieve it.

By not implementing the Nunavut agreement and the 42 articles in our Nunavut agreement, we were falling short of the dream that so much time and so many lives had been dedicated to achieving, so out of frustration, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated took the Government of Canada to court because, specifically in terms of article 23, we have yet to receive sufficiently detailed Inuit employment plans that talk about how many positions there are in each department, which would provide a real, concrete plan of how you would get an Inuk to fill the position.

Also, then, it's not enough to have a plan. You need to have the resources to support and implement the plan, and those things have not been forthcoming. Since the 2015 settlement agreement, it was reaffirmed that we were still going to work towards that. We're now in 2017 and we still don't have Inuit employment plans that are sufficiently detailed to satisfy our needs and to give us assurances that Inuit will be employed.

If you don't mind, I'm going to ask Alastair to provide details about the legal aspects.

[Alastair Campbell, Senior Policy Advisor, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.]

I'm not sure of exactly the legal aspects, but there's a sort of general approach that was taken towards the interpretation of the Nunavut Agreement early on. When the Auditor General reviewed DIAND's implementation of it in 2003, he observed that the department tended to look not at the objectives of the agreement, but at the obligations, and in a rather narrow sense.

People focused on, let's say, 14(1)(c)(iii), and interpreted that in relation to their existing government policies and what they were free to do as a result of those policies in carrying out 14(1)(c)(iii), for example. I'm making up the numbers. The problem is that the objectives that are laid out in various places, both in the front piece, in the preamble of the agreement, and then in some of the chapters where there are objectives, tended to get glossed over.

The objective of securing greater Inuit self-reliance, for example, kind of got.... If you're working in a department where you're doing contracting, you don't think about that. I think a lack of oversight was one of the reasons. I think a lack of the ability to go to arbitration, as was pointed out, is another reason. Inuvialuit have or had arbitration; I believe they may have the only modern treaty, before we got it in 2015, to have a provision that allows them to go to arbitration whether or not the government agrees.

From what I'm told, this made the government very careful about doing what they have to do, because they do not want to face arbitration. There was a lack of incentive. If something is put off, it can take a few years, and then it gets put off again, and a person changes and the policy changes, and there's a lack of oversight and direction within the government.

Presumably that has changed a bit with the establishment of the deputy ministers' oversight committee, but this is a long-term problem, and until there's a.... This is a complicated agreement, and there are 30 of them. I don't think there's much government-wide understanding of them.

[The Chair, Liberal, MaryAnn Mihychuk]

That ends your portion of time, Mr. Amos. We're moving on to MP Waugh.

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Thanks to all three of you for coming today.

In article 23, you gave percentages, which are good: 18% senior management and 27% middle management. What are the numbers, though? Let's peel this back. Percentages are fine, because you wanted 85%, but I'm looking at numbers. For 18% of senior management, what number is it? How many is that? For your 27% of middle management, and your 50%, how many people is that? I'm trying to get a perspective on population. What is your population? The goal is 85%, so if you don't mind, how many public servants in that 85% am I looking at for numbers...?

[Aluki Kotierk]

Qujannamiik.

I will be able to provide detailed information in terms of numbers, but in generalities I can talk about the footprint of the territorial government. There are about 3,000 employees for the territorial government, and 50% of that number are Inuit employees. In terms of the federal government that is located within Nunavut, the footprint is much smaller.

I know that from the NTI's perspective we've been very much focused on putting more pressure on the territorial government, because we know that if we're able to do that well, it will have a bigger impact on Inuit lives. That doesn't mean that we're taking the hook away from the federal government, but we know where we need to focus.

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Could you share with the clerk the PricewaterhouseCoopers study? I think we do need to see that. I mean, you did spend some money: there's obviously a concern and you did go to PricewaterhouseCoopers to have a study on that. I think these are pretty good jobs, and I think that's what you're talking about here.

[Aluki Kotierk]

That is exactly what we're talking about. The public service is one of the biggest employers in our territory, so if we're able to do a good job to ensure that Inuit can get public service jobs, not only will it be good for Inuit and their households but, as I said, it will make a big impact on the essential services the public service provides because they will be able to incorporate Inuit ways of being, or Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, in their understanding, as well as being able to use Inuktitut more.

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Yes. Thank you. I know you will share that, so we'll all get a copy that we'll need to look at.

[Aluki Kotierk]

We have a copy that we'll provide to the clerk.

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Thank you very much.

In terms of your land claims agreement being “honoured and fully implemented”, that hasn't occurred, obviously. Do you think it has? On your Land Claims Agreement Coalition, our notes say:

The Coalition's primary objective is to “ensure that comprehensive land claims and associated self-government agreements are respected, honoured, and fully implemented...”.

Have they been?

[Aluki Kotierk]

They have not been. That's the short answer. That was why the Land Claims Agreement Coalition was established: we recognized that our land claims agreements were not being implemented. That was a commonality amongst modern treaties. We came together in 2003 to talk about that and to try to work to get structures and policies in place that would help the federal government move forward in being able to implement.

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Yes.

The mass of this land is half of Canada. I think that's huge. What price do you put on that? When you look at your 29 modern treaties, that's a lot of land we're talking about, and a lot of land that probably 99% of Canadians don't appreciate, if you don't mind me saying that, because we have no knowledge of it, right?

[Aluki Kotierk]

I agree. I totally agree that it's not appreciated enough, but if I may take this liberty, I recognize that there's a large land mass, but I like to focus on the people. I think that not implementing the land claims agreements is having a negative impact on our people. I think that was the whole purpose of trying to achieve land claims: we wanted to make sure that our people were able to have adequate services comparable to those of other Canadians, whether or not they were appreciated by other Canadians.

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Yes, and why wouldn't you? Thank you.

Morgan, we'll go to you. Are you representing Havlik?

[Morgan Chapman]

No. Today it's the Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council TARR program.

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Okay, but as Havlik, as that side—because we saw you in B.C.—you have a lot of clients here that you're dealing with. Maybe you can talk about Lesser Slave Lake. I see Horse Lake here and another seven. How does that all work? Can you break it down for us, if you don't mind? How many is that company representing—let's start there—in Canada or or western Canada?

[Morgan Chapman]

Inside Alberta and British Columbia, we're up to, I think, between 15 and 18 nations. The majority of those take the form of consolidated claims research units or TARR programs. The seven that I am here representing today are part of the Lesser Slave Lake Indian Regional Council, which I was asked by the clerk to come and represent today.

We also contract our research and writing services to the Treaty 8 Tribal Association TARR program in northern B.C., and then we have a couple of independent nations. I don't have a mandate to talk to you about them today.

If that helps...?

[Kevin Waugh, Conservative, Saskatoon—Grasswood, SK]

Yes.

There are differences. You're dealing with Slave Lake and those seven in and B.C. and Alberta. What are the differences between the ones you represent?

[Morgan Chapman]

From my perspective as a researcher, you're obviously going to have different situations in British Columbia with regard to the lands question. When you get into dealing with things like assets, money, and expropriation, those are bit more similar. I would say that dealing with lands issues, because of B.C.'s joining of the confederacy.... They'd been recognized as a province for I believe over 20 years prior to joining Canada, and that creates a certain set of problems when you come to dealing with lands issues, so in Alberta.... I tend to focus more on our Alberta clients when I'm working.